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ABSTRACT
Legislating Against Liberties: Congress and the Constitution in the Aftermath of War
By Harry Blain
Advisor: Susan Woodward
How far can a democracy go to protect itself without jeopardizing the liberties upon which
democracy depends? This dissertation examines why wartime restrictions on civil liberties outlive
their original justifications. Through a comparative historical analysis of five major American
wars, it illustrates the decisive role of the U.S. Congress in preserving these restrictions during
peacetime. This argument challenges the prevailing consensus in the literature, which identifies
wartime executive power as the main threat to postwar freedoms. It also reveals broader narratives
of American constitutional development, including the rise and fall of intrusive congressional
investigations, the decline of sedition legislation since the Second World War, and the growth of
federal subsidies for aggressive local policing since the Vietnam War.
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1. The Most Dangerous Branch
How far can a democracy go to protect itself without jeopardizing the liberties upon which
democracy depends? No one is particularly shocked when democratic governments curtail civil
liberties during wartime. Fighting a war – let alone winning one – is a collective struggle, in which
blind devotion to the rights of the individual can be a recipe for self-destruction. But the cure is
not supposed to outlive the disease. When tools of war seep into times of peace, the fearful prospect
of permanent crisis government – and permanently curbed freedoms – looms. The aftermath of
war is a crucial test for a democracy – a fraught moment when liberties should be revived but could
be damaged beyond repair. These fraught postwar moments are the subject of this dissertation.
Do wartime restrictions on civil liberties tend to outlive their original justifications? If so,
how, why, and under what conditions? I seek answers to these questions through a comparative
historical study of five major American wars: the Civil War, the First World War, the Second
World War, the Vietnam War, and the War on Terror. In each case, I find evidence of lingering
postwar constraints on free expression, due process, and self-government. Martial law outlived the
Civil War, persecution of foreign-born leftists outlived the First World War, government loyalty
purges outlived the Second World War, and congressional support for more aggressive local
policing outlived the Vietnam War. It is hard to say what, if anything, has outlived the War on
Terror because it is hard to say whether the War on Terror is over. What is clear is that most of the
legal framework built in the aftermath of 9/11 remains intact.
What explains these trends? Scholars have generally done a better job of explaining
violations of civil liberties that occur during, rather than after, wars. The hypothesis in the literature
that most explicitly addresses the aftermath of war is institutional. Especially dominant in
American politics and constitutional law scholarship, this hypothesis identifies the executive
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branch as the primary menace to civil liberties after wartime. The logic is straightforward: during
war, lawmakers require “decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch,”1 so they choose to enable
executive leadership. Citizens may grow frustrated with ponderous democratic institutions,
preferring no-nonsense decrees, orders, and proclamations. Executives may promise to wield
extraordinary powers temporarily, only to entrench them indefinitely and to tar critics with
accusations of disloyalty. Perhaps checking and balancing institutions will lack the strength and
the unity to restore normal constitutional arrangements; perhaps new emergencies will consistently
– and conveniently – justify permanent changes to the constitutional landscape.2 Either way, the
expansion of executive power during wartime poses a threat to civil liberties even after the war is
over.
Across U.S. history, I find scant evidence for this executive power hypothesis. Instead, I
find that legislators are decisive in sustaining postwar restrictions on civil liberties. These
legislators are enabled by five categories of institutional powers. First, they can organize and
structure their own institution without external interference.3 They make their own rules, pass their
own resolutions, create their own committees, and determine the qualifications of their own
members. These internal powers have consistently been used to curb civil liberties. After the Civil
War, the exclusion of ex-Confederate representatives and senators, along with the creation of the
Joint Committee on Reconstruction, allowed the Republican Party to establish martial law in the

Alexander Hamilton, “Federalist #70,” in Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist
Papers (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004), 502.
2
These arguments are well summarized in Kim Lane Scheppele, “Exceptions That Prove the Rule: Embedding
Emergency Government in Everyday Constitutional Life,” in Jeffrey K. Tulis and Stephen Macedo (eds.), The
Limits of Constitutional Democracy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 124-154; see also Kim Lane
Scheppele, “Law in a Time of Emergency: States of Exception and the Temptations of 9/11,” University of
Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law, 6 (2003-4): 1001-1075. I elaborate on these arguments below.
3
See Josh Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution: Legislative Authority and the Separation of Powers (New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press, 2017), 232-302, which describes congressional powers of “internal discipline” and “cameral
rule-making.”
1

2

former Confederacy despite the objections of the President. After the First World War and the
Second World War, special investigating committees initiated highly repressive “Red Scares.”
After the Vietnam War, permanent intelligence committees in each house of Congress became
permanent allies of a national security bureaucracy that was deeply implicated in intrusive
surveillance practices and harassment of political dissidents. These committees behaved similarly
after 9/11.
Second, legislators can use their powers over the judiciary to insulate attacks on civil
liberties from judicial review. While the appointment and confirmation of federal judges is a
combined executive-legislative duty, Congress is vested with the constitutional authority to alter
the appellate jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court and to create tribunals inferior to the
Supreme Court where most federal cases are heard.4 After the Civil War, legislators flexed both
these muscles to stop the judiciary from obstructing martial law in the former Confederacy. After
the Second World War, legislators kept the Supreme Court out of civil liberties disputes by
threatening to circumscribe its jurisdiction. After the Vietnam War, a special national security
court – the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court – was created by Congress to legalize electronic
surveillance practices that the Supreme Court had previously questioned. After 9/11, Congress
again threatened the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction – this time over habeas corpus petitions from
Guantanamo Bay detainees. There was no need to bully the courts after the First World War
because the main method of that “Red Scare” was deportation, and the U.S. judiciary has a long
tradition of deferring to the elected branches in this area.5

4

United States Constitution, Article III, Section 2, Clause 2; Article I, Section 8, Clause 9; Article III, Section 1.
As I will discuss further below, the detention or deportation of non-citizens is not always a violation of civil
liberties, but I identify cases and conditions (including Guantanamo and the Red Scare) where the rights that noncitizens enjoy under the Constitution were violated.
5
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Third, legislators can find allies in the executive branch even when the president is hostile
to Congress: U.S. Army generals after the Civil War, the Department of Justice after the First
World War, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) after the Second World War, and the
national security bureaucracy in the post-Vietnam and War on Terror eras. As a result, although
legislators do not have the constitutional authority to execute the law, they are able to work with
executive branch officials who act on their behalf. The supposedly unitary and hierarchical
executive branch is, it turns out, a “they,” not an “it.”6 Legislators are further aided by the fact that
they have formal constitutional powers over the executive branch, including impeachment, the
power to create, monitor, and restructure the federal bureaucracy, control of the federal purse
strings, and the power to confirm or deny executive branch nominees.7 Though such powers often
lie dormant, a credible threat to deploy them can pressure reluctant executive officials into actions
that violate civil liberties. The chapters that follow provide several examples of this leverage at
work, including in driving the post-WWI Palmer Raids, the Truman Administration’s loyalty
program for federal employees, and the Lyndon Johnson Administration’s “War on Crime.”
Fourth, legislators can influence civil liberties through their powers over state and local
government. Because all powers that are not assigned elsewhere in or prohibited by the
Constitution are reserved to the states, Congress cannot simply “commandeer” state officials to

Kenneth A. Shepsle, “Congress is a ‘They,’ not an ‘It’: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron,” International Review of
Law and Economics 12, no. 2 (1992): 239-256.
7
Powers over executive “personnel” and the “purse” are emphasized in Chafetz, Congress's Constitution, 45-152.
Congressional authority over the bureaucracy has been investigated at length in Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G.
Noll, and Barry R. Weingast, “Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control,” Journal of Law,
Economics, & Organization 3, no. 2 (1987): 243-277; Mathew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz,
“Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms,” American Journal of Political
Science (1984): 165-179; Roderick D. Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins, The Logic of Delegation (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1991); Jason A. McDonald, “Limitation Riders and Congressional Influence Over
Bureaucratic Policy Decisions,” American Political Science Review 104, no. 4 (2010): 766-782.
6
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implement federal policy.8 Instead, Congress primarily influences state actions through financial
levers: lose your highway funding if you do not raise the drinking age, lose your education funding
if you do not desegregate your schools, lose your Medicaid funding if you do not expand coverage.9
In recent years, civil libertarians have voiced less concern about funding with strings attached than
they have about the federal government’s role in subsidizing local police militarization through
financial support and the supply of surplus military equipment.10 My fifth chapter traces this
development back to the Vietnam War, when Congress started aiding local police forces as part of
the War on Crime. My sixth chapter underlines how this process accelerated after 9/11.
Finally, Congress can pass overtly repressive statutes, such as sedition and internal security
laws. These laws periodically appear in the coming chapters: the 1871 Ku Klux Klan Act, which
authorized the suspension of habeas corpus in regions plagued by Klan terrorism; the 1918
Sedition Act, which criminalized criticism of the Wilson Administration’s war effort; or the 1950
McCarran Act, which forced so-called “subversive organizations” to register with the attorney
general, and authorized mass internment in the event of a national emergency. While these laws
appear menacing on paper, I demonstrate how they are regularly undermined by executive branch
non-enforcement, and how they have faded into obscurity since the Vietnam War, in large part
because the Supreme Court undermined their constitutionality in the 1950s and 1960s. I further
discuss this apparent death of sedition legislation in Chapters 5, 6, and 7.

This is generally referred to as the state “police power.” See, especially, Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898
(1997).
9
The Supreme Court upheld the highway funding measure in South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987), but it
struck down as unduly coercive the Medicaid measure in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,
567 U.S. 519 (2012). The line between reasonable conditionality and coercion is not obvious, but some amount of
conditionality is clearly constitutional.
10
For example, Radley Balko, Rise of the Warrior Cop: The Militarization of America's Police Forces (New York:
Public Affairs, 2013).
8
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Table 1.1: Five Enablers of Congress
Category of
congressional power
Powers over itself

Powers over the
executive
Powers over the
judiciary

Powers over state and
local government
Repressive legislation

Description

Presence in case studies

The power to structure debates,
committees, and membership in
each chamber
The power to deny funding, and
to confirm, oversee, impeach,
and remove executive officers
The power to alter the Supreme
Court’s appellate jurisdiction and
create tribunals inferior to the
Supreme Court
The power to influence state and
local policies through federal
funding
The power to pass repressive
laws that are binding on all
citizens and residents

All cases

All cases

All cases except the First World
War

The Vietnam War and the War on
Terror
All cases except the Vietnam War
and the War on Terror

Legislators thus have at their disposal a variety of institutional tools that can enable the
curtailment of civil liberties. However, these tools still run up against constraints. President
Andrew Johnson obstructed martial law in the former Confederacy during Reconstruction,
Assistant Labor Secretary Louis Post cancelled thousands of deportation warrants after the First
World War, President Truman wielded a wide variety of tools to counter congressional red-baiters
after the Second World War, and President Obama defied Congress to reduce the population of
Guantanamo, protect the civil liberties of undocumented immigrants, and limit local police
militarization. The documentary record does not always reveal the motivations of these executive
officials. However, internal executive branch documents point to four possible factors that have
applied at different moments. First, in each of my case studies, Congress has come under the
control of a party opposed to the president in the aftermath of war, and presidents have defended
civil liberties from their partisan rivals in Congress. Second, the internal procedures of the

6

executive branch have obstructed the enforcement of repressive legislation. Third, executive
officials have responded more rapidly than Congress to public and judicial advocacy for civil
liberties, especially in the aftermath of the First World War and the Vietnam War. Fourth,
executive officials have taken principled stands of their own. This was particularly true of Harry
Truman after the Second World War. In more limited and indirect ways, the judiciary has also
protected civil liberties, as when the Supreme Court cautiously called into question the legality of
electronic surveillance practices in the latter years of the Vietnam War.
Why do legislators seek to curtail civil liberties in the first place? In general terms, I argue
that wartime restrictions on civil liberties help legislators achieve a variety of political objectives.11
Martial law in the former Confederacy was indispensable for Reconstruction after the Civil War.
Harsh wartime immigration laws were valuable for conservative legislators who wanted to crush
left-wing political movements after the First World War. The invasive wartime investigations
conducted by the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) provided a perfect stick with
which conservative legislators could beat labor unions, peace activists, and liberal government
officials after the Second World War. The domestic social unrest generated by the Vietnam War
gave “tough-on-crime” legislators the opportunity to initiate generous federal financial support for
local policing – a policy goal that would not be given up when the war ended. The War on Terror
gave congressional Republicans useful tools for undermining the Obama Administration, such as
the Guantanamo Bay detention regime and a Department of Homeland Security dedicated to harsh

The idea of “multiple motivations” for legislators is prominent in Eric Schickler, Disjointed Pluralism:
Institutional Innovation and the Development of the US Congress (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
2001), especially 189-248. On earlier debates surrounding the motivations of legislators, see David Mayhew,
Congress: The Electoral Connection (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974); Richard Fenno, Home Style: House
Members in Their Districts (New York: Little, Brown, and Co., 1978). On the application of these concepts outside
the United States, see Steven S. Smith and Thomas F. Remington, The Politics of Institutional Choice: The
Formation of the Russian State Duma (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001), 15-22.
11
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deportation policies. In various ways, legislators have benefited from wartime restrictions on civil
liberties, hence why they have attempted to sustain them.
Nevertheless, some legislators have curtailed civil liberties more aggressively than others.
Conservative legislators, who dominated Congress after the World Wars and after the first decade
of the War on Terror, sustained and sometimes expanded wartime violations of due process and
free expression. After the World Wars, conservative legislators organized as a cross-party coalition
of Republicans and Southern Democrats determined to reverse what they saw as the leftward shift
of American society under liberal wartime presidents. Their control of Congress stemmed from
successful campaigns against these presidents in the 1918 and 1946 midterm elections, but their
influence was magnified by the absence of electoral competition in the South, which entrenched a
powerful conservative faction within the Democratic Party.12 Particularly after the Second World
War, this faction, and its allies in the Republican Party, used their control over HUAC to
continually harass the American left even after the 1948 and 1950 elections cut away at the
conservative triumph of 1946. In short, although cross-party conservative coalitions received
electoral support, they did not embody a tide of repressive public opinion. Their strength in
Congress was greatly inflated.
Conservatives were concentrated in the Republican Party during the War on Terror. Like
the cross-party conservative coalitions that controlled Congress after the World Wars, their
influence in Congress was amplified by the internal structures of the institution. They leveraged
the Senate filibuster to obstruct Guantanamo closure in 2009 and 2010 when Democrats were in
the congressional majority. Later, the far-right fringe of the Republican caucus compensated for
its relatively small numbers by threatening to derail the party’s legislative agenda. This pushed the

12

Generally, see Daniel DiSalvo, Engines of Change: Party Factions in American Politics, 1868-2010 (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2012), 164-169.
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party leadership into increasingly hostile policy positions towards minority groups and
undocumented immigrants. Overall, across my case studies, conservative legislators have
damaged civil liberties not because they represent a “tyranny of the majority,” but because they
successfully exploited the powers and structures of Congress.
On the other hand, despite placing legally dubious wartime surveillance practices on stable
legal footing through the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), the liberal legislators
who controlled Congress after the Vietnam War did not seek to continue or accelerate the
repressive policies that the federal government had inflicted on political dissidents during the war.
In an even starker contrast to the postwar conservative coalitions, the coalition of “Radical” and
“Moderate” Republicans who controlled Congress after the Civil War expanded civil liberties with
the aid of wartime constitutional powers.13 The continuation of martial law in the former
Confederacy represented a sharp break from the rights to self-rule enjoyed by white Southerners,
but this extraordinary legal regime was only sustained until the ex-Confederate states ratified the
Fourteenth Amendment and extended the franchise to black males. The Fourteenth Amendment,
in particular, became the cornerstone of American civil liberties, binding state governments to the
Bill of Rights and providing due process protections to citizens and non-citizens alike. While civil
liberties were temporarily suspended for those who opposed Reconstruction, they were
permanently enlarged for everyone else. Thus, among my cases, the aftermath of the Civil War is
distinctive. In my conclusion, I suggest that this distinctiveness is related to the nature of the war
itself, which generated revolutionary social and political processes unlike any of the other wars
discussed in this dissertation.

In Chapter 2, I will elaborate more on what “Radical” and “Moderate” meant. I maintain quotations marks for
each group because these were not necessarily the labels that they gave to themselves.
13
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My arguments may be compatible with others in the literature about the deeper social,
political, and economic forces that shape outcomes for civil liberties in democracies, including
racism, hostility toward the labor movement, and reactions to dramatic international events. My
goal is not to reject these arguments, but to foreground something that they have largely
overlooked: legislative behavior. The next section will examine this blind spot in the literature.
From there, I will explain my methodology and rationale for testing my argument against its
primary competitor, the executive power hypothesis. I will conclude the chapter by defining and
operationalizing the crucial concepts of war, peace, and civil liberties.
Literature Review
Scholars of civil liberties have had surprisingly little to say about legislatures. They have said
plenty about executives. Concern with emergency executive powers can be traced at least as far
back as Machiavelli’s Discourses on the Roman Republic.14 The Discourses inspired Clinton
Rossiter’s 1948 comparative study of “Crisis Government in the Modern Democracies,” which
applied Machiavelli’s concept of “constitutional dictatorship” to the 20th Century. Rossiter argued
that national crises tend to increase executive power in two ways. Executives can act unilaterally
and dare legislatures to defy them, as Abraham Lincoln did in the early weeks of the U.S. Civil
War; or legislatures can delegate emergency powers to the executive. Often, there will be a
combination of unilateralism and delegation. Whatever the precise process, Rossiter agreed with
James Madison’s conclusion (before he was president) that “war… is the true nurse of executive
aggrandizement.”15 For Rossiter, the only institution capable of checking this “aggrandizement,”

See Marc De Wilde, “Why Dictatorial Authority Did Good, and not Harm, to the Roman Republic: Dictatorship
and Constitutional Change in Machiavelli,” Ratio Juris 31, no. 1 (2018): 86-99.
15
“Helvidius IV,” in Alexander Hamilton and James Madison, The Pacificus-Helvidius Debates of 1793–1794:
Toward the Completion of the American Founding (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2007), 87.
14
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and averting long-term constitutional degeneration under cover of crisis, was a robust and alert
legislature.16
Rossiter was optimistic that “strong government can be democratic government” and that
“dictatorship can be constitutional.”17 Yet in the second half of the 20th Century, Rossiter’s
optimism was challenged by scholars focused on the rise of “terrorism.” In the United Kingdom,
Paddy Hillyard and Clive Walker recounted how the British government responded to the
“Troubles” in Northern Ireland by adopting various tools of emergency rule, including military
intervention in 1969, the Falls Curfew in 1970, internment without trial in 1971, and the dissolution
of the Northern Irish Parliament in 1972. Over the long-term, Hillyard and Walker demonstrated,
the most substantial threat to the idea of time-bound “constitutional dictatorship” in Britain was
the 1974 Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, which granted the Home Secretary
unprecedented powers of arrest, detention, and proscription of “terrorist” organizations. Despite
its ostensibly “temporary” character, Parliament habitually renewed the Prevention of Terrorism
Act every year, until it was replaced in 2000 by the permanent Terrorism Act.18 Other scholars
documented similar conflicts between civil liberties and counter-terrorism across European
democracies, including Kurt Groenewald’s study of the West German government’s campaign
against the Red Army Faction from 1970-1990 and Peter Chalk’s comparative study of the Spanish

16

Clinton Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship: Crisis Government in the Modern Democracies (New Brunswick,
NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1948). See also Frederick Mundell Watkins, The Failure of Constitutional Emergency
Powers Under the German Republic (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1939).
17
Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship, 314.
18
See, especially, Paddy Hillyard, Suspect Community: People’s Experience of the Prevention of Terrorism Acts in
Britain (London: Pluto Press in association with Liberty, 1993); Joe Sim and Philip A. Thomas, “The Prevention of
Terrorism Act: Normalising the Politics of Repression,” Journal of Law and Society 10, no. 1 (1983): 71-84; Clive
Walker, The Prevention of Terrorism in British Law (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992); Colin
Warbrick, “The European Convention on Human Rights and the Prevention of Terrorism,” International &
Comparative Law Quarterly 32, no. 1 (1983): 82-119. On the permanent Terrorism Act, see Conor Gearty, “11
September 2001, Counter‐terrorism, and the Human Rights Act,” Journal of Law and Society 32, no. 1 (2005): 1833.
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government’s “dirty war” against Euskadi Ta Askatasuna in the Basque country from 1983-1987
and the Italian government’s covert battle against the Red Brigades from 1969-1974.19
Collectively, these scholars observed how emergency delegations to the executive that are
sold as “temporary” can permanently curtail civil liberties. Since September 11, 2001, scholars of
civil liberties in democracies have had no difficulty finding additional evidence to support this
argument, highlighting the continual renewal of counter-terrorism statutes and the normalization
of restrictions on civil liberties as evidence of flaws in the theory of temporary emergency
powers.20 A notable but empirically vague assessment comes from Giorgio Agamben’s State of
Exception, which frames the War on Terror as only the most recent example of a persistent fact:
once legislatures hand over power to presidents or prime ministers, they do not get it back.21 With
greater specificity, Kim Lane Scheppele highlights how a variety of governments have enacted a
common “Emergency Script,” beginning with “executive centralization,” followed by restrictions
on free speech and due process, excessive state secrecy, state-sponsored violence, and, eventually,
the normalization of emergency government.22 While Scheppele suggests that “the other branches

Peter Chalk, “The Response to Terrorism as a Threat to Liberal Democracy,” Australian Journal of Politics &
History 44, no. 3 (1998): 373-388; Kurt Groenewold, “The German Federal Republic's Response and Civil
Liberties,” Terrorism and Political Violence 4, no. 4 (1992): 136-150. This issue of Terrorism and Political
Violence was dedicated to “Western Responses to Terrorism,” and included further commentary on Spain. See
Fernando Jimenez, “Spain: The Terrorist Challenge and the Government’s Response,” Terrorism and Political
Violence 4, no. 4 (1992): 110-130.
20
Bruce A. Ackerman, Before the Next Attack: Preserving Civil Liberties in an Age of Terrorism (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2006); Ryan Alford, Permanent State of Emergency: Unchecked Executive Power and the Demise
of the Rule of Law (Montreal: McGill-Queen's Press-MQUP, 2017); Karen J. Greenberg, Rogue Justice: The Making
of the Security State (New York: Random House, 2016); Jane Mayer, The Dark Side: The Inside Story of How the
War on Terror Turned Into a War on American Ideals (New York: Doubleday, 2008); Glenn Greenwald, No Place
to Hide: Edward Snowden, the NSA, and the U.S. Surveillance State (New York: Macmillan, 2014); Louis
Fisher, The Constitution and 9/11: Recurring Threats to America's Freedoms (Lawrence, KS: University Press of
Kansas, 2008); Emily Berman, “The Paradox of Counterterrorism Sunset Provisions,” Fordham Law Review, 81
(2012): 1777-1833; Susan N. Herman, Taking Liberties: The War on Terror and the Erosion of American
Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); Christopher J. Coyne and Abigail R. Hall. Tyranny Comes
Home: The Domestic Fate of US Militarism (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2018).
21
Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception, Translated by Kevin Attell (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).
On Agamben’s limited empirical contributions, see Stephen Humphreys, “Legalizing Lawlessness: On Giorgio
Agamben’s State of Exception,” European Journal of International Law 17, no. 3 (2006): 677-687.
22
Scheppele, “Exceptions That Prove the Rule”; Scheppele, “Law in a Time of Emergency.”
19
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of government [often] collude in their own marginalization,”23 Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson
raise the specter of “Presidential Ponzi Schemes,” when presidents seek “to convert the felt sense
of crisis into a durable advantage,” continually finding “new ways of stoking the public’s sense of
urgency to maintain their [emergency] mandate.”24
“Presidential Ponzi Schemes” seemed more than a speculative concern after the election of
Donald Trump to the U.S. presidency in 2016. In their popular 2018 book, How to Save a
Constitutional Democracy, Aziz Huq and Tom Ginsburg bemoaned how “liberals and
conservatives alike have been captivated by the prospect of a decisive president capable of slicing
through the Gordian knot of partisan disagreement to achieve great things for the people.” While
agreeing that “deadlock is undesirable,” Huq and Ginsburg emphasized the need for greater
“bureaucratic autonomy” within the executive branch to counteract Trump-like personal crusades
against FBI directors, attorneys general, and special counsels.25 Similar proposals emerged in Bob
Bauer and Jack Goldsmith’s After Trump, and each of the teams of scholars who participated in
the National Constitution Center’s post-Trump constitution drafting project – libertarian,
progressive, and conservative – all called for additional constraints on the executive branch.26
Many of these scholars, particularly Huq and Ginsburg, see Trump’s flirtation with
authoritarianism as the predictable product of an “unchecked and unbalanced” executive that has

Scheppele, “Exceptions that Prove the Rule,” 137.
Sanford Levinson and Jack M. Balkin, “Constitutional Dictatorship: Its Dangers and Its Design,” Minnesota Law
Review 94 (2009): 1848. The specter of “contrived crises” is also investigated in Chris Edelson, Emergency
Presidential Power: From the Drafting of the Constitution to the War on Terror (Madison, WI: University of
Wisconsin Press, 2013).
25
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fattened itself on crisis government.27 Indeed, scholars of American politics have long feared the
impact of endless (undeclared) war on the separation of powers and civil liberties. For Michael
Glennon, the dominant executive branch that has emerged and become permanent since the Second
World War “threaten(s) civil liberties and personal freedom in ways never seen before in the
United States.”28 For Louis Fisher, “presidents have pushed the limits of executive power under
the theory that an activist agenda inevitably promotes the nation’s interest,” but this “concentration
of power in the Executive always puts at risk the Constitution and individual rights and liberties.”29
For Laura Donohue, “the drive to increase [executive] power” during wartime “is a function of the
office, not of the political affiliation of those in power.” After over a half a century of this “drive,”
“expanded executive authority” – especially in the realm of surveillance – has become a menace
to “popular dissent” and a mechanism of “social control.”30
Several scholars have critiqued these arguments. Scholars of the U.S. presidency have cast
doubt on the idea that war expands executive power.31 William Howell, who extensively
catalogued and evaluated “the politics of direct presidential action” in his 2003 study Power
Without Persuasion, argues that Congress and the courts may initially defer to the executive during
wartime, but that these checking and balancing institutions often become more assertive as wars
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drag on.32 Andrew Polsky and Eric Schickler have found evidence of this legislative assertiveness
during the era of ostensibly imperial presidents, particularly in the twilight and aftermath of the
Vietnam War, when Congress enacted the 1973 War Powers Resolution and other landmark
checks on the executive.33 By 2009, Benjamin Wittes also saw evidence in the United States of
“the waning over time of society’s willingness to tolerate unrestrained executive leadership,”
during the War on Terror, which enabled “the imposition of legal rules” by “the courts and
Congress.”34
Other scholars see no reason to believe that a strong executive inherently threatens civil
liberties, let alone democracy itself. Eric Posner and Adrian Vermuele argue that a presidency
“unbound” from the other branches of government will still be “constrained by the shifting tides
of mass opinion.”35 An energetic executive may well be the surest protector of rights and liberties,
they suggest, because it is led by the only politician with a national constituency, who can be held
personally accountable for the actions of his subordinates. This is the central tenet of the “unitary
executive” theory, which sees executive centralization under presidential leadership as a central
pillar of American democracy.36
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Comparative scholars have also debated the extent to which executive power threatens civil
liberties. Comparative studies of “democratic backsliding” have warned about the dangers posed
by “executive aggrandizement” under cover of crisis. This “aggrandizement” involves the
incremental marginalization of courts and legislatures, often with popular or plebiscitary approval.
“Aggrandizement” is distinguished from blunt power grabs, when executives simply dissolve
legislatures or ignore courts and decide to rule by decree. On its face, the slow pace of
“aggrandizement” might allow democratic institutions to regroup and resist their marginalization.
However, aggrandizement might also be hard to detect – even in supposedly stable democracies –
enabling what Tarunabh Khaitan calls “the killing of a Constitution by a thousand cuts.” 37
Arguments such as these draw heavily on Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan’s long-standing warnings
about the tendency of “presidential democracies” to fall prey to “a single leader” who “enjoys, or
thinks he or she enjoys, a ‘democratic’ legitimacy that allows him or her to ignore, dismiss, or alter
other institutions.”38
The dependent variable in these comparative studies is democracy, whereas my dependent
variable is civil liberties. The two are not the same. Nevertheless, scholars of democracy and
democratic backsliding recognize that any meaningful conception of democracy must involve civil
liberties – hence why almost every comparative study of democracy includes civil liberties either
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as indicators of democratic inclusion, components of a definition of democracy, or even as primary
goals of democracy.39 An erosion of civil liberties may be an early warning sign of democratic
backsliding – or, perhaps, an early symptom of it. At a minimum, an erosion of civil liberties can
undermine core promises of democracy: that members of the polity will be able to speak and
associate freely, organize politically without state repression, and defend themselves vigorously if
they are accused of violating the law. If “executive aggrandizement” is a danger to democracy, it
is surely also a danger to civil liberties.
Other comparativists are not convinced by this logic. José Antonio Cheibub has argued that
the supposed dangers of “presidential democracies” are exaggerated by selection effects, because
presidential systems have been disproportionately concentrated in countries and regions where the
prospects for democratic consolidation were already bleak.40 Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt
argue that while “would-be autocrats often use economic crises, natural disasters, and especially
security threats—wars, armed insurgencies, or terrorist attacks—to justify antidemocratic
measures… Legislatures may also overindulge their constitutional prerogatives.” Levitsky and
Ziblatt go on to describe cynical impeachment processes in Latin America, which have triggered
spiraling attacks on the democratic “guardrails” of “mutual toleration and institutional
forbearance.”41 The most significant recent example of this was Dilma Rousseff’s impeachment
in Brazil – which came at the hands of self-serving rightwing legislators, many of whom cast their
votes as tributes to the country’s former military dictatorship.42
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Legislative “overindulgence” was also a primary fear of the framers of the U.S.
Constitution, who repeatedly stressed the dangers of “legislative tyranny” to their new republican
regime and created an independent executive to counter this. As Gouverneur Morris put it, “One
great object of the Executive is, to controul the Legislature.” Morris worried that “[t]he Legislature
will continually seek to aggrandize and perpetuate themselves; and will seize those critical
moments produced by war, invasion, or convulsion, for that purpose.” As a result, “the Executive
magistrate should be the guardian of the people, even of the lower classes, against legislative
tyranny; against the great and the wealthy, who, in the course of things will necessarily compose
the legislative body.” 43 James Madison also wanted the executive to check the legislature, though
his fears of “legislative tyranny” did not carry Morris’s populist overtones.44 Either way, Congress,
not the executive – and certainly not the judiciary – was “the most dangerous branch” in the eyes
of the framers.45 After all, Congress was in the business of law making. The executive and the
judiciary were confined to law execution and interpretation.
Scholars familiar with the career of Senator Joseph McCarthy would not find “legislative
tyranny” to be a far-fetched concept. A recent biography by Larry Tye describes how McCarthy’s
combination of luck, ruthlessness, opportunism, and rough charm made the heavy-drinking
Wisconsinite one of the greatest demagogues in the history of the United States. In his antiCommunist crusade that began in February 1950, McCarthy hounded more than one person to
suicide, many more to severe trauma, and more still to miserable unemployment and ostracism.
Tye hesitates to settle on a number for the McCarthy “body count,” but it was surely high in both
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personal costs, and in costs to the institutions that McCarthy attacked, especially the State
Department.46 Other historians have addressed the wider phenomenon of “McCarthyism,”
exploring the politics of red-baiting in the United States both before and after the career of the
Wisconsin senator.47
Aside from the recounting of historical examples such as the life and legacy of Senator
McCarthy, scholars of American and comparative politics have generally identified three ways
that legislatures can damage civil liberties. The first is excessive delegation of emergency power
to the executive branch. As described above, this is common during wartime, because legislators
recognize the need for “decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch” – attributes that the executive has
in abundance. Especially since the Second World War, however, Congress has permanently given
to the executive what Bruce Ackerman calls “disorganized, but massive grants of substantive
authority to declare emergencies” on issues ranging from workplace health and safety and
environmental regulation to economic sanctions of foreign nations and border security.48 Not all
of these emergency powers threaten civil liberties, but the potential for abuse is obvious. Indeed,
as the liberal Ackerman and several more conservative legal scholars have underlined, many of
the most infamous abuses of civil liberties – such as Japanese-American internment – have been
authorized by emergency legislative delegation.49 While the executive can be blamed for abusing
emergency authority, Congress can be blamed for creating that authority and failing to monitor it.
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The second, and related, way that scholars have identified legislative complicity in
restrictions on civil liberties is through inadequate oversight of executive agencies. Michael
Glennon has made this point most forcefully in the U.S. context, arguing that Congress has been
so inept at oversight of the national security bureaucracy that it has inadvertently created a system
of “Double Government,” in which the presidency, the Congress, and the judiciary pretend to
govern, while the real rulers are unaccountable spy chiefs and generals.50 In a similar vein, Loch
Johnson and Amy Zegart have documented the reluctance of legislators to conduct meaningful
oversight of the nation’s intelligence agencies because it will only bring them minimal or
negligible electoral payoffs.51 Poor oversight, like excessive delegation, does not inevitably
threaten civil liberties. But agencies that are allowed to operate in the dark have a long track record
of intrusive surveillance practices, infiltration of social movements, and over-policing of dissent.52
By turning a blind eye to these practices, Congress bears responsibility for them.
Finally, scholars have identified legislative gridlock as a possible threat to civil liberties.
Gridlock, they argue, paralyzes the political system, and this empowers authoritarian populists
who promise to “drain the swamp” of feckless, corrupt, and inefficient lawmakers. While some
legislators resist populist challenges to their authority, others embrace these challenges. Partisan
polarization exacerbates these problems, as legislators value their partisan identity over their
institutional responsibilities. Hence, the dynamic described by Kim Lane Scheppele, in which
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legislators “collude in their own marginalization.”53 Scholars of democratic backsliding have
increasingly argued that such legislative degeneration is afflicting constitutional democracies,
including the United States, laying the foundation for future attacks on civil liberties and
democracy itself.54
In these accounts, the legislative threat to civil liberties is indirect and a consequence of
inaction or abdication. In my account, the threat is more direct. Damage is done not just through
excessive delegation to the executive branch, inadequate oversight, or gridlock, but through the
constitutional powers of the legislature to make its own rules, structure the executive branch,
coerce the judiciary, influence state and local governments, and pass repressive legislation. With
these tools at its disposal, the U.S. Congress has been a valuable institutional vehicle for legislators
who are eager to exploit and sustain wartime restrictions on civil liberties.
Congress, in this sense, is more of a mechanism than a cause. The deeper causes of the
campaigns against civil liberties that I document in the following chapters have already been
examined by various scholars. I follow Robert Justin Goldstein, Alan Wolfe, and others in
illuminating persistent efforts by federal and state governments to crush social movements during
and after major American wars.55 I follow James Gibson in exploring the popular and elite
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foundations of repressive government policies in the United States.56 I follow David Cole,
Christian Davenport, and others in demonstrating how restrictions on civil liberties are often
directed at racial minorities.57 I do not intend to disprove the arguments of these scholars, but to
enrich them with a fuller understanding of how national political institutions shape outcomes for
civil liberties.
Methodology
The main argument that I challenge traces postwar restrictions on civil liberties to wartime
executive aggrandizement. I engage with this argument because it makes clear claims about
postwar restrictions on civil liberties, and because it has gained significant traction among scholars
of American and comparative politics. Each of my chapters deploys a methodology of diagnostic
process tracing.58 In other words, I am first identifying the presence or absence of my dependent
variable: are civil liberties curtailed after war? Then, I am asking to what degree they are curtailed
and by whom.
Heeding Ian Lustick’s warning against over-reliance on secondary sources in historically
grounded political science,59 I build my claims on an evidentiary foundation of primary sources,
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especially the Congressional Record, transcripts from congressional hearings, opinions from the
Supreme Court and federal appellate courts, FBI records, the archives of the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU), and the personal and official papers of U.S. presidents. I use these
sources to illuminate postwar restrictions on civil liberties, the executive or legislative origins of
these restrictions, and the institutional tools that enabled them. Secondary sources assist in this
undertaking.
Because I am focusing on the United States, I draw my definition of “civil liberties” from
the U.S. Bill of Rights. The First Amendment guarantees freedoms of expression that are essential
to any democracy. For convenience, I fold the many criminal procedure protections of the Bill of
Rights – such as trial by jury, the privilege against self-incrimination, and the right to confront and
cross-examine accusers – under the general banner of “due process,” and I infer “privacy” from
the Fourth Amendment’s protections against unreasonable searches and seizures.60 I include these
liberties, along with the Eighth Amendment’s protection against cruel and unusual punishments,
because they are widely regarded, across the world, as cornerstones of anything resembling a
constitutional democracy.61 I exclude the right to keep and bear arms not because I think this is a
second-class liberty, but because it lacks international recognition. The Tenth Amendment’s
protection for state governments is excluded for similar reasons.
I do not confine the scope of civil liberties to citizens of the polity. The United States
Supreme Court has said as much in its interpretations of the “due process” and “equal protection”
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, applying these clauses to citizens and non-citizens alike.62
I am aware that the existence of a constitutional right to privacy is hotly contested. I only use the word “privacy”
because it is less clunky than saying “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
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Courts have debated what this means in practice. I agree with their basic conclusion that the U.S.
government is not violating civil liberties by deporting a non-citizen, but I side with more liberal
judicial opinion in seeing a problem for civil liberties if that deportation is retaliation for political
opinions, if the process leading to that deportation is flagrantly unfair, or if the conditions imposed
on deportable individuals are inhuman and degrading. Hence why I believe – and will further
demonstrate in Chapter 6 – that the harsh deportation regime created by the Department of
Homeland Security after 9/11 has violated civil liberties. Similarly, while it is not necessarily a
violation of civil liberties to subject a non-citizen to military detention, when such detention is
indefinite and is on U.S. soil – as in the case of Guantanamo Bay, which is de facto if not de jure
U.S. territory – civil liberties are implicated. The Supreme Court’s recognition of habeas corpus
petitions from Guantanamo underscores the fact that the territory is not a constitution-free zone.63
Arguably, the same principle should apply to other U.S. military bases and Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) sites across the world, however prevailing definitions of civil liberties involve how
governments treat people within their own territory. I would thus describe the global U.S. detention
regime as implicating human rights rather than civil liberties.
Drawing on the work of Conor Gearty, I also include in my conception of civil liberties an
implicit right to self-government. Civil liberties can exist without democracy, but if a society that
has enjoyed the right to elect its own representatives has this right curtailed by the state, even a
narrow idea of “negative liberty” – freedom from undue governmental constraints – is violated.64
Therefore, I define the U.S. military’s control over the civilian governments of the former
Confederacy after the Civil War as a suspension of civil liberties. As the next chapter will illustrate,
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however, these liberties were suspended in order to expand the Bill of Rights across the entire
nation.
In tracing the institutional origins of restrictions on civil liberties, I must navigate problems
associated with classifying legislative and executive actions. A law is seemingly a legislative
action, but it may be heavily shaped by executive pressure. Likewise, an executive order is
seemingly an executive action, but it may be heavily shaped by legislative pressure. Thus, I do not
attempt to place the surface-level outputs of Congress and the executive into discrete boxes. This
approach allows me to identify the underappreciated legislative origins of several postwar
violations of civil liberties that scholars have attributed to the executive branch, including the
1919-20 Palmer Raids and the Truman Administration’s loyalty program for federal government
employees instituted in 1947.65 I find little evidence for executive leadership in the formulation of
repressive legislation in the aftermath of war.
Classification of congressional action is additionally complicated by the number and
diversity of interests and goals within a large legislative body.66 Fortunately, however, my
argument does not depend on a fiction of unified congressional intent. Rather, it recognizes that
the collective powers of Congress can serve partisan ends. If I do refer to Congress in the singular
throughout this dissertation, I only do so for the sake of brevity.
In defining the liberalism or conservatism of postwar legislative coalitions, I make use of
DW-NOMINATE roll-call data. I am conscious of the fact that this data only indicates the ideology
of legislators relative to each other, that it creates a division between “economic” and “noneconomic” votes that is often unhelpful (particularly in grasping a complex, multifaceted issue
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such as Reconstruction), and that this data has become less reliable since the 1970s, as party leaders
have increasingly withheld divisive issues from ever coming to the floor for a vote. 67 However,
particularly in conceptualizing the legislative coalitions that controlled Congress after the First
World War, the Second World War, and the Vietnam War, DW-NOMINATE helps to illuminate
alliances among legislators that would not be revealed by raw numbers of Republicans and
Democrats.
In contrast to the executive and the legislature, the judiciary gets rather less attention here
than it does in many existing studies of war and civil liberties.68 Still, Supreme Court cases and
opinions feature prominently in the coming chapters. The Court’s refusal to issue advisory
opinions limits the extent of its commentary, but this also ensures that when the Court does speak,
it speaks on real people and real disputes.69 The Court also features prominently in this dissertation
when it rules on disputes that implicate civil liberties.
In a larger sense, this dissertation is a work of comparative history.70 It compares wars,
rather than countries. The overarching idea is to examine how evolving national institutions
perform in different crisis contexts. This limits the generalizability of my findings beyond the
United States, but it should provide a robust test of my argument in the U.S. context. Moreover,
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my conclusion provides suggestions for how my methodology and findings might inform crossnational studies of war and civil liberties in constitutional democracies.
Within the United States, scholars of the War of 1812, the Mexican-American War, or the
Spanish-American War may feel aggrieved that their cases are not included here, but I confine
myself to conflicts that have challenged democratic commitments to civil liberties. The
revolutionary war – which was prolonged and deadly, and raises its own interesting set of questions
about republican institutions fumbling around for tools of self-preservation71 – does not make the
cut because it was not fought under the modern Philadelphia Constitution. The Korean War does
not make the cut in its own right, but it is folded into a wider discussion of the post-WWII period
because restrictions on civil liberties during the Korean War (primarily the 1950 Internal Security
Act) were continuations and extensions of a “Red Scare” that began in the aftermath of the Second
World War. WWII is not the only case in this dissertation of one war bumping into another, or a
war bumping into another type of crisis, such as a strike, an economic recession, or a pandemic.
Across my case studies, legislators have used such tumultuous postwar events to justify continual
restrictions on civil liberties.
Admittedly, my emphasis on federal government institutions does not fully cover assaults
on civil liberties at the local level, or the history of violence and political repression by private
actors in the United States.72 What I lose, here, in analytical sweep, I hope to gain in fresh analytical
terrain. There is no shortage of scholarship on private and local repression, but there is a serious
lack of integrated scholarship on war, legislative behavior, national institutions, and civil liberties.
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Thus far, I have referred to “wartime” and “peacetime,” but both confound intuitive
definition. Mary Dudziak makes this point forcefully in her work on Wartime: An Idea, Its History,
Its Consequences. Dudziak underlines the difficulty of distinguishing between war and peace in
the United States since the Second World War, when a permanent national security state emerged
and became entrenched. The U.S. Congress no longer formally declares war, in line with global
trends. The War on Terror – in the U.S. and abroad – resembles a constant condition of not-quitewar, in which there is death, destruction, and chaos, but nothing approaching the formal
declarations and mass social and economic mobilizations demanded by the so-called conventional
wars of yesteryear.73 I cannot escape these conceptual ambiguities.
Nevertheless, I do not uncritically accept the view that wartime and peacetime have
become indistinguishable or conceptually useless. This view is a valuable and provocative
hypothesis that can – and ought to be – tested. Although such a test is not my primary goal here, a
historical study of war and civil liberties inevitably implicates the question of how war itself has
(and has not) changed over time. The following chapters will suggest that the boundaries of war
and peace have never been clear throughout U.S. history, but outcomes for American civil liberties
can still be connected to periods of “wartime” and “peacetime.” Even in the ostensible era of
endless (undeclared) war since WWII, civil liberties in the United States have waxed and waned
with U.S. military commitments abroad. The Vietnam War, in particular, generated a distinctive
wave of repressive government policies – most of which were terminated before the war ended.
The discussion of ex-Confederate civil liberties and the rights of newly emancipated slaves
in Chapter 2 arguably obscures the traditional distinction that judges and scholars of constitutional
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law have drawn between civil liberties (“freedom from oppressive government authority”) and
civil rights (“protections against discriminatory treatment.”)74 This distinction can be undermined
by the fact that civil liberties are frequently curtailed in a highly targeted – arguably,
“discriminatory” – fashion. Overall, I try to maintain some distinction between “civil liberties”
and “civil rights” by focusing on curtailments of “civil liberties” that are related to war and national
security. This approach is consistent with the conception of “negative” freedom from
governmental constraint (as opposed to the “positive” freedoms of personal fulfilment) that
predominates in existing definitions of civil liberties.75
I acknowledge that war might also expand rights and liberties, as the demands of
mobilization force rulers to offer concessions to the ruled.76 I am not convinced that I can, for
instance, weigh the impact of Brown v. Board of Education – which was significantly motivated
by Cold War Soviet shaming of American racism77 – against the impact of Cold War anti-leftist
loyalty purges. On the other hand, I do have one clear-cut case study – Reconstruction – when
wartime restrictions on one (small) group’s civil liberties served to protect the liberties of another
(large) group. I take this tension into consideration when evaluating this case in comparative
perspective.
As this dissertation delves into the history of restrictions on civil liberties after major
American wars, it does so with a keen sense of normative stakes. Civil liberties are central to, but
not synonymous with, democracy. Democracy can benefit from curtailments of civil liberties. My
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next chapter – on the most destructive war in American history, and the struggle over rights,
liberties, and democracy that it produced – makes this fact abundantly clear.
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2. The War on White Terror
If there is a single phrase encapsulating civil liberties and the United States Civil War, it is surely
“habeas corpus.” President Lincoln’s unilateral decision to suspend this “great writ” embodied his
larger theory of emergency powers: amputate a constitutional limb to save the country’s life.
Particularly in the first twelve weeks of the war, when Congress was not in session, Lincoln took
this theory to unprecedented lengths. American citizens were imprisoned without the right to
challenge their detention. Powers committed to Congress in Article I of the Constitution were
brazenly exercised by the president, including the spending of public funds without appropriation,
the expansion of the armed forces, the calling up of the militia, and the imposition of a naval
blockade. Lincoln would not hesitate to bend the Constitution as the war dragged on, emancipating
hundreds of thousands of slaves in the largest confiscation of property in American history. He
would suppress newspapers, commence the reconstruction of liberated territory in direct defiance
of Congress, and ignore the rulings of the Supreme Court’s chief justice.1
Reviewing this history, scholars of civil liberties have asked several questions. Were
Lincoln’s actions justified by necessity?2 How do Lincoln’s actions compare with more recent
cases, such as the War on Terror?3 How many people had their civil liberties curtailed by the
Lincoln Administration?4 While these questions have been hotly debated, even Lincoln’s harshest
critics grant him this: his radical constitutional cures did not outlast the life-threatening diseases
of war and secession. As one of these critics, James G. Randall, puts it, “The Constitution, while
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stretched, was not subverted. The measures taken were recognized by the people as exceptional;
and they were no more exceptional than the emergency for which they were used… If Lincoln was
a dictator, it must be admitted that he was a benevolent dictator.”5 Friendlier scholars have gone
so far as to promote “Lincoln’s Example” as a model of crisis management. It is better, they argue,
for a President to temporarily push the limits of his authority than to seek legal sanction and
entrench a state of exception.6
This chapter challenges the view that emergency powers and restrictions on civil liberties
died along with the Confederacy.7 Although Northerners could no longer expect censorship,
summary detention, or martial law, Southerners were subjected to continued – and, in some ways,
expanded – curtailments of self-government. Their elected leaders were removed by officers of
the United States military, their civilian justice system was undercut by a system of military
commissions, and their representatives were excluded from Congress. Yet these extraordinary
measures were only maintained until the ex-Confederate states ratified the Fourteenth Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution, which made everyone born in the United States a citizen, bound state
governments to the Bill of Rights for the first time, and entitled everyone within the jurisdiction
of the United States – citizen or non-citizen – to “due process” and “equal protection of the laws.”
Congress certainly curtailed civil liberties after the Civil War, but it also expanded them.
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I begin the chapter by describing the various ways in which President Andrew Johnson
preserved martial law in the former Confederacy after the Civil War had ended on the battlefield.
I go on to document how Johnson’s attempts to restore self-government in the South were thwarted
by an assertive postwar coalition of congressional Republicans. I then discuss the various powers
that underpinned congressional action. The bedrock power involved the right of each chamber to
determine the qualifications of its members, and thereby disqualify the ex-Confederate
representatives from Congress in December 1865. From here, I examine how legislators deployed
their powers over the executive branch and the judiciary to maintain martial law in the former
Confederacy and to reconstruct Southern governments upon the principles of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Congress successfully set the terms for the restoration of self-government, but the
postwar Republican coalition – which was always balancing “Radical” and “Moderate” factions –
was unable to see the project through after martial law was lifted in 1870. I conclude the chapter
by reflecting on this failure, and on the legacy of Reconstruction for the study of civil liberties
after major American wars.
Executive Martial Law
The U.S. Civil War did not legally end when General Ulysses S. Grant accepted the surrender of
General Robert E. Lee at Appomattox Court House on April 9, 1865, or when Brigadier General
Stand Watie finally surrendered his force of Native American Confederates in Fort Towson on
June 23. These surrenders suggested that peace was imminent, as did General Grant’s
recommendation that Lee be rewarded with an amnesty for “his manly course and bearing” in
laying down his arms.8 The arrival of peacetime was also symbolized by the release and return of
prisoners-of-war, reductions in the size and spread of the U.S. army in the South, the pardoning of
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several other high-ranking Confederate generals, and the return to former slaveholders of land that
had been redistributed, late in the war, to former slaves.9
However, after the Confederacy collapsed, President Andrew Johnson was immediately
confronted with attempts by ex-Confederates to cling to political power. Between April and
December 1865, when Congress was not in session, Johnson and his War Secretary, Edwin
Stanton, used the military to stop ex-Confederate governors from calling their legislatures into
session. The governors of Georgia and North Carolina were arrested, and the governor of Texas
was driven into exile across the Mexican border. Beginning with William W. Holden in North
Carolina on May 29, Johnson installed hand-picked Unionist governors in Mississippi (June 13),
Georgia (June 17), Texas (June 17), Alabama (June 21), South Carolina (June 30), and Florida
(July 13).10 These governors were tasked with overseeing fresh elections to the state legislature on
the condition that they repudiated secession and Confederate debt, abolished slavery, and pledged
their loyalty to the union. “The military commander” in each state would “aid and assist the said
provisional governor” in this effort, and the military men were “enjoined to abstain from, in any
way, hindering, impeding, or discouraging the loyal people from the organization of a State
government.” Federal authority would start to return in the form of tax collectors, customs officers,
post offices and postal routes, and district courts.11
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Johnson was trying to “restore” (a word he preferred to “reconstruct”) the former
Confederacy under military tutelage. The writ of habeas corpus remained suspended, military
commissions continued to substitute for civilian courts, and military officials kept a close eye on
Johnson’s new state governments. These war-like conditions were serious affronts to the liberties
that white Southerners had long enjoyed. Military justice was particularly problematic. Some form
of military justice had existed since the nation’s founding and was authorized by the Fifth
Amendment: “No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime unless
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces,
or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger.”12 Military tribunals for
military men were not controversial. The application of the military justice system to civilians was
another matter. This undermined the grand jury requirement of the Fifth Amendment, as well as
the Sixth Amendment’s promise that “the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.”13
Military commissions did not distinguish themselves for their procedural protections
during the war. Four cases were especially infamous. First, Clement Vallandigham, a former Ohio
Democratic Congressman, was arrested in May 1863 for “publicly expressing, in violation of
General Orders No. 38, from Head-quarters Department of the Ohio, sympathy for those in arms
against the Government of the United States” and for “declaring disloyal sentiments and opinions,
with the object and purpose of weakening the power of the Government in its efforts to suppress
an unlawful rebellion.”14 After his conviction before a military commission, Vallandigham’s
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application for a writ of habeas corpus was denied by an Ohio federal district court judge. “Those
who live under the protection and enjoy the blessings of our benignant government, must learn
that they can not stab its vitals with impunity,” the judge concluded.15 When the case eventually
came before the Supreme Court, the Court held that it had no jurisdiction over military
commissions.16 The army thus tried and convicted a prominent politician for antiwar speech.
Second, Lambdin P. Milligan was arrested under military order in Indiana in October 1864.
Milligan was accused of creating and leading a secret society opposed to the war and working on
behalf of the Confederacy. After his habeas appeal was denied, a military commission found him
guilty and sentenced him to death by hanging. In contrast to Vallandigham, the Supreme Court
denounced the military proceedings after the war, ordering Milligan’s release, and underlining the
importance of limiting military commissions to areas and times in which civilian courts cannot
function.17
Third, Henry Wirz was executed in November 1865 after a military conviction for
conspiracy and murder. Wirz was not a civilian – he was the commandant of Camp Sumter, an
enormous, filthy, and overcrowded prisoner-of-war facility near Andersonville, Georgia. Although
the conditions in Camp Sumter were unquestionably horrendous – causing the deaths of many
thousands of Union soldiers – Wirz’s personal responsibility for these conditions was far from
fully proven. His trial by military commission was accompanied by furious Northern press
coverage, witnesses struggled to pin specific abuses on Wirz, and his main defense – that he lacked
necessary support from the Confederate government to maintain the facility – was swiftly
dismissed. No one responsible for conditions similar to Andersonville in the North – particularly
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in the notorious Camp Douglas facility in Chicago – faced justice. In short, Wirz may well have
been a scapegoat.18
Fourth, much earlier in the war – in September 1862 – a military commission was convened
to try 392 Dakota Indian men for their participation in an uprising against white settlers in
Minnesota. These proceedings were so farcical and rushed that President Lincoln commuted the
number of death sentences down from 303 to 38. In explaining his actions, Lincoln told the Senate
that he was “anxious to not act with so much clemency as to encourage another outbreak on the
one hand, nor with so much severity as to be real cruelty on the other.” Therefore, he culled the
numbers through “a classification of all who were proven to have participated in massacres” – and
rape – “as distinguished from participation in battles.”19
Mark E. Neely estimates that “during the Civil War, the army conducted at least 4,271
trials by military commission,” with over 50% taking place in “the strife-torn border states of
Missouri, Kentucky, and Maryland.”20 The concentration of military trials in the border states
should caution us against seeing Vallandigham or Milligan as typical cases. Suspected guerrillas
and smugglers made up almost all the border state cases. Nevertheless, because military
commissions did not require the same standards as civilian trials, they could readily curtail civil
liberties.
As the Wirz trial suggests, military commissions remained intact after the Confederacy
disintegrated. The War Department accused Wirz of “wholly disregarding the usages of civilized
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warfare” – a charge that was at least rooted in existing understandings of the laws of war.21
Contrastingly, it was more difficult to level war crimes charges against the alleged assassins of
Abraham Lincoln because Washington, D.C. was no longer a warzone when he was murdered.
Yet they were still accused of “maliciously, unlawfully, and traitorously” devising a conspiracy
“in aid of the existing armed rebellion against the United States of America.”22 As Detlev Vagts
notes, “the conduct of the trial has been subject to severe criticism, including charges that the
prosecution had presented perjured testimony and that the court’s recommendation of leniency for
some of those convicted was concealed from President Johnson.”23 In any event, the key
implication of the trial was less about procedure than it was about the continual application of
military justice to civilians.
It is difficult to gauge the precise scope and scale of the military justice system during
Reconstruction. Mark Neely tallies the total number of cases from 1865-1870 at approximately
1,400, but Detlev Vagts suggests that most of these “had little to do with Reconstruction and
resistance,” and more to do with “maintaining military discipline – punishing civilians who sold
liquor to soldiers or purchased military gear from them.” Vagts estimates the “real” number – of
what we might call political cases, brought under Reconstruction laws – at around 500.24 For
African-Americans, the commissions offered the prospect of real justice. For white Southerners,
the commissions were an assault on the inalienable constitutional right to trial by a jury of one’s
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peers. The Georgia-born lawyer George W. Paschal – who had supported the Union during the
Civil War – spoke for many white Southerners when he said in 1870 that he could not celebrate
the Fourth of July “while there lingers in a loathsome dungeon a single American citizen with no
constitutional warrant for his imprisonment.”25
Throughout 1865, President Johnson was willing to tolerate military commissions in the
former Confederacy because the civilian courts were permitting lawsuits against soldiers and
agents of the federal government.26 However, by the end of the year, Johnson was largely satisfied
that Reconstruction was complete. His provisional governments had taken their loyalty oaths,
abolished slavery, and foresworn secession. In December, Johnson said that it was time for the
new, postwar Congress to re-admit the Southern delegations that had walked out in 1860 and 1861,
and to consummate the transition from war to peace.
Congress’s Powers Over Itself
The 39th Congress, which began its first full session on December 4, 1865, had 132 Republicans
and 40 Democrats in the House, and 37 Republicans and 9 Democrats in the Senate. Andrew
Johnson had been a Democrat, but his loyalty to the Union over the secessionists in his home state
of Tennessee had earned him a place on Lincoln’s ticket for the 1864 general election. These strong
unionist credentials endeared him to congressional Republicans, with whom he had a tolerable
working relationship throughout 1865. In May, even Pennsylvania Congressman Thaddeus
Stevens, the Republican who was most zealous about a revolutionary Reconstruction program and

25

George W. Paschal, Letter to the President Asking for the Pardon of Ludovic P. Alford and Other Citizens
Imprisoned by Military Commissions Under the Reconstruction Laws (Washington: M’Gill and Witherow, 1870), 1.
26
See General Orders No.3, War Department Adjutant General’s Office, January 12, 1866, Grant Papers, Vol. 16,
7-8; AH Van Bokkelen to USG, March 23, 1866, Grant Papers, Vol. 16, 8.

39

would later become an implacable foe of the president, told Johnson that he “agree[d] with you
almost unanimously as to the main objects you have in view” for Reconstruction.27
Nevertheless, Stevens and his decidedly less zealous colleagues were deeply concerned
about military reports coming out of the South. Although General Grant painted a generally
optimistic picture of the former Confederacy on a tour across the South at the end of 1865, he
believed that “four years of War, during which law was executed only at the point of the bayonet,
throughout the states in rebellion, has left the people possibly in a condition not to yield that ready
obedience to civil authority the American people have generally been in the habit of yielding.”
Because of this “obedience” deficit, “small garrisons throughout the states” would be “necessary
until such time as labor returns to its proper channel and civil authority is fully established.” “I did
not meet any one,” he added, “either those holding place under the Government or citizens of the
Southern States who think it practicable to withdraw the Military force from the South at present.
The white and black mutually require the protection of the General Government.”28
Grant alluded to the problem of violence – by “white and black.” Subsequent histories of
Reconstruction make this even-handed assessment seem absurdly euphemistic: violence was
overwhelmingly white on black.29 “A great number of murders are committed in almost every
portion of the State where there are negroes,” Major General Peter J. Osterhaus wrote from
Vicksburg, Mississippi. There was “hardly an instance in which the offender was arrested by the
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civil authorities. It is altogether a very mysterious affair.”30 Former General Carl Schurz more
bluntly concluded from his tour of the South that “the people are not yet in a fit condition to
legislate.”31
Where “the people” were legislating under Andrew Johnson’s provisional governments in
Mississippi and South Carolina, they were passing laws that heavily restricted the movement,
freedom, and dignity of African-Americans. These “Black Codes,” which involved onerous, longterm labor contracts and draconian punishments for “vagrancy” – and would later be mimicked by
other Southern governments – effectively established slavery-by-another-name.32 So, when
President Johnson claimed that Reconstruction was done, and that Congress should readmit
Southern representatives, Republicans in Congress harbored deep doubts.
There was also a practical problem with re-admitting Southern congressional delegations.
The Constitution had allowed slave states to count three out of every five slaves toward their House
and Electoral College apportionment. With slavery abolished, white Southerners could count every
single African-American toward their House and Electoral College apportionment, no matter how
awfully the former slave was treated.33 This meant that Southerners would not only be returning
to Congress, but – in the House of Representatives – they would be returning in greater numbers.
All these factors led congressional Republicans to decide that they should keep the
Southerners out. So-called “Radical” Republicans, who advocated a total remaking of the South
(such as Thaddeus Stevens), as well as “Moderates,” who wanted to tread more carefully (such as
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Senator William Pitt Fessenden of Maine) agreed with the conclusion that the former Confederates
had “voluntarily deprived themselves of representation in Congress for the criminal purpose of
destroying the federal Union.” As a result, “the burden now rests upon them, before claiming to
be reinstated in their former condition, to show that they are qualified to resume federal
relations.”34 Under the constitutional authority of Article I, Section 5, which empowers “Each
House” to “be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members,” 35 the
Republicans excluded the ex-Confederate states from Congress, and there was nothing Andrew
Johnson could do about it.
There remained the problem of divisions within the Republican Party. Before the war,
Republicans had unified around opposition to the expansion of slavery into new territories. The
idea of abolishing slavery in the South was confined to hardcore abolitionists outside Congress.36
During the war, Republicans unified around the necessity of victory, but they bickered over how
aggressively the war needed to be prosecuted, and how directly and completely the institution of
slavery needed to be attacked. As the war progressed, and more Southern territory came under
federal control, the question of what to do with it became a major source of disagreement. In
February 1864, Representative Henry Winter Davis of Maryland and Senator Benjamin Wade of
Ohio successfully crafted a bill that would allow rebel states back into the Union if fifty percent
of their populations submitted to a loyalty oath and if they provided for black male suffrage.
Lincoln pocket-vetoed the bill in favor of a lighter ten percent oath requirement and no requirement
for black suffrage.37
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After the war, Republicans agreed that President Johnson’s readmission plan had not gone
far enough. But what would a viable readmission plan look like? How would the promise of
emancipation be fulfilled? Would ex-Confederates have to be barred from office or
disenfranchised? For how long and under what mandate would the military have to remain in the
South? What rights would the federal government guarantee for African-Americans? The right to
vote? The right to freely enter into labor contracts? The right to bear arms? Should the men who
had toiled on Southern plantations as slaves now be entitled to their own land?
In the Republican Party of 1865, there were no simple answers to these questions.
Thaddeus Stevens – who supported land redistribution, full civil and political rights,
disenfranchisement and disbarment of ex-Confederates, and a sustained military presence in the
South – recognized that these views were not universally shared by his colleagues, and so he
moved to create a Joint Committee on Reconstruction that could thrash out a workable
compromise.38 The Joint Committee, which was established immediately after the Southern
delegations were prevented from taking their seats in December 1865, was composed of fifteen
members: nine representatives and six senators, of whom twelve were Republicans and three were
Democrats. Its charge was “to inquire into the condition of the States which formed the so-called
Confederate States of America, and report whether they or any of them are entitled to be
represented in either house of Congress.”39 Predictably, the Democrats on the Committee regarded
its entire project as illegitimate, and they said so.40 But the Committee was an ideal forum for
“Radical” Republicans like Stevens and George Boutwell (Representative from Massachusetts) to
work closely and consistently with “Moderates” like William Pitt Fessenden and John Bingham
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(Representative from Ohio). Much of the Committee’s work was secret, but it did produce a final
report – based on extensive oral and written testimony – detailing the grim conditions prevailing
in the old Confederacy. It concluded, in June 1866, that the rebel states were still unfit to rejoin
the Union.41
The Joint Committee also laid out a vision for Reconstruction and the legal basis for it. The
Committee said it welcomed President Johnson’s views on Reconstruction, but “it was not for him
to decide upon the nature or effect of any system of government which the people of these States
might see fit to adopt.” Rather, “this power is lodged by the Constitution in the Congress of the
United States, that branch of the government in which is vested the authority to fix the political
relations of the States to the Union, whose duty it is to guarantee to each State a republican form
of government.”42
This theory quoted directly from Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitution, the “Republican
Guarantee Clause.”43 Other theories had floated around the Republican Party, including the idea
that Congress could treat the ex-Confederate states as if they were territorial possessions.
Territorialization was too extreme for “Moderate” Republicans because this would grant Congress
total and indefinite control over the affairs of the old Confederacy.44 Nevertheless, the “Moderates”
on the Joint Committee did accept what, at first, seemed like an even more extreme proposition –
that “conquered rebels” should be “at the mercy of the conquerors.”45 Congress, under this theory,
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could hold the South in what the Republican lawyer Richard Henry Dana called “the grasp of war”
until the federal government “secured whatever it has a right to acquire.”46
What could the federal government “acquire,” and when should it loosen the “grasp of
war”? The Joint Committee on Reconstruction suggested that a Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution could provide a way forward. This amendment was – like all the Committee’s output
– a product of compromise. It did not guarantee black suffrage, as “Radicals” hoped it would, but
Section 1 utterly repudiated the prewar Dred Scott decision by declaring that “All persons born or
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside.” The “privileges and immunities” associated with
citizenship could not be abridged by any state, nor could any state “deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” Section 2 mandated that “when the right to vote…
is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens
of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion or other crime,”
then that state would then have its House and Electoral College representation reduced
proportionally. Section 3 barred from federal and state office anyone who had taken an oath to the
Constitution before waging rebellion against it, while Section 4 repudiated Confederate debt.
Section 5 granted Congress the power to “enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this
article.”47 On June 13, 1866, Congress sent this constitutional amendment to the states for
ratification.
Legislators had thus used two powers over their own institution to clear the path for a
potentially sweeping program of Reconstruction, one that could significantly curtail the rights and
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liberties of self-rule that white Southerners had long enjoyed. The power of each house to
determine the qualifications of its members kept the Southerners out; the Joint Committee on
Reconstruction sketched a possible route back in, and ensured that “Radical” and “Moderate”
Republicans were on board with the plan. The president could only watch these internal workings
of the congressional machinery. But if Congress was to execute its program, it would, inevitably,
have to work with – or against – the executive branch.
Confronting the Executive
While the Joint Committee on Reconstruction conducted its business, the Senate Judiciary
Committee proceeded with a legislative program. On January 12, 1866, it reported two bills aimed
at advancing Reconstruction: one would extend the funding and mandate of the recently created
Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands, and the other would be a national civil
rights bill. The Freedmen’s Bureau bill got to President Johnson’s desk first, and the Chairman of
the Senate Judiciary Committee, Illinois “Moderate” Republican Lyman Trumbull, believed that
Johnson would sign it. But on February 19, Johnson vetoed it in no uncertain terms.48
“I have, with Congress, the strongest desire to secure to the freedmen the full enjoyment
of their freedom and their property and their entire independence and equality in making contracts
for their labor,” Johnson wrote. “But the bill before me contains provisions which, in my opinion,
are not warranted by the Constitution and are not well suited to accomplish the end in view.”
Johnson was primarily concerned with the bill’s promise to extend “the existing temporary
jurisdiction of the Freedmen’s Bureau, with greatly enlarged powers, over those States in which
the ordinary course of judicial proceedings has been interrupted by the rebellion.” The idea of the
Bureau – a military agency – presiding over contract disputes would “unnecessarily disturb the
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commerce and credit and industry of the country, by declaring to the American people and the
world that the United States are still in a condition of civil war.” Foreshadowing the anti-welfare
rhetoric of more recent American history, Johnson added that “sufficient consideration” was not
“given to the ability of the freedmen to protect and take care of themselves.” They had “received
their freedom with moderation and forbearance,” and there was no reason to believe that they could
not, “by their own efforts, establish for themselves a condition of respectability and prosperity.”
Finally, he hinted that he would not consider signing into law any bills passed by a rump Congress
that continued to exclude the ex-Confederate states.49
Thaddeus Stevens was not impressed. He had already scolded his colleagues for failing to
legislate on a land ownership plan for the freedmen. “Even the emperor of Russia gave land to the
serfs when he freed them,” Stevens said in the House.50 Other Republicans, such as Fessenden and
Trumbull, were more annoyed at Johnson for the disjuncture between his annual message at the
beginning of the year and his veto message. In the annual message, he had seemingly accepted the
right of Congress to exclude the Southerners, and supported additional legislation to aid the
freedmen. In the veto message, he was rejecting both. Republicans had a comfortable two-thirds
majority in the House, and a much tighter one in the Senate, but they could not unify around an
override of the veto.51
The civil rights bill included the basic language of the proposed Fourteenth Amendment,
while specifying some of the “privileges and immunities” therein, including the right to sue and
be sued, the right to testify in court, the right to freely enter into contracts, and the right to buy,
sell, hold, and lease property. Conspicuously absent was the right to vote. Notwithstanding the
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“essential conservatism”52 of the civil rights bill, President Johnson would again wield his veto
pen on March 27, 1866. He tore the bill apart, claiming that its provision for birthright citizenship
was “a discrimination against large numbers of intelligent, worthy, and patriotic foreigners… in
favor of the Negro, to whom, after long years of bondage, the avenues to freedom and intelligence
have just now been suddenly opened.” He said the bill would “establish for the security of the
colored race safeguards which go infinitely beyond any that the General Government has ever
provided for the white race,” and added that it represented “another step, or rather stride, toward
centralization and the concentration of all legislative powers in the National Government.”53
John Bingham seemed to be the only prominent Republican willing to uphold the veto, as
he believed that the civil rights bill was unconstitutional in the absence of a Fourteenth Amendment
to the Constitution. Even though the bill was not remotely coercive or repressive, it did propose
an unprecedented role for the federal government in state and local affairs. Trumbull justified this
on the ground that the Thirteenth Amendment authorized Congress to forever eliminate the
“badges and incidents of slavery” from the United States.54 Bingham thought this was a stretch. In
the end, “Moderate” and “Radical” Republicans unified around a veto override, probably because
of growing impatience and frustration with Johnson rather than high-minded constitutional
theory.55 This emboldened the Republicans to take another shot at the Freedmen’s Bureau bill,
which became law over Johnson’s veto in July 1866. Though slightly watered down from the
original version, it succeeded in extending the Bureau’s funding for two years and in keeping the
Bureau under military jurisdiction. Overall, Johnson had suffered two major political defeats.56
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The stage was thus set for a tumultuous election season in the fall of 1866. During the
campaign, Johnson traversed the country, furiously attacking Republican lawmakers, arguing with
hecklers, and accusing Congress of subverting the Constitution. General Grant was appalled. “I
regret to say that since the unfortunate differences between the President and Congress,” he wrote
to General Philip Sheridan in October, “the former becomes more violent with the opposition he
meets with until now but few people who were loyal to the Government during the rebellion seem
to have any influence with him… I much fear that we are fast approaching the point where he will
want to declare the body itself illegal, unconstitutional and revolutionary.”57 The voting public was
also, apparently, appalled, handing Johnson’s legislative allies a massive defeat, and the
Republicans comfortable supermajorities in both houses.
After a year of cantankerous vetoes, vicious verbal attacks, and executive obstruction,
Republicans began the 1867 legislative session with few illusions about cooperation with the
president. The threat of his veto pen had been dampened by the Republican landslide in the 1866
elections, but, as the nation’s chief law enforcement officer, he could still thwart Congress by
refusing to enforce its laws or reinterpreting them out of existence. The best hope for enforcement
was the military, whose generals seemed more aligned with Republican legislators than their
commander-in-chief.
The reluctance of the generals to side with Johnson was evident as early as April 1866,
when Johnson issued a “Proclamation on the End of the Confederate Insurrection,” which loftily
declared that
Standing armies, military occupation, martial law, military tribunals, and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus are in time of peace
dangerous to public liberty, incompatible with the individual rights of the citizen,
contrary to the genius and spirit of our free institutions, and exhaustive of the
national resources, and ought not, therefore, to be sanctioned or allowed except in
57
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cases of actual necessity for repelling invasion or suppressing insurrection or
rebellion.58
“The newspapers Contain the intelligence that the President has issued a proclamation declaring
the insurrection ended,” Major General Alfred Terry wrote General Grant from Richmond,
Virginia, on April 3, 1866. “I suppose this relieves all military Commissions. I have a very
important case on trial before one, of a white man for the murder of a negro. I respectfully ask
instructions whether this case should be completed or abandoned at once.”59 Brevet Major General
John W. Turner, also in Richmond, wondered “whether Martial law has been removed in this
Department, and the writ of Habeas Corpus restored,” while General George Thomas, from
Nashville, Tennessee, asked Grant, “Does the President’s peace proclamation abrogate martial
law, and restore the writ of habeas corpus?”60 Grant’s responses did not mince words. “I do not
understand Martial Law to be removed in VA, or the writ of Habeas Corpus to be restored. Obey
no writ for taking out of custody any military prisoner without direct instructions to do so,” he
instructed Turner. “The President’s proclamation as I understand it, does not abrogate martial law
and restore the writ of Habeas Corpus,” he told Thomas. “Complete the case referred to in your
telegram of to day, unless you receive other orders. The Judge Advocate General can determine
the validity of the proceedings,” he told Terry.61
The military was defying Johnson, and Republican legislators exploited this fact on March
2, 1867, when Congress passed “An Act for the More Efficient Government of the Rebel States.”
Known informally as the first Military Reconstruction Act, this law began by dividing the “Rebel
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States” into five districts “made subject to the military authority of the United States.” Each district
would have a commander who would “protect all persons in their rights of person and property,”
“suppress insurrection, disorder, and violence,” and “punish, or cause to be punished, all disturbers
of the public peace.” “When in his judgment it may be necessary,” the commander would “have
power to organize military commissions or tribunals for that purpose.” Crucially, “all interference
under color of State authority with the exercise of military authority under this act” was to be “null
and void.” As commander-in-chief, the president could appoint and oversee the work of district
commanders, but his discretion in removing commanders would be circumscribed by the “Act
Regulating the Tenure of Certain Civil Offices” (the Tenure of Office Act), which protected War
Secretary Edwin Stanton, allied with the congressional Republicans, from removal without Senate
consent. Johnson tried and failed to veto both laws.62
Johnson did not veto the 1867 Army Appropriations Act, which contained a provision
requiring that “all orders and instructions relating to military operations, issued by the President
or Secretary of War, shall be issued through the General of the Army [Grant],” who “shall not be
removed, suspended, or relieved from command, or assigned to duty elsewhere… except at his
own request, without the previous approval of the Senate,” as well as a provision disbanding the
state militias in the ex-Confederate states. The Appropriations Act “deprives the President of his
constitutional functions as Commander-in-Chief of the Army,” Johnson protested, but he did not
want to “defeat… necessary appropriations” with a veto.63 Congress had wielded the power of the
purse to tie the president’s hands.
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Under the Military Reconstruction regime created by Congress, martial law began to
involve much more than military commissions. General Grant, despite his reticence in public,
privately recognized this reality. “Reconstruction measures have passed both houses of Congress
over one of the most ridiculous Veto messages that ever emanated from any President,” he wrote
to Elihu Washburne on March 4, 1867. “There is nothing clearer to my mind than that Congress
intended to give district Commanders entire control over the Civil government,” he told General
Philip Sheridan, commander of the Fifth District (Louisiana and Texas). “Enforce your own
construction of the Military Bill until ordered to do otherwise,” he instructed General John Pope,
commander of the Third District (Alabama, Georgia, and Florida). “The law,” he emphasized to
Edward Ord, Commander of the Fourth District (Arkansas and Mississippi), “makes District
Commanders their own interpreters of their power and duty.”64
Sheridan, Pope, and Daniel Sickles, Commander of the Second District (the Carolinas),
became the most vigorous executors of martial law. Sickles felt that the “Sixth section of first
Military Government Act authorizes the removal of nearly every Civil officer in the South from
Governors down,” Sheridan argued he could remove the Mayor of New Orleans, the Louisiana
attorney general, and “Judge E. Abell of the Criminal Court of New Orleans” without “giv[ing]
any reason,” and Pope believed he could prohibit “newspapers or speakers in their discussions
about the policy of Reconstruction under the late acts of Congress, from abusing or denouncing
the Govt or any of its Departments or using personal epithets or misrepresentation personally of
any officer of the US Government for any acts done in performance of his duty.”65 In addition,

64

USG to Elihu B Washburne, March 4, 1867, in John Simon (ed.), The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant, Volume 17:
January 1 – September 30 1867 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1991), 76; USG to Sheridan, April
5, 1867, Grant Papers, Vol. 17, 95; USG to John Pope, June 28, 1867, Grant Papers, Vol. 17, 204; USG to Edward
Ord, June 23, 1867, Grant Papers, Vol 17, 192.
65
Sickles to USG, June 17, 1867, Grant Papers, Vol. 17, 167; Sheridan to USG, April 19, 1867, Grant Papers, Vol.
17, 96; Pope to USG, April 24, 1867, Grant Papers, Vol. 17, 118.

52

Grant and his district commanders agreed that they could instruct local election registration boards
to cross-examine newly registering voters before determining whether they should be
disenfranchised due to past affiliations with the Confederacy. This contradicted the U.S. attorney
general’s opinion that voters would only have to sign a loyalty oath.66
Thus, by 1867, martial law included military commissions, the power to remove elected
officials, control over the press, and regulation of elections. These powers were exercised with
varying levels of enthusiasm. Sheridan did not hesitate to remove the city and state officials whom
he blamed for the New Orleans race riots of July 1866. From his point of view, this tool was a
priceless deterrent. “The moment that the office holders here find out I have not the power to
remove them,” he wrote to Grant, “[at] that moment they become defiant and I lose nearly all my
strength.” Sheridan ended up removing not only the officials implicated in the New Orleans riots,
but also the Governor of Louisiana and the Governor of Texas. He further ordered the
desegregation of New Orleans streetcars. Sickles defied federal courts and removed twelve local
and state officials in the Carolinas within three months of the first Military Reconstruction Act.67
Pope, on the other hand, feared that dismissals would bring charges of “Military Despotism.” In
Georgia, he believed that “Nearly all the State officers are rebels and opposed to the execution of
these Acts of Congress, but I had rather keep them where they are (silenced) than by displacing
them, make martyrs of them.”68
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Disenfranchisement also varied from district to district. Pope, for instance, admitted that
“many worthy and now loyal men who could be safely trusted, are disfranchised by these clauses
of the Military Bills,” but he was satisfied that “such a result was unavoidable and can in their
cases be easily remedied.” Sheridan, meanwhile, argued that disenfranchisement was measured
and proportionate, instead claiming that “quite a large number of whites will not register [to vote]
because they do not like the military bill.”69
Predictably, given his opposition to the Military Reconstruction Acts – not to mention the
Civil Rights Act, the Freedmen’s Bureau bill, and apparently any military interference in Southern
politics – Andrew Johnson was not fond of the more zealous generals, especially Sheridan and
Sickles. As commander-in-chief, he had the constitutional right to fire them, but the Secretary of
War, Edwin Stanton, stood in the way. Stanton was loyal to his generals and to the Military
Reconstruction project – hence why the Republican Party sought to insulate him from presidential
removal. However, the Tenure of Office Act allowed the president to suspend Stanton while
Congress was out of session – and Johnson did just that in the summer of 1867, replacing him with
General Grant, who reluctantly accepted his recess appointment as Secretary of War ad interim.
This cleared the path for the dismissal of General Sheridan, whom Johnson accused of “render[ing]
himself exceedingly obnoxious by the manner in which he has exercised even the powers conferred
by Congress, and still more so by a resort to authority not granted by law, or necessary to its faithful
and efficient execution.” Worse, “his rule has, in fact, been one of absolute tyranny, without
reference to the principles of our government or the nature of our free institutions.”70 Sickles was
then relieved of his command in the Carolinas on August 26.71
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Grant was not happy.72 Congressional Republicans were apoplectic. Talk of impeachment
escalated. In November 1867, the House of Representatives requested “any and all
correspondence” from the executive branch relating to the suspension of Stanton and the removals
of Sheridan and Sickles.73 Four days later, in a letter sent to his entire cabinet, Johnson claimed
that “certain evil disposed persons have formed a conspiracy to depose the President of the United
States.” The conspiracy might come through “articles of impeachment,” or an outright “revolution
changing the whole organic system of our Government.”74
After the Senate – back in session – formally disapproved of the Stanton suspension,
Johnson finally fired the War Secretary, and the House of Representatives impeached Johnson for
violating the Tenure of Office Act. Privately, Grant also impeached Johnson for using him as a
pawn against Stanton. “Now, Mr. President,” he wrote on February 3, 1868 (three weeks before
the House impeachment vote), “where my honor as a soldier and my integrity as a man have been
so violently assailed, pardon me for saying that I can but regard this whole matter, from the
beginning to the end, as an attempt to involve me in the resistance of the law.”75
Johnson’s narrow acquittal by the Senate in May 1868 has led some historians and legal
scholars to conclude that the Republicans failed in their campaign against him. He was on the
ropes, but the Republicans could not unite around his removal, and he survived.76 However,
Johnson’s failure to gain his own party’s nomination for re-election later in the year suggests that
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his political reputation suffered from the confrontation with Congress. In the more fundamental
struggle over Reconstruction, there is more than a grain of evidence to support the idea that, in
Harold Hyman’s words, “impeachment swerved [Johnson’s] course.” As Hyman observes:
While the [impeachment] trial was on, Johnson made clear his intention to name a
moderate general to be Secretary of War; forwarded to the Senate the
Reconstruction constitutions of Arkansas and South Carolina created by terms of
Congress’s Reconstruction laws which he said were unconstitutional, including
ratification of the detested Fourteenth Amendment and provisions for blacks’
voting; and ceased obstructing the progress of congressional Reconstruction in
provisional states by devious interpretations of the laws or other overt means.77
At the beginning of 1867, Congress had faced the enormous task of implementing martial law with
a resistant commander-in-chief. Yet the commander-in-chief was circumvented through the
insulation of the military from presidential control. When President Johnson fought back against
this wedge that was driven into the executive branch, legislators called his bluff. Although they
did not succeed in removing him from office, they did succeed in neutralizing his opposition –
and, eventually, in driving him into political obscurity.
The Limits of Martial Law
The success of the campaign against Johnson was reflected in the fact that when Ulysses S. Grant
assumed office as a Republican president in 1869, eight ex-Confederate states had already met
Congress’s terms of readmission: ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment and the extension of
suffrage to all black men.78 These readmission terms, like all the policies of the postwar Republican
coalition, were the product of compromise between “Radicals” and “Moderates.” Thaddeus
Stevens, as we have seen, did not see the point of emancipation if it did not include substantia l
land redistribution. His “Moderate” colleagues only embraced black suffrage reluctantly and did
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not want the military to govern the South perpetually. The military itself was uncomfortable with
a prolonged role in civilian affairs. As Grant had told Edward Ord, “I am exceedingly anxious to
see reconstruction effected and Military rule put an end to. Politicians should be perfectly satisfied
with the temperate manner with which the Military have used authority thus far, but if there is a
necessity for continuing it too long there is great danger of a reaction against the Army.”79
On this evidence, the “Radicalism” of the postwar Republican coalition – even during the
peak “Radical” years of 1867 and 1868 – should not be overstated. Republicans preserved wartime
restrictions on civil liberties, but never claimed the right to do so indefinitely. Indeed, if the other
ex-Confederate states had followed Tennessee’s lead in swiftly ratifying the Fourteenth
Amendment, martial law might have ceased as early as 1866. These states did have a valid
objection to the less-than-free choice of ratification or continued “bayonet rule.”80 But the
Fourteenth Amendment itself aimed to simply – in the words of its principal framer, “Moderate”
John Bingham – “arm the Congress . . . with the power to enforce the Bill of Rights.”81 This was
new, to be sure, because the Bill of Rights had only constrained the federal government before the
Civil War.82 Still, in 1868, the Fourteenth Amendment emphatically did not require full racial
equality, interracial marriage, desegregation, or any of the disruptive social changes alleged by its
opponents. Only in the 20th Century would the Supreme Court say that these “civil rights” were
covered by the Fourteenth Amendment.83
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Despite the stamp of the “Moderates” on readmission terms, the requirements of black
suffrage and constitutional amendment generated radical political transformations in the former
Confederate states. Reconstructed state legislators, governors, and local officials included AfricanAmericans, Northern Republicans who had moved to the South during Reconstruction (derisively
labelled “Carpetbaggers”), and white Southern Republicans, who had shifted their allegiances
from the Democrats after the war (derisively labelled “Scalawags”). A new Southern politics, with
new political leadership and a new commitment to multiracial democracy, was taking root.84
The problem was that once a state was readmitted to the Union, the military became
completely subservient to the civilian authorities, with a view to eventually leaving the South
altogether. A long game became possible for the Democrats who were unwilling to tolerate the
new regime. They could wait for martial law to end, and then attack the reconstituted civilian
authorities. Those authorities could conceivably call out troops to defend themselves, but how
often could they do so before they lost their legitimacy, and the army lost its will to fight? The
Democratic strategy became known as “Redemption,” and it rested primarily on violence and
terror. Back in September 1866, General Grant received reports of “secret Military organizations…
rumored to be forming” in Tennessee. Although this fear was partly allayed by Brevet Brigadier
General Cyrus Comstock, who was “of the opinion that there exist no armed organizations within
the state (except a few guerilla parties that are being suppressed by the military authorities),” more
persistent accounts of “an organized body of men… causing dismay and terror to all,” and a “rebel
order Known as the Ku Klux Klan” headquartered in Pulaski, Tennessee, flooded Grant’s
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correspondence in early 1868.85 The Klan was only one of numerous “White Terror” organizations
that set about overthrowing the Reconstructed state governments.86
Republicans in Congress did not simply surrender to Southern “Redeemers.” When the
white members of the Georgia state legislature expelled their black colleagues just two months
after the state’s restoration in 1868, federal legislators promptly re-expelled Georgia’s
congressional delegation and, following escalating reports of Klan violence in the state, reimposed
martial law. Commander Alfred H. Terry reinstated the black lawmakers. Then, continuing the
expulsion frenzy, Terry threw six ex-Confederate senators out of the state legislature. Georgia was
re-reconstructed (if we count the first attempt by Andrew Johnson in 1865, re-re-reconstructed) in
July 1870. After all that, in the 1871 state elections – with the aid of violence and intimidation –
Democrats regained control of the state legislature and the governor’s mansion. By 1872, Georgia
was “redeemed.”87
No other state had Georgia’s back-and-forth experience. The Constitution does allow
“Each House” to “determine the Rules of its Proceedings” and “punish its Members for disorderly
Behaviour,” but expulsion requires “the Concurrence of two thirds.”88 By 1870, such a process
was procedurally and politically difficult, especially as Republican lawmakers became
increasingly exhausted with the financial commitments of Reconstruction and increasingly
uncomfortable with the continual exclusion of Southern representatives from Congress five years
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after Appomattox.89 Instead, congressional Republicans worked with President Grant to bolster
legal protections for African-Americans. Three laws – collectively known as the “Enforcement
Acts” – tried to do exactly what they said: enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. The Enforcement
Acts produced Section 1983 of the federal code, which remains a vital tool in civil rights
litigation.90 The second of these Acts (known as the Ku Klux Klan Act) also produced a war-like
emergency power that could be deployed against “unlawful combinations” found to be plotting “to
either overthrow or set at defiance the constituted authorities” of the state and federal government.
If these “combinations” could not be prosecuted by the “constituted authorities,” then “it shall be
lawful for the President of the United States, when in his judgment the public safety shall require
it, to suspend the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus, to the end that such rebellion may be
overthrown.”91
President Grant used this power on one occasion. On October 17, 1871, the writ was
suspended in nine Klan-ravaged South Carolina counties. Federal marshals and troops arrested six
hundred men in these areas before the end of the year. Prosecutors only managed to get five
convictions in federal court, but they did earn 49 guilty pleas. The suspension of the writ and the
mass arrests certainly spooked Klan members in South Carolina, who fled and snitched in far
greater numbers than those who ended up in court. Ultimately, however, this brief and limited war
on white terror was nowhere near enough to prevent “Redemption” in South Carolina, let alone
the rest of the former Confederacy.92

89

On the declining commitment of Republicans, see Du Bois, Black Reconstruction, 670-710.
Section 1983 is at the center of ongoing debates about “qualified immunity” for police officers. See Joanna C.
Schwartz, “After Qualified Immunity,” Columbia Law Review 120, no. 2 (2020): 309-388.
91
“An Act to Enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and for
other Purposes, United States Statutes at Large,” 17 U.S. Statutes at Large, 14-15 (1871).
92
Lou Falkner Williams, The Great South Carolina Ku Klux Klan Trials, 1871-1872 (Athens: University of Georgia
Press, 1996), 122-123.
90

60

The reality was that once Congress readmitted the Southern states, it lost the coercive
power that underpinned the early years of Reconstruction. Creatively, Congress supplemented the
Enforcement Acts with an expansion of the federal judiciary and the creation of a federal
Department of Justice.93 This gave the federal government more prosecutors and, potentially, more
judges who would be friendly to Reconstruction. Nevertheless, the Grant Administration was not
blessed with anything resembling the quantity or quality of prosecutorial power wielded by future
administrations. In 1876, there were only seventeen assistant U.S. attorneys in the former
Confederacy, and 67 nationwide.94 In 1917 alone, the attorney general appointed 100 special
assistant attorneys dedicated to specific cases, and had at his disposal a growing Bureau of
Investigation tasked with enforcement of federal law.95 The Reconstruction Justice Department
lacked these resources.
Confronting the Judiciary
The difficulty of federal law enforcement was compounded by the United States Supreme Court.
The Enforcement Acts had attempted to protect African-Americans from the organized private
violence of white terror groups by allowing civil suits in federal court against private actors who
violated constitutional rights. In 1876, the Supreme Court held this to be unauthorized by the
Fourteenth Amendment, which only extended federal authority to action by state governments, not
private actors.96
The Supreme Court also diluted the Fourteenth Amendment by narrowly defining its
“privileges and immunities” clause. In declaring that “No State shall make or enforce any law

93

Robert J. Kaczorowski, The Politics of Judicial Interpretation: The Federal Courts, Department of Justice and
Civil Rights, 1866-1876 (New York: Oceana Publications, 1985).
94
Jed Handelsman Shugerman, “The Creation of the Department of Justice: Professionalization Without Civil
Rights or Civil Service,” Stanford Law Review 66 (2014): 172.
95
United States Department of Justice, Register of the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Courts of the
United States, 25th Edition (Washington: GPO, 1917), 7. On the Bureau of Investigation, see Chapter 3.
96
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876).

61

which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States,” the framers of
the Fourteenth Amendment aimed to stop state governments from violating the Bill of Rights,
which had only bound the federal government before the Civil War. In 1873, however, the
Supreme Court decided that the “privileges and immunities” clause could not have been intended
to do this, because it would be tantamount to an attack on American federalism. Instead, the
privileges and immunities clause only stopped states from violating a much more limited subset
of “national” citizenship rights, such as “the right to travel to the seat of government,” “the right
of protection in a foreign land or on the high seas,” “the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,”
and “rights secured by treaties.”97 “Exactly how a state would abridge an American citizen’s rights
in France or on the high seas is unclear,” Lucas Powe points out. “The Arkansas navy perhaps?”98
The Supreme Court might have undermined Reconstruction earlier if Congress had allowed
it to. In April 1866, in Ex parte Milligan, the Court condemned the use of military commissions in
states where the civilian courts were open.99 This ruling seemed to threaten the continuation of
martial law in the former Confederacy, where the civilian courts were very much open. “That
[Milligan] decision,” Thaddeus Stevens told the House of Representatives, “although in terms
perhaps not as infamous as the Dred Scott decision, is yet far more dangerous in its operation upon
the lives and liberties of loyal men of this country.” The Court had “unsheathed the dagger of the
assassin” and “taken away every protection in every one of these Rebel states from every loyal
man, black or white, who resides there.”100
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Happily for Stevens, the “grasp of war” theory enunciated by the Joint Committee on
Reconstruction helped Congress evade the implications of Milligan in the South. Milligan said that
military justice could not be applied to civilians outside an active warzone. But the Joint
Committee on Reconstruction had determined that the old Confederacy was, legally, still a
warzone – and would be until the moment that Congress saw fit to readmit Southern
representatives. The Constitution gives Congress the power to declare war, and the president the
power to command the armed forces, but the text says nothing about which branch of government
can terminate a war – let alone an undeclared civil war.101 Amid such ambiguity, legislators
responding to Milligan could make a credible and straightforward legal argument: Congress
declares war, Congress gets to decide when to end war. Congress says the South is still in the
“grasp of war,” so martial law still applies. Milligan is irrelevant.102
However, a far more alarming case came down the pipeline in late 1867, when the Supreme
Court agreed to hear arguments in Ex parte McCardle. William McCardle was a Mississippi
newspaper editor who made his uncharitable views about Reconstruction and military rule wellknown to the reading public. This caught the attention of General Edward Ord, who called
McCardle a provocative and dangerous “spitfire.”103 Ord detained McCardle and the Court would
be reviewing the legality of Ord’s action. Could a district commander, under the authority of the
Military Reconstruction Acts, arrest a civilian for their political views and try them before a
military commission? This question put martial law squarely on the judicial chopping block.
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Without explaining why, Attorney General Henry Stanbery told General Grant that “I do
not propose to appear in the [McCardle] case,” leading Grant to ask Senator Lyman Trumbull – an
accomplished lawyer – if he would represent the government.104 Stanbery, who was a close ally of
President Johnson, thought that the Military Reconstruction Acts were unconstitutional. By
refusing to appear in the McCardle case, he repudiated the executive’s “duty to defend” federal
statutes in court. The “duty to defend” is a contested doctrine, and presidents and attorneys general
have routinely rejected it, usually with negative consequences for the law in question. 105 In
rejecting his “duty to defend,” Stanbery sent a clear signal that he wanted the Court to rule for
McCardle and invalidate martial law.
By February 1868, General Meade went so far as to tell Grant that “the fear that
reconstruction was, or is to be set aside, has deterred many white voters from taking part in” an
Alabama election. “The prevailing opinion,” according to Meade, was “that the Supreme Court
will pronounce the Reconstruction Laws unconstitutional.”106 Sensing the danger, Congress
intervened. The Supreme Court’s relatively limited original jurisdiction is defined in the
Constitution, but its appellate jurisdiction is defined by Congress.107 Thus, the Court’s authority to
hear McCardle was statutory, rather than constitutional. Specifically, the case was heard under the
Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, which had begun to restore the “great writ” across the South. 108 If
Congress wanted to stop the Court from hearing habeas petitions – like McCardle’s – it could
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simply repeal the 1867 Act. This is what Congress did – after arguments were heard in Ex parte
McCardle, but before a decision came down.109
Could Congress do this? A century-and-a-half later, the Supreme Court would say no. The
Constitution may empower Congress to define the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction, but the
idea of removing jurisdiction over a pending case seems to violate basic principles of fairness to
all parties.110 But the costs for the Court of saying this in 1868 could have been significant.
Republicans had been highly suspicious of the Court ever since the Dred Scott decision in 1857.
The problem with Dred Scott was not only Chief Justice Roger B. Taney’s conclusion that AfricanAmericans could never be American citizens, but also his declaration that Congress could not
regulate the expansion of slavery into U.S. territories.111 In his first inaugural address, Abraham
Lincoln left no doubt about where he stood on the question of the judiciary’s role in the separation
of powers. “If the policy of the government, upon vital questions, affecting the whole people, is to
be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court,” he said, referencing Dred Scott, “the
people will have ceased to be their own rulers.”112
During the war, Lincoln ignored the chief justice when, sitting as a circuit judge in
Maryland, he tried to stop Lincoln from unilaterally suspending the writ of habeas corpus in
1861.113 Taney then failed to persuade his colleagues that Lincoln’s imposition of a naval blockade
on the Confederacy was unconstitutional.114 When Taney died in October 1864, Lincoln replaced
him with his Treasury Secretary, the staunch abolitionist Salmon P. Chase. Lincoln ended up
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appointing five justices to the Court, one of whom was the product of Congress adding an extra
seat (and circuit) in 1864. Congress then shrunk the Court back down to seven seats in 1866 in
order to deny Andrew Johnson any judicial appointments.115
Put simply, since Dred Scott, the Republicans had shown that they were not bluffers: they
had restructured and bullied the judiciary when they wanted to. In the 1860s, the idea that the
Supreme Court had the final word on constitutional disputes was repugnant to the Republican
Party.116 Surveying this unfavorable landscape, the Supreme Court capitulated in Ex parte
McCardle, declining to address the merits of McCardle’s case due to lack of jurisdiction.117 Martial
law survived.
The Civil Liberties Legacy of Reconstruction
When martial law did eventually die – more or less completely with the re-re-admission of
Georgia, the last unreconstructed state, in July 1870 – it died with congressional blessing. The
postwar Republican coalition constrained the civil liberties of white Southerners reluctantly,
fitfully, and unevenly. The consequences were obvious to the prescient Philip Sheridan, who told
General Grant in 1867 that “we can never have peace or quiet until the States which were in
rebellion surrender their attempts at political power as absolutely as Lee surrendered the Military
strength of the rebellion at Appomattox Court House.”118 This “political” surrender never
happened, and the federal government never did enough to make it happen.
Nevertheless, war-like constitutional powers were central to the Reconstruction project.
The military enfranchised black Southerners, indicted, tried, and punished hundreds of defiant
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white Southerners, facilitated the election of black officeholders for the first time in American
history,119 and, in some places, desegregated public accommodations. Later in the 19th century –
especially during the 1890s – the Jim Crow system would reverse these gains.120 But even Jim
Crow could not extinguish the Fourteenth Amendment, emancipation, Historically Black Colleges
and Universities, or the powerful and inspiring memory of Reconstruction. 121 Black activism and
courage were undoubtedly the foundation of these achievements, but martial law was a necessary
enabler.
When we step back to evaluate the relative significance of the tools that Congress put
toward sustaining martial law, the exclusion of ex-Confederates looms largest. If unreconstructed
Southerners had been readmitted in December 1865, there would have been no Joint Committee
on Reconstruction, no Military Reconstruction Acts, no Enforcement Acts, and no Fourteenth
Amendment.
Congress also creatively exercised powers over the executive branch to sustain martial law.
The Military Reconstruction Acts, the Army Appropriations Act, and the Tenure of Office Act
turned the executive branch against itself, insulating the military from presidential control. The
Tenure of Office Act was probably an unconstitutional violation of the separation of powers. It is
hard to see how the executive can function as a coequal branch of government if its personnel are
routinely granted their own jurisdictional fiefdoms by Congress.122 But during Reconstruction,
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Congress had confidently asserted its right to interpret the Constitution. When President Johnson,
as head of the executive branch, fought back, he was dragged through an impeachment ordeal that
weakened his political standing and tempered his opposition to Reconstruction.
The judiciary received similar treatment. The Republican Party refused to give the courts
the final say on the constitutional questions arising from martial law, adhering, instead, to the
democratic principles that Abraham Lincoln laid down in his first inaugural. The Republicans grew
and shrunk the Supreme Court during and after the Civil War with a view to consolidating
Republican policies. When the Court’s Republican-appointed judges started stepping out of line,
Reconstruction Republicans struck back by curtailing the Court’s jurisdiction. The congressional
intervention in Ex parte McCardle, like the impeachment of President Johnson, kept
Reconstruction alive.
Because “Redemption” and Jim Crow prevailed in the old Confederacy, it is tempting to
conclude that the national government lacked the will and the teeth to implement Reconstruction.
However, legislators utilized a wide variety of constitutional powers to restrain the rights of selfrule that were enjoyed by white Southerners before the war. Courts and jury trials were curbed,
newspaper editors were imprisoned on military orders, elected officials were summarily removed
by generals, the Supreme Court was manipulated, and the unitary façade of the executive branch
was punctured. Some of these measures, such as the Tenure of Office Act, were constitutionally
questionable. Yet, as Table 2.1 summarizes, congressional restrictions on civil liberties during
Reconstruction rested on Congress’s clearly enumerated powers over itself, the executive branch,
and the judiciary.
On the other hand, one major constitutional barrier impeded Congress after the Civil War.
As General Pope put it in a lengthy July 1867 letter to General Grant, once the old Confederate
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states were readmitted, then “the power of Congress over them is reduced practically to the general
power which that body has over all States in the Union.” In essence, this would mean that
“Congress and the people disarm themselves – The moment admission into the Union is
accomplished the Military power is suspended and with it all restrictions are removed.”123
Congress could only intervene in the affairs of the ex-Confederate states so long as they were not
fully fledged states. Congress’s “general power… over all States in the Union” in 1868 was
extremely limited. The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution gave
Congress new powers of enforcement over the states through “appropriate legislation,” but
Congress could not – and still cannot – commandeer state officials to carry out federal edicts. As
state reliance on federal funds increased in the 20th Century, Congress gained leverage over the
states – leverage that would prove decisive in the Second Reconstruction of the 1950s and 60s.124
Such leverage did not exist during the First Reconstruction. The “Military power” was the only
game in town – a fact that was further demonstrated by the impotence of the Enforcement Acts
(including the ostensibly repressive Ku Klux Klan Act) after martial law was lifted.
Table 2.1: The Tools of Reconstruction
Congressional Tools

Examples during Reconstruction

Powers over itself

The exclusion and expulsion of ex-Confederates from Congress,
the creation of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction

Powers over the executive

The Military Reconstruction Acts, the Army Appropriations Act,
the Tenure of Office Act, the impeachment of Andrew Johnson
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Powers over the judiciary

Court expansion and contraction, the stripping of Supreme Court
jurisdiction over the McCardle case

Powers over state and local Military authority
government
Repressive legislation

The Ku Klux Klan Act

Despite these constraints, through an inventive combination of their institutional powers,
Republican legislators provided some of the harsh medicine that Reconstruction required. But the
postwar Republican coalition only constrained civil liberties for a limited time and purpose. That
purpose – ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment – promised to expand the civil liberties
contained in the Bill of Rights across the entire United States. This promise would not begin to be
fulfilled until the Supreme Court started selectively and incrementally “incorporating” specific
provisions of the Bill of Rights against state governments in the 20th Century. “Selective
incorporation” continued into the 21st Century.125
The Fourteenth Amendment has become the cornerstone of American civil liberties. It not
only makes everyone born on U.S. soil a citizen – and places all born and naturalized U.S. citizens
under full protection of the Bill of Rights – it also guards “any person” against deprivation of their
“life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,” and guarantees to “any person” “the equal
protection of the laws.” Citizens and non-citizens alike can claim civil liberties under the
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Fourteenth Amendment, although, as the coming chapters will show, non-citizens have often had
these liberties undercut by punitive immigration laws.
Notwithstanding the limits of the Fourteenth Amendment and the many years that passed
before it was seriously enforced, the fact remains that, in the aftermath of the most devastating war
in American history, the postwar legislative coalition expanded civil liberties for the many even
while it curtailed them – temporarily and reluctantly – for the few. As the following chapter will
demonstrate, the same was not true of the conservative coalition that controlled Congress after the
next major American war.
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3. The War on “Alien Radicals”
The aftermath of the First World War produced one of the most infamous attacks on civil liberties
in U.S. history. Scholars and commentators have frequently pinned these attacks on one man:
United States Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer, orchestrator of the “Palmer Raids.”1 In late
1919 and early 1920, Palmer’s Department of Justice arrested around 3,000 people, primarily
immigrants involved in left-wing politics. The raids were not models of due process or fairness, as
a group of outraged, nationally recognized lawyers would later point out in a scathing and detailed
Report Upon the Illegal Activities of the Department of Justice.2 Although the raw number of 3,000
may seem small in what was then a nation of 110 million people, the chilling effect of mass arrests
across multiple cities should not be understated, nor can the summary deportation of 249 political
“radicals” on a single day in December 1919. President Woodrow Wilson may have been missing
in action due to a debilitating stroke, but the Palmer Raids seemed to embody the enduring ability
of the executive branch to suppress civil liberties in the aftermath of war.
This chapter analyzes the extent to which A. Mitchell Palmer and the Justice Department
were responsible for the post-WWI “Red Scare.” I find that Palmer and his precocious colleague,
J. Edgar Hoover, carried out the wishes of conservative legislators in seeking to arrest and deport
“radical” foreigners. However, I highlight how other officers within the executive branch thwarted
their plans, especially Assistant Labor Secretary Louis Post. I show how Post defied not only
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Palmer and Hoover, but also the Republican-controlled 66th Congress, which pushed for an all-out
war on “alien radicals” before A. Mitchell Palmer did.
Although legislators did not extend or replace wartime sedition legislation, they suppressed
civil liberties through wartime immigration legislation. The 1918 Immigration Act was particularly
crucial in expanding categories of deportable foreigners and removing protections for those
residing in the United States for more than five years. This Act explicitly authorized the Palmer
Raids, but the Raids still did not happen until various forms of congressional pressure – including
a resolution publicly criticizing Palmer’s softness, and a special Senate subcommittee dedicated to
the investigation of “Bolshevik Propaganda” – goaded Palmer into action.
In addition to these national campaigns, members of Congress influenced the behavior of
legislators at the state and local level, particularly in New York. The New York state legislature’s
Joint Committee to Investigate Seditious Activities, led by State Senator Clayton Lusk, was formed
in response to hearings on “Bolshevik Propaganda” conducted by the U.S. Senate. New York
legislators also followed the national lead when they expelled five socialists from the state
assembly in 1920 – one year after the U.S. House of Representatives refused to seat Wisconsin
Socialist Victor L. Berger.
Finally, the “voice of the white South” in Congress prompted the Justice Department’s first
foray into infiltration and surveillance of black political organizations. 3 In the summer of 1919,
racist riots were instigated by white mobs across the country in collaboration with local authorities.
In Washington, DC, and Chicago, African-Americans fought back. Witnessing with horror this
assertiveness and self-defense, influential South Carolina Democrat James F. Byrnes blamed
“radical” black newspapers, and alleged that the black press was taking money and, perhaps,

3

Cameron McWhirter, Red Summer: The Summer of 1919 and the Awakening of Black America (New York: Henry
Holt and Company, 2011), 163.

73

orders, from Moscow. He demanded that the Justice Department keep an eye on the agitators, and
Marcus Garvey, W.E. B. du Bois, Chandler Owen, Claude McKay, and others were soon turning
up in the files of the Department’s Bureau of Investigation. The Bureau would not be prohibited
from such activities until 1924, when a new attorney general confined its remit to law enforcement.
I conclude the chapter by reflecting on the significance of these events for the study of war
and civil liberties. Five findings are particularly salient. First, unlike the Reconstruction Congress,
the post-WWI Congress had no interest in expanding civil liberties. Second, even though the
executive branch had much more money, staff, and authority in 1919 than it did in 1866, its internal
procedures – particularly surrounding deportation – were cumbersome and disjointed. This
bureaucratic mess served to protect victims of the Palmer Raids. Third, the creative use of
prosecutorial discretion by the Assistant Labor Secretary represents a compelling case of executive
power protecting civil liberties. Fourth, legislators played an instrumental role in suppressing civil
liberties after the First World War, but they did so erratically, relying on the short-cuts provided
by immigration law and the bully pulpit provided by special investigations and resolutions. Fifth,
conservative legislators began to cultivate an alliance with the Department of Justice and its
Bureau of Investigation. This alliance was primitive and informal in 1919, but it would mature and
consolidate over the course of the 20th Century.
The Palmer Raids and Executive Power
There is evidence to support the idea that executive power expanded during the First World War
and damaged civil liberties in its aftermath. Even before the United States formally entered the
First World War on April 6, 1917, repressive impulses spread across the home front. “The foreignborn population of this country must be an Americanized population,” Theodore Roosevelt told
the Knights of Columbus at New York’s Carnegie Hall on October 12, 1915. “No other kind can
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fight the battles of America either in war or in peace.” German-Americans, predictably, were the
“hyphenated” residents who drew the sharpest suspicions, especially as Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz
expanded his U-Boat campaign against American vessels and as rumors of Kaiser-sponsored
sabotage within the United States were spread by journalists and public officials.4
The temperature rose further when the United States entered the war. Attorney General
Thomas Gregory found himself flooded with piles of anxious mail. The sources were diverse: a
Charleston district attorney panicking at “unscrupulous demagogues” and “disloyal speeches”
deceiving the “average man” into believing “that this war is a matter with which we have nothing
to do”; a lawyer in Canute, Oklahoma, complaining of a woman from a “German family… residing
in our midst” who called Woodrow Wilson a “bastard”; or an engineering professor at the
University of Texas (Gregory’s alma mater) relaying, “I have heard our Government criticized for
one thing, and that is its lenient attitude towards spies, and disloyal citizens.” Gregory estimated
that “we not infrequently receive as many as fifteen hundred letters in a single day suggesting
disloyalty and the making of investigations.”5
Although the attorney general was not shy about chastising hysterical citizens (“Keep your
shirt on,” he told the UT professor),6 he oversaw a forceful government response to wartime
dissent. His colleagues in the Justice Department crafted an Espionage Act, passed by Congress in
June 1917, which gave the Postmaster General the power to exclude what he defined as seditious
publications from the mails, and gave U.S. attorneys the authority to prosecute opponents of
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conscription. Within twelve months, Postmaster General Albert Sidney Burleson was able to
provide a list of forty-four different “publications whose second-class mail privilege has been
revoked after a hearing on account of violation of the Espionage Law.”7 Congress passed an even
broader Sedition Act in May 1918, which Gregory and his subordinates privately described as
unduly repressive, but nonetheless enforced.8 By this time, Walter Nelles, the Chief Legal Counsel
of the National Civil Liberties Bureau (later known as the American Civil Liberties Union –
ACLU), had tallied 1,181 cases brought under the original Espionage Act. In his later study,
Freedom of Speech in War Time, Harvard Law Professor Zachariah Chafee would include the
“Sedition” cases, and put the figure closer to 2,000. Prominent dissenters were targeted. Among
the most notable were Socialist Party leaders Eugene Debs and Rose Pastor Stokes, as were the
leaders of the militant union, the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW). Debs, Stokes, and others
were not subjected to Civil War-style military commissions, but their free speech rights were
clearly curtailed by the Espionage and Sedition Acts.9
To what extent were restrictions on civil liberties retained after the war? Happily for Walter
Nelles and Zachariah Chafee, the Sedition Act expired and was never replaced. Less happily, the
Espionage Act remained on the books, ostensibly to aid the enforcement of Prohibition.10 Nelles,
Chafee, and their allies protested this retention of wartime legislation during peacetime, but they
soon became more concerned with postwar actions taken by the executive branch.

7

Internal Memo, May 8, 1918, Albert Sidney Burleson Papers, Box 19, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
Warren to TWG, April 3, 1918, Warren Papers, Box 6; TWG to Warren, April 4, 1918, Warren Papers, Box 6.
9
Walter Nelles, Espionage Act Cases (New York: National Civil Liberties Bureau, 1918); Zachariah Chafee, Free
Speech in the United States (Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press, 1964 [1941]), 53.
10
See Albert de Silver (ADS) to William Borah, May 13, 1921, American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) Papers,
Correspondence-Volume 167, the Roger Baldwin Years; see also Borah to ADS, May 14, 1921, ACLU Papers,
Correspondence-Volume 167; ADS to Borah, July 20, 1921. On the Prohibition justification, see American Union
Against Militarism, Republicans Give Burleson a Longer Lease of Life, n.d. [likely December 1919], ACLU Papers,
Correspondence-Volume 106. On later uses of the Espionage Act, see Harry Blain, “The Sun Never Sets on the
Espionage Act,” Foreign Policy in Focus, April 4, 2019.
8

76

In late 1919 and early 1920, Thomas Gregory’s successor as attorney general, A. Mitchell
Palmer, ordered the mass arrest of at least 3,000, primarily foreign-born, suspected Communists
and members of the Union of Russian Workers. By April 1920, 263 victims of the “Palmer Raids”
had been deported – most (249) in a single boatload aboard the USAT Buford, nicknamed the
“Soviet Ark.” “It was 4:20 A.M. on the day of our Lord, December 21, 1919,” the Ark’s most
famous passenger, Emma Goldman, recalled. “I felt dizzy, visioning a transport of politicals
doomed to Siberia, the étape of former Russian days. Russia of the past rose before me and I saw
the revolutionary martyrs being driven into exile. But no, it was New York, it was America, the
land of liberty!”11
The Soviet Ark deportations bookended a tumultuous year. 1919 started with a general
strike in Seattle, which lasted for five days. The mayor, Ole Hanson, described the strike as an
“attempted revolution,” part of a plan to “establish a soviet” and carry out “the ultimate destruction
of the Government and the establishment in its stead of bolshevism, pure and undefiled, with its
consequent red terror and tyranny.”12 Other labor struggles compounded these fears. The Boston
Police Department dramatically walked off the job in June after the Police Commissioner
sabotaged officers’ attempts to affiliate with the American Federation of Labor (AFL). Massive
strikes in the steel and coal industry followed in September and November.13 North of the border,
a general strike in Winnipeg lasted for more than a month. That this all happened within a year of
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the Bolshevik Revolution and the founding of the Communist Party USA (CPUSA) did little to
calm nerves in Washington.14
Exacerbating the panic, high-profile Americans who had shown their displeasure with the
“reds” were subjected to bomb threats. In April, a homemade bomb was sent to Mayor Hanson.
The former chairman of the Senate Committee on Immigration received a similar package.
Combustible deliveries to Senators Lee Overman (D-North Carolina) and William King (D-Utah),
as well as Department of Justice employee Frank Nebeker, were intercepted by the authorities.
The prosecutors of Thomas Mooney and Warren Billings – who had allegedly carried out the 1916
“Preparedness Day” bombing in San Francisco – were also targeted, as was the Chicago judge
who presided over a mass trial and conviction of IWW members in 1918. Another target, Alabama
Democratic Congressman John Burnett, was saved by the package getting stuck while he tried to
open it, and Senator Reed Smoot (R-Utah) was saved by the senders’ failure to pay the adequate
postage. There were thirty bombs overall and they claimed zero casualties. But they were
accompanied by menacing, vengeful messages – apparently of “radical” provenance – and they
did manage to reach some of the most powerful men in the country, including A. Mitchell Palmer,
Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, and Postmaster General Albert Sidney Burleson.15
Acutely conscious of this backdrop, when the twelve renowned lawyers of the National
Popular Government League condemned the Palmer Raids in May 1920, they made sure to
emphasize that “we make no argument in favor of any radical doctrine as such, whether Socialist,
Communist or Anarchist.” Instead, “we are concerned solely with bringing to the attention of the

14

These events are recounted thoroughly in Robert K. Murray, Red Scare: A Study in National Hysteria, 1919-1920
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1955).
15
A succinct summary of the bombings is provided in Paul Avrich, Sacco and Vanzetti: The Anarchist Background
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), 141-143. The bombings were also described – dramatically – by
representatives in United States Congress, House Judiciary Committee, Hearings Before Committee on the
Judiciary, House of Representatives Sixty-Sixth Congress Second Session H.R. 10210, 10235, 10319, 10014, 10010,
10050, and 11009, Serial 10, December 11 and 16, 1919 (Washington: GPO, 1919), 39, 33.

78

American people the utterly illegal acts which have been committed by those charged with the
highest duty of enforcing the laws.” The lawyers conceded that deportation in itself was not a
violation of civil liberties, but summary deportation – solely on the basis of political opinions –
was an outrage to the Constitution. The Palmer Raids, they argued, had been stained by “cruel and
unusual punishments,” “arrests without warrant,” “unreasonable searches and seizures,” the
deployment of “provocative agents,” “compelling persons to be witnesses against themselves,”
and “propaganda.”16
Did the Justice Department abuse its power? It certainly had ample power to abuse. As we
saw in Chapter 2, the Justice Department was established in 1870 to enforce Reconstruction after
martial law was lifted in the former Confederacy. Although the Department had some successes
in prosecuting the Ku Klux Klan in South Carolina, and in professionalizing the prosecution of
federal law more broadly, it was woefully under-equipped for the war on white terror in the 1870s.
Things looked different in 1919. By then, the Justice Department had its own Bureau of
Investigation, thanks to the efforts of Attorney General Charles Bonaparte in 1908. Initially, this
Bureau was justified as an efficiency measure, ending the costly practice of hiring Secret Service
agents to investigate violations of federal law.17 The Bureau grew in size and stature during the
First World War, with its annual congressional appropriations trebling to over $2 million, and its
total staff increasing five-fold to just under 700 between 1914 and 1919.18 “The signing of the
armistice did not end the war activities of the bureau,” its director William J. Flynn wrote in his
section of the Annual Attorney General’s report for 1919. “It may be said however, that the
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pressure of work for the bureau is ended. In its stead the bureau is confronted with a very large
and important task in connection with social and economic unrest which in part has grown out of
the war.”19
On August 1, 1919, the Bureau of Investigation created a dedicated “Radical Division.”
Director Flynn complained that the Division’s potential was hampered “by reason of the present
state of permanent legislation on this subject,” which was “exceedingly limited” in “affect[ing]
persons of American citizenship engaged in radical agitation.” As a result, “the efforts of the
division” were “largely centered upon the activities of alien agitators with the object of securing
the deportation of such persons. To this end very close relations have been established with the
office of the Commissioner General of Immigration.” Ominously, Flynn “believed that in the near
future this country may be freed of the presence of a considerable number of undesirable aliens
who have come as missionaries of unrest rather than as emigrants from oppression.”20
Flynn was correct that it was legally easier to deport “aliens” than it was to censor
American citizens. The leaders of the ACLU acknowledged this. “As you know,” Albert de Silver
wrote Charles Recht in June 1920, “the view taken by the United States courts [is] that deportation
is not a punishment for crime.” This “does not have much relation to the facts of life,” he continued,
and “I don’t believe you can constitutionally penalize a state of mind, but my guess is that you can
nevertheless constitutionally deport because of a state of mind or because of the color of your hair
or for any other arbitrary reason that Congress sees fit to make a test.”21
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De Silver was referring to the Supreme Court’s determinations that, even though noncitizens are protected by the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and even
though deportation must involve due process,22 the powers of the federal government are nearly
boundless in this area. In Fong Yue Ting v. United States (1892), the Court had articulated these
powers in terms that conservative senators would favorably quote during the Red Scare: “The right
of a nation to expel or deport foreigners who have not been naturalized or taken any steps toward
becoming citizens of the country, rests upon the same grounds, and is as absolute and unqualified
as the right to prohibit and prevent their entrance into the country”; “The right to exclude or to
expel all aliens or any class of aliens, absolutely or upon certain conditions, in war or in peace, [is]
an inherent and inalienable right of every sovereign and independent nation, essential to its safety,
its independence and its welfare”; and “The power to exclude aliens and the power to expel them
rest upon one foundation, are derived from one source, are supported by the same reasons, and are
in truth but parts of one and the same power.”23
J. Edgar Hoover, the man in charge of the Radical Division of the Justice Department,
knew this legal landscape well. As a former librarian, he also knew the importance of fastidious
record-keeping, and he soon established “a card-index system, numbering over 200,000 cards,
giving detailed data not only upon individual agitators connected with the ultraradical movement,
but also upon organizations, associations, societies, publications, and special conditions existing
in certain localities.” He began to receive “weekly surveys from the various offices covering all
matters of a general intelligence nature coming under their observation,” including Army and Navy
intelligence, and developed “biographies… of all authors, publishers, editors, etc., showing any
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connection with an ultraradical body or movement.”24 Upon such intelligence the Palmer Raids
relied. Fittingly, when Palmer later testified about the raids before the Senate Judiciary Committee,
J. Edgar Hoover sat alongside him, answered questions, and provided his own snippet of
testimony.25
Hoover’s intelligence was not distinguished for its accuracy. “Three thousand warrants
were in the hands of the immigration inspectors in the various cities in the United States on January
2nd, 1920,” Palmer told Congress. However, “in the execution of that many warrants on a single
night against aliens, many of whom could not speak the language, many of whom would not tell
their names, undoubtedly persons were arrested who were not named in the warrants.” These aliens
were released. “It was also bound to happen,” Palmer conceded, “in a large number of
simultaneous arrests of that sort, that citizens would be taken—persons who had been naturalized.
They were not subject to deportation. Of course, when it was discovered that they were citizens,
they were promptly released. Some of them were held overnight.”26
These blunders aside, the development of the Radical Division (soon renamed the General
Intelligence Division) was central to the Palmer Raids. The Justice Department also paved the way
for the Raids by changing administrative rules, particularly “rule 22.” As Palmer recalled,
The rule, as it originally stood, was changed by the Department of Labor in the
early part of 1919 so that it would accord to the alien the right of counsel from the
beginning of the proceedings. In the arrests which were made in November, 1919,
of members of the Union of Russian Workers it developed that the ends of justice
were certainly defeated by the operation of such a rule. It was impossible in many
of those proceedings to elicit information from the alien as to the date of his arrival
in the country or as to his activities after arrival therein, for upon advice of counsel
he would refuse to answer any question whatsoever. The demand from the field
officers of the Bureau of Immigration, from this experience, brought about a change
in rule 22 in December of 1919, and the arrests which were made on January 2,
24

United States Department of Justice, Annual Report of the Attorney General for the Year 1920 (Washington:
GPO, 1920), 173, 178.
25
U.S. Congress, Charges of Illegal Practices, 649-651 (Testimony by Hoover).
26
Ibid, 8-9.

82

1920, were made under the rule as it then stood, and counsel was not accorded to
the aliens until after the preliminary investigation.
A “preliminary investigation” without counsel seemed reasonable to Palmer. To the ACLU’s
Charles Recht, who testified in the same Judiciary Committee hearings, this was “a sort of
tyranny.”27
On the available evidence, it is difficult not to side with Recht, the ACLU, and the National
Popular Government League. The conduct of the Justice Department in planning and executing
the Palmer Raids seems to embody a common fear of constitutional law scholars: the executive
branch became more powerful during wartime, sustained that power during peacetime, and then
turned that power against civil liberties.
The Politics of Deportations
The Palmer Raids were legally sanctioned, as Palmer reminded the Senate Judiciary Committee in
1921. Palmer quoted extensively from the Immigration Act of October 1918, which called for the
deportation of
[a]liens who are anarchists; aliens who believe in or advocate the overthrow by
force or violence of the Government of the United States or of all forms of law;
aliens who disbelieve in or are opposed to all organized government; aliens who
advocate or teach the assassination of public officials; aliens who advocate or teach
the unlawful destruction of property; aliens who are members of or affiliated with
any organization that entertains a belief in, teaches, or advocates the overthrow by
force or violence of the Government of the United States or of forms of law, or that
entertains or teaches disbelief in or opposition to all organized government, or that
advocates the duty, necessity, or propriety of the unlawful assaulting or killing of
any officer or officers, either of specific individuals or of officers generally of the
Government of the United States or of any other organized government, because of
his or their official character, or that advocates or teaches the unlawful destruction
of property.28
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The primary author of the Act, Democratic Representative John Burnett of Alabama, had told the
House that “the purpose of the bill” was to provide “a summary means of getting rid of these
people without the long delays of the court.” In fact, as Burnett later acknowledged, “it has been
the law for years and years to deport without any trial,” but his bill streamlined the existing process
in two ways. First, it removed procedural protections for “anarchists who have been here for more
than five years.” Second, it was aimed not only at “anarchists,” but also “at all who are conniving
and scheming for the destruction of this Government.”29 Although the House debates on the
Immigration Act suggest some wartime fears of “the pro-German,” highly dishonorable mentions
were reserved for the “bolsheviki,” the “anarchist,” the “socialist,” and the “I.W.W.” – the
bugbears of the looming Red Scare.30 Only New York Socialist Congressman Meyer London
spoke out against the bill.31 In the end, the bill comfortably passed both houses, and Woodrow
Wilson signed it into law on October 16, 1918, less than a month before the Armistice.
The debate surrounding the Immigration Act reflected the politics of the 65th Congress.
1918 was the last year in U.S. history that the House of Representatives was run by a minority
coalition. After losing sixteen seats in the 1916 election, Democrats held 214 seats and the
Republicans held 215. The Democrats were only able to control the House with the support of
three Progressive Party Representatives and the sole Socialist, Meyer London. The margin was
healthier in the Senate, which the Democrats controlled 54-42. In both houses, the Democratic
Party was dominated by Southerners – both in raw numbers, and in chairmanship of standing
committees. Wilson, himself a Southerner, had unified his party around a “progressive” agenda
that modestly reformed capitalism through measures such as antitrust legislation, promotion of
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collective bargaining, and income taxation, while crushing “radical” labor movements and
preserving Jim Crow.32 In modern terms, the Wilson Democrats were economically liberal (in the
American sense) and socially conservative. This is reflected in their DW-Nominate scores, which
scale and spatially map the ideology of legislators based on all their roll-call votes. As figures 3.1
and 3.2 demonstrate, the Wilson Democrats were consistently to the left of Republicans on the
“Economic/Redistributive” votes, but frequently more conservative than Republicans on other
votes.33
Figure 3.1: DW-Nominate Scores in the 65th Congress, House of Representatives
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Figure 3.2: DW-Nominate Scores in the 65th Congress, Senate

Immigration, of course, does not neatly fit into an “economic” or “non-economic”
category, and Wilson Democrats were an awkward mix of xenophobic white Protestants and urban
machine politicians. Congress had twice passed restrictive immigration legislation with provisions
for the deportation of “anarchists” during the war, and Wilson had twice issued a veto. The earlier
Immigration Act of 1917 only became law through a veto override. Wilson’s objections to this law
were apparently rooted in its introduction of a literacy test and a measure to “all but close entirely
the gates of asylum.”34 In October 1918, neither Wilson nor any Democrats in Congress harbored
serious reservations about using deportation statutes to target “alien radicals.”
Congressman Burnett boasted that “this bill is very much desired by several of the
departments,” including “the Department of Labor and the Department of Justice,” as well as
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“Representatives of the Intelligence Bureaus of the War and Navy Departments.”35 Based on what
we have seen from the Justice Department’s conduct during and after the war, its support for
summary deportation procedures is not surprising. We have also already seen how J. Edgar Hoover
cultivated an amicable working relationship among the Justice Department and Army and Navy
Intelligence. What brought the Department of Labor along? Burnett told the House that the Labor
Secretary simply “favors [the bill’s] general provisions.”36 The procedures were also surely to the
Department of Labor’s liking, as the ultimate authority to issue deportation warrants was vested in
the Labor Secretary. This was not unusual, as the Bureau of Immigration was a Labor Department
agency – and would be until 1940. But now the Labor Secretary had wide discretion to determine
who harbored ideas dangerous enough to require their removal from the United States. In the
House of Representatives, no one (other than Meyer London) questioned this discretion.37
Legislators had created their “means of getting rid of these people.”
After the passage of the Immigration Act, Americans went back to the polls, with the end
of war imminent. Wilson, who was trying to sell his “Fourteen Points” peace plan to Europe,
publicly warned voters that “the return of a Republican majority to either House of Congress
would… certainly be interpreted on the other side of the water as a repudiation of my leadership.”
Vote Democrat, he urged, “not for my own sake or the sake of a political party, but for the sake of
the nation itself, in order that its inward unity of purpose may be evident to all the world.”38
Wilson’s advice was not heeded. For the first time since 1908, the Republican Party won the House
(by a margin of 240 change to 192) and the Senate (by a margin of 49 to 47). “Any party which
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carries out progressive and constructive policies is sure to bring about a reaction,” Wilson
reflected. “There is apparently nothing in which the human mind is more inhospitable than to
change and in the business world that is particularly true, because if you get in the habit of doing
business in a particular way, and are compelled to do it in a different way, you think somebody in
Washington doesn’t understand business.”39
Wilson’s assessment may have been sanctimonious, but it was not completely off-base in
blaming the Democratic Party’s defeat on conservative reaction. The Democrats had moved
cautiously on many policy fronts, but the war had compelled them to give government a more
active role in the economy: nationalizing the railroads, encouraging mass production through a
War Industries Board, and controlling food distribution through the U.S. Food Administration.40
During the campaign, Henry Cabot Lodge, the pre-eminent Senate Republican from
Massachusetts, had accused Wilson of surrounding himself with “socialists and bolsheviks.” Will
Hays, the national Republican Party chairman, thundered that “every thinking man and woman
has noted the socialistic tendencies of the present government,” in contrast to “the Republican
Party,” which, “from its inception has stood against undue federalization of industries.” The task,
now, Hays said, was “just restriction of the present socialistic tendency in our government.”
Former President Theodore Roosevelt and Washington Senator Miles Poindexter piled on with
criticisms of the government’s willingness to accept anything short of unconditional surrender
from Germany.41
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Other factors influenced the election outcome. Wilson shot himself in the foot by
connecting partisanship and patriotism so intimately in his pitch to voters. Republicans justifiably
accused him of politicizing the war effort. His case was not helped by the impact of the influenza
pandemic, which depressed voter turnout across the nation and added to the misery of wartime
inflation and casualties.42
Whatever the causes – and whether their fears of creeping socialism were sincere or not –
the Republicans who prevailed in 1918 were determined to sink the Wilson Democrats. When they
took their congressional seats in January 1919, they continued to harp on the idea that Wilson was
soft on radical leftists. Senator Poindexter, who was plotting a 1920 presidential run, was
particularly vociferous in accusing Wilson of being friendly with the IWW, the domestic socialist
movement, and the new Bolshevik government in Russia.43 But it was a conservative Democrat,
Lee Overman of North Carolina, who led the first major congressional investigation of “Bolshevik
Propaganda” in February and March 1919. Under a Senate resolution passed near the end of the
war, Overman’s special subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee was initially charged
with publicizing the links between “Brewing and Liquor Interests and German Propaganda.” After
publishing a 2,975 page report on this subject,44 Senate Resolution 439, passed on February 4,
1919, authorized Overman to expand his remit to “any efforts being made to propagate in this
country the principles of any party exercising or claiming to exercise authority in Russia,”

42

See A. Scott Berg, Wilson (New York: Putnam, 2013), 503-506.
Schmidt, Red Scare, 238-239.
44
United States Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Brewing and Liquor Interests and German
Propaganda: Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Sixty-fifth
Congress, Second and Third Sessions, Pursuant to S. Res. 307 (Washington: GPO, 1919) (two volumes).
43

89

particularly if those “principles” involved “any effort to incite the overthrow of the Government
of this country.”45
Overman’s subcommittee heard from twenty-five witnesses.46 Arguably, the most
explosive testimony came from a witness in the earlier brewing industry hearings. Archibald E.
Stevenson called himself “a special agent in the Department of Justice, Bureau of Investigation,”
and he claimed that “the Bolsheviki movement is a branch of the revolutionary socialism of
Germany.” He proceeded to name organizations and individuals in the United States that allegedly
sympathized with the “movement.” These included Roger Baldwin and Albert de Silver of the
National Civil Liberties Bureau, Morris Hillquit and Victor L. Berger of the Socialist Party, and
various editors of foreign-language newspapers.47 The Overman subcommittee added to these
allegations with lurid accounts of the Bolshevik Revolution, extensive publicization of zealous and
ambitious radical literature, and testy cross-examinations of the revolution’s supporters, including
John Reed, Albert Rhys Williams, and Louise Bryant.48
Congressional conservatives, who had co-existed with Socialist Party Representative
Meyer London in the 65th Congress, next turned their attention to keeping Wisconsin Socialist
Victor L. Berger out of the 66th Congress, after he had won election to the House in the 1918
midterms while under indictment for violating the Espionage Act. The House responded to
Berger’s election by convening a special committee to determine whether he could be seated. The
Constitution does not prohibit office-holding for felons, let alone for someone who is awaiting a
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verdict in their case, but the special committee dug up the long-neglected Section 3 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which holds that “no person shall be a Senator or Representative in
Congress” if they have “engaged in insurrection or rebellion” against the United States “or given
aid or comfort to the enemies thereof.” Because support for socialism amounted to “aid and
comfort” to American enemies, the House refused to seat Berger.49
All this was happening while major strikes and “radical” bomb plots gripped the country,
and A. Mitchell Palmer, who had assumed the office of attorney general in March 1919, seemed
to be sitting on his hands. The 1918 Immigration Act had explicitly authorized the attorney general
to round up “alien radicals” and throw them out. Palmer had given no indication that he would act
on this authority. Losing patience, in October 1919, Senator Poindexter publicly denounced the
Justice Department. On October 14, he introduced a Senate resolution demanding that Palmer
“advise and inform the Senate the reason for the failure of the Department of Justice to take legal
proceedings for the arrest and punishment of the various persons within the United States who…
have attempted to bring about the forcible overthrow of the Government of the United States.” In
particular, “the Attorney General is requested to advise and inform the Senate why the Department
of Justice has failed to take legal proceedings for the arrest and deportation of aliens who, it is
alleged, have… committed the acts aforesaid.”50 Although some of Palmer’s Democratic allies
feared that the resolution “conveys the idea that there has been a neglect of duty or a failure to
perform duty on the part of the Attorney General,” it passed the Senate on October 17.51
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Palmer finally acted in November, with the first multi-city raid on the Union of Russian
Workers. “I was being shouted at from every editorial sanction in America,” Palmer later reflected.
“I was preached upon from every pulpit; I was urged – I could feel it dinned in my ears –
throughout the country to do something and do it now, and do it quick, and do it in a way that
would bring results to stop this sort of thing in the United States.”52 His tone was far less bashful
in the immediate aftermath of the November raids. He reveled in the opportunity to write a formal
reply to the Poindexter Resolution on November 14, in which he described his raids, and blamed
Congress for not giving him the money to carry them out sooner.53
Which Palmer should we believe? The retrospective Palmer was aware of the bad press the
raids received in the 1920s, so he was eager to downplay his role in them. The Palmer of November
1919 was biting back against senators who had publicly embarrassed him in the Poindexter
Resolution, so he was eager to blame them for delays and claim as much personal credit as
possible. We can be sure that Poindexter did not give Palmer the idea for the raids. J. Edgar Hoover
had been planning for a possible round-up of radicals since at least August 1919. On the other
hand, Palmer showed no public or private indication that he would make full use of the 1918
Immigration Act, and he was likely to be susceptible to pressure from Poindexter. Palmer, like
Poindexter, was ready to seek his party’s nomination for the 1920 presidential contest. 54 Palmer
did not want to concede the anti-radical mantle to his potential rival for the highest office in the
land, especially after anti-radicalism seemed to play so well for Republicans at the ballot box in
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1918. This political jostling continued after the November raids. Poindexter and other Republicans
claimed to have forced Palmer into action; Palmer repeated his claim that he would have acted
earlier if not for a stingy Congress. More raids in January soon followed.55
This political context bears greatly on the extent to which we describe the Palmer Raids as
an abuse of executive power. At a minimum, we can see that the Palmer Raids were both legally
sanctioned and encouraged by Congress. The executive branch is supposed to faithfully execute
the laws, and this is exactly what A. Mitchell Palmer did. Would the Raids have happened without
the legislative clamor for them? Possibly not. Palmer’s hesitation in carrying out the Raids, and
his sensitivity to criticisms from the Senate, make the Raids look like a wild counter-punch by a
cornered political fighter, rather than an executive official emboldened by extraordinary wartime
powers.
More broadly, the executive branch – controlled by Democrats – was substantially
weakened by the Republican triumph in the 1918 elections. The hostility of the Republican
Congress to the Wilson peace plan is well-documented, and this hostility extended to the
administration’s allegedly soft treatment of domestic “radicals.” Palmer’s Raids defused some of
this criticism, but other executive officials were soon attacked for failing to go further. Although
Palmer and Hoover successfully shipped off Emma Goldman and company aboard the Soviet Ark,
they struggled to expel more. The simple reason was because the final authority to deport did not
lie with them. Instead, it lay with the Labor Department. Specifically, it lay with Assistant Labor
Secretary Louis F. Post, who had been put in charge of deportations by the Labor Secretary,
William B. Wilson.
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After rubber-stamping the Soviet Ark deportations, Secretary Wilson stepped back from
his cabinet duties because of illness. “I had often administered the immigration duties of the
Department,” Assistant Secretary Post later recalled. “But now I was plunged into responsibility
for the aftermath of this [anti-radical] crusade to the full.”56 In February and March 1920, Post
reviewed 3,000 outstanding deportation warrants requested by the Department of Justice. He
cancelled 1,293 of them. By April 1920, the Republican Chairman of the House Committee on
Immigration and Naturalization, Albert Johnson of Washington, was exploding at the realization
that only 263 of the “radicals” who were arrested during the Palmer Raids had been deported.
Johnson held a special hearing to consider impeachment charges against the Assistant Labor
Secretary. “When Congress writes laws that anarchists shall be deported, Congress means that
very thing,” Johnson told his colleagues on the Rules Committee. “In my opinion the public is not
seeing red without a reason. It is seeing its laws violated by public officials in behalf [sic] of aliens
who have contempt for this Government… if necessary, Congress should clean out any executive
department that encourages these aliens or indorses [sic] their ideas.”57
The author of the resolution to consider impeachment, Kansas Republican Homer Hoch,
argued that “Assistant Secretary of Labor Post, by his attitude toward the law and by his action in
specific cases, has virtually nullified the law against alien reds and anarchists.” Fellow Kansas
Republican, Jasper Tincher, agreed that “Mr. Post has violated the law, acted without authority
and acted against the interests of the Government of the United States.” Albert Johnson alleged
that Post was “boring within” the Labor Department (an expression alluding to dual loyalties) right
under the nose of President Wilson.58
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Post was comfortable and confident that he had acted lawfully. “The entire function of
deportation is vested in the Secretary of Labor,” he told the Rules Committee. “He decides whether
a warrant shall issue or shall not issue and controls the examination from the beginning, except in
one respect that it must be conducted by an inspector under the immigration bureau at a station.”
Overall, “the Commissioner General of Immigration has nothing whatever to do with this
proceedings [sic] except to act in a ministerial capacity to obey the orders of the Secretary of
Labor.”59
Because Labor Secretary William B. Wilson had delegated this authority to Post, Post
could exercise prosecutorial discretion. “To permit aliens to violate the hospitality of this country
by conspiring against it is something which no American can contemplate with patience,” Post
conceded. “Equally impatient, however, must any patriotic American be with drastic proceedings
on flimsy proof to deport aliens who are not conspiring against our laws and do not intend to.” 60
Post would later recount things more bluntly, describing how foreign radicals were held
“incommunicado, old Spanish fashion, for days at a stretch,” with the immigration inspectors
“lawlessly intercepting their letters in the mail, depriving them of the help of friends and the
services of lawyers, [and] placing them beyond the reach of writs of habeas corpus.”61
Post won the fight. The House did not even bring an impeachment vote. This might be due
to Post’s success in cogently defending his actions. More realistically, Congress could do little to
reverse what Post had done. He had created facts on the ground and dared Congress to defy him,
and he had leveraged the fragmented chain of command for deportations within the executive
branch to protect the victims of the Red Scare. In theory, Congress could have removed him from
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office and rewritten the law to give all power to A. Mitchell Palmer and the Justice Department.
In practice, these would be large, time-consuming, and complex legislative challenges – challenges
that Congress had already experienced when pondering the passage of a postwar replacement for
the Sedition Act.62 In any event, a new law still might not have reversed Post’s decisions. Another
administrative procedure would have to be established, and it would have had to provide some
discretion to some executive officer somewhere down the line. Louis Post thus succeeded in using
executive power to resist Congress and protect civil liberties.
Overall, the Palmer Raids were sanctioned and encouraged by Congress, and reined in by
the executive. This is not a typical story of executive power being abused. If anything, it is a story
of the executive branch bungling the implementation of a repressive law. Future chapters will
examine whether such bungling was merely a fluke, a consequence of a fragmented deportation
process and Louis Post being in the right place at the right time. For now, it is sufficient to say that
Post was in the right place at the right time, and he succeeded in thwarting the worst excesses of
the Red Scare.
The “Red Summer”
While A. Mitchell Palmer was enduring congressional criticism in 1919 for going soft on the reds,
one of his co-partisans in Congress publicly alleged that the reds were destabilizing American
racial hierarchies. On August 25, South Carolina Congressman James Byrnes – a future Senator,
Supreme Court Justice, and Secretary of State – advanced a troubling theory. “Coming from South
Carolina, I think I know something of the negro,” Byrnes began, “and I have become convinced
that the race antagonism manifesting itself throughout the country is due to the incendiary
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utterances of the would-be leaders of the race now being circulated through negro newspapers and
magazines.” The “conservatism” of “Booker Washington” had been supplanted by “a crowd of
radicals.” Chief among these “radicals” was “W.E.B. Du Bois, editor of the Crisis Magazine,” who
had espoused menacing ideas to returning black war veterans, including that “no intelligent
American negro is willing to lay down his life for the United States as it now exists.” Most
menacing, however, were favorable references in the black press to Russia and the Soviet Union.
This could only mean one thing: “the IWW’s [sic] are financing it in an effort to have the negro of
America join them in their revolutionary plans.” The IWW and “the Bolsheviki of Russia” had to
be stopped from “using the negro press of America to further their nefarious purposes.” Close
government surveillance of the “negro press” would be essential to this end.63
Byrnes, who had already established himself as “the voice of the white South”64 in the
House, was responding to a tumultuous summer for American race relations. What really occurred
was racist terror. Black neighborhoods were attacked by white mobs in twenty-six American cities.
Six were killed and fifty injured in Washington, DC; 38 were killed and “hundreds injured” in
Chicago; the mayor of Omaha, Nebraska, was hanged for trying to prevent a lynching; in
Knoxville, Tennessee, seven were killed and two injured; six more were killed in Norfolk,
Virginia; and 25-50 – probably more – were killed in Phillips County, Arkansas.65 This violence
had numerous causes. In Chicago, the key factor seemed to be backlash against black migration
from the South. In the South, the resurgence and rebranding of the Ku Klux Klan was pivotal.

63

Congressional Record, 66th Congress, 1st Session, August 25 (Washington: GPO, 1919), 4303, 4304.
McWhirter, Red Summer, 163.
65
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), 10th Annual Report for the Year 1919
(New York: NAACP, 1920), 34-36. If anything, the NAACP undercounted. See McWhirter, Red Summer.
64

97

Everywhere, the economic consequences of the war – especially high inflation – threw fuel on the
already smoldering fire of entrenched racial prejudice.66
Byrnes’s conspiratorial explanation of this “Red Summer” earned plenty of press attention.
Anonymous Justice Department officials lent credence to his claims in the New York Tribune, even
though their boss, A. Mitchell Palmer, had apparently concluded that “considerable [Communist]
money has been spent and great quantities of literature distributed [in black communities] to no
effect.”67 W.E.B du Bois gave it as good as he got from Byrnes. “Mr. Byrnes, and his kind” were
“primarily the ones who not only precipitated the riots,” Du Bois said, but they were also guilty of
“encouraging for fifty years the lynching of 4,000 Negroes, the disenfranchisement of a million
and a half voters, the forced ignorance of three million human beings, and the theft of hundreds of
millions of dollars in wages.”68
Byrnes clearly caused a stir, but he never presented any bill or resolution that would
indicate the degree to which his colleagues agreed with him. Most Democrats in the Deep South
surely would have. In any event, the Justice Department followed his lead. In November, when A.
Mitchell Palmer presented to the Senate “A Report on the Activities of the Bureau of Investigation
of the Department of Justice Against Persons Advising Anarchy, Sedition, and the Forcible
Overthrow of the Government,” he included a special report from the Bureau of Investigation on
“Radicalism and Sedition Among the Negroes.” The report did not substantiate Byrnes’s
allegations of a full-blown red-and-black plot, but, after quoting extensively from the black press,
it warned of a “dangerous spirit of defiance and vengeance at work among the Negro leaders, and,

66

See McWhirter, Red Summer.
“No Bolshevism in Riots,” New York Times, July 31, 1919.
68
Quoted in McWhirter, Red Summer, 163-164.
67

98

to an ever-increasing extent, among their followers.”69 The same theme – “stirring up of racial
hatred” by “radical [black] publications” – came through in evidence that Palmer submitted to the
Senate in April 1920.70
Meanwhile, the Bureau of Investigation’s General Intelligence Division began a more
concerted campaign of surveillance and infiltration of black political organizations.71 An informant
– known in the Bureau files as “800” – sent regular reports to Bureau headquarters on Cyril
Briggs’s African Blood Brotherhood and Marcus Garvey’s Universal Negro Improvement
Association.72 “800” monitored and sometimes encouraged the rift between Briggs and Garvey,
while sending to the Bureau various publications from both organizations – all of which J. Edgar
Hoover had personally requested.73 Du Bois and the NAACP were also watched closely, as were
A. Philip Randolph and Chandler Owen.74 Bureau agents were particularly interested in the
political divisions between Garvey and these groups and individuals, and the agents reported on
such divisions gleefully.75 Otherwise, the Bureau had an agent regularly wander around “a number
of places in Harlem among the colored people” and regularly report “nothing of interest to the
Department.”76
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There remained no real evidence of the Communist connections alleged by Congressman
Byrnes. Briggs and Du Bois certainly sympathized with the Communist movement, and Marcus
Garvey said some nice things about the patriotic credentials of Trotsky and Lenin. 77 The best the
Bureau could come up with involved the three African-American delegates to the Third
Communist International in 1922. Of particular concern was the poet Claude McKay, who had
travelled to Russia without a passport and planned to return to the United States “with instructions
to organize a colored Soviet,” according to a State Department official.78 The State Department
was also able to acquire at least one of McKay’s private letters and forward it to the Bureau of
Investigation, but this involved reflections on Parisian architecture rather than a blueprint for a
“colored soviet.”79
It was not until 1924 that the Bureau’s surveillance operations were constrained, when
newly installed Attorney General Harlan Fiske Stone formally prohibited what the ACLU called
“the political and propaganda activities” of the Bureau. Stone fired the head of the Bureau of
Investigation and dissolved the General Intelligence Division. 80 Before this, House and Senate
investigations had accused A. Mitchell Palmer’s successor, Harry Daugherty, of filling the Bureau
with corruption, graft, and improper political activities, including spying on members of
Congress.81 But abuses of civil liberties were a secondary concern to these legislators, who
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continued to generously increase the Bureau’s appropriations, and declined to put any legal
constraints on the Bureau.82
The task of a clean-up fell to President Calvin Coolidge, who fired Daugherty in April
1924, and replaced him with Stone. Stone had established himself as one of the nation’s most
prominent civil libertarians, an ally of the ACLU and of the National Popular Government League
that had so fiercely criticized the Palmer Raids. Stone had consistently defended academic freedom
against attacks from red-baiters during his tenure as Dean of the Columbia Law School. He was
appalled by the “political activities” of the Bureau of Investigation, and, in consultation with the
ACLU, he appointed J. Edgar Hoover as the replacement for Bureau Director William J. Burns.83
Hoover smartly distanced himself from the Palmer Raids and sold himself as a reformer, and,
despite keeping a close eye on Communists throughout the 1920s, Hoover largely obeyed Stone’s
edict against “political activities.” Only in the 1930s, under the Roosevelt Administration, would
Hoover revive the invasive surveillance methods that the Bureau pioneered from 1919 to 1924.84
We do not know if Congressman James Byrnes – or any of his friends in Congress –
actively collaborated with the Bureau of Investigation during this time. We do not know if Byrnes
and the Bureau simply had similar preferences and concerns. But we do know that the Bureau did
what Byrnes wanted without Byrnes ever having to put it in a resolution or a bill. We also know
that Bureau misconduct, like the “Deportations Delirium,”85 was curbed from within the executive
branch – not by Congress.
Little Red Scares
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Along with their attempts to enlist the executive branch in a Red Scare, congressional
conservatives had a substantial influence on little Red Scares that took hold at the state and local
level after the First World War. Although the Overman subcommittee on “Bolshevik Propaganda”
produced little in the way of concrete recommendations, aside from calls to regulate foreignlanguage publications,86 it did inspire the New York State legislature, on March 26, 1919, to pass
a “concurrent resolution authorizing the investigation of seditious activities.” This resolution
credited “the sub-committee of the Senate of the United States” with providing “sufficient facts”
on the scope and danger of seditious activities, thus “indicat[ing] the necessity of further inquiry
and action.”87 New York’s Joint Legislative Committee to Investigate Seditious Activities, led by
Senator Clayton Lusk, then spent an entire year collecting testimony, with the close assistance of
Archibald Stevenson, the star witness of the Overman subcommittee.
New York became one of at least twenty-eight states that passed either a sedition statute, a
criminal syndicalism statute, or a criminal anarchy statute after the war. These statutes, combined
with “Red Flag Laws,” were aimed at Communists and militant labor organizations like the IWW.
Most Southern legislatures apparently found no need for such laws, as their Jim Crow legal systems
were already well-equipped for repression. According to the ACLU’s internal assessments, New
York’s legislature was the most aggressive in its prosecution of a “Red Scare,” passing a sedition
law, a syndicalism law, and a red flag law.88
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The Lusk Committee recommended these laws (and others) after publicizing literature that
was seized in raids against the offices of the Union of Russian Workers and the socialist Rand
School for Social Sciences on East 15th Street in Manhattan in 1919. The raids were conducted in
collaboration with the New York City Police Department’s Bomb Squad, vigilantes from the
American Protective League, and federal agents.89 Lusk and his allies said that they were merely
enforcing the state’s dormant criminal anarchy law and that their raids – hardly the typical activity
of a legislative committee – were authorized by search warrants from local magistrates. While the
courts did little to constrain Lusk’s activities, the state executive – Governor Al Smith – was
ultimately the most effective opponent of Lusk, assembling a bipartisan coalition to repeal the
“Lusk laws” in early 1923.90 The excesses of the Lusk Committee illustrate both the local
dimensions of the Red Scare, as well as the impact of the Overman subcommittee on state politics.
Overman provided a model of exposure and sensationalism that could be easily replicated.
New York also followed the federal legislature in excluding five duly elected Socialists
from representation. When the Republican State Assembly Speaker, Thaddeus Sweet, opened the
1920 legislative session, he began with a sermon on “the problems confronting us,” which were
“many and of grave concern to the future welfare of the State and Nation.” He praised “laws that
will prohibit the printing and circulation of publications designed to create unrest, discontent, and
class distinction; laws to rid our schools of the teaching of socialistic Soviet doctrines.” 91 The
Speaker then “directed the sergeant-at-arms to bring Messrs. Claessens, deWitt, Orr, Solomon, and
Waldman before the bar of the House.” To these five Socialists, Speaker Sweet said: “You are
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seeking seats in this body – you who have been elected on a platform that is absolutely inimical to
the best interests of the State of New York and of the United States.”92
The Speaker went on to highlight the Socialist Party’s opposition to the late war effort as
evidence of its disloyalty. He then presented a motion that resolved to do exactly what the U.S.
Congress did with its solitary Socialist: establish a special investigation into the eligibility of the
Assemblymen. In the meantime, “they are hereby denied seats in this Assembly.” The resolution
passed with 140 ayes and six noes.93
The rest of the year was a game of whack-a-mole: the committee voted to expel the
Socialists in April, Governor Al Smith, who condemned the expulsion, convened a special
legislative session in September, at which the Socialists took their seats. Three out of five were
expelled again at the end of September, and the remaining two resigned in protest.94 All five
contested another general election in November, and only two – one who had been expelled, one
who had resigned – won their seats back. No more expulsions followed.95
The New York expulsions were not an exact replica of the Berger expulsion by the federal
Congress and the resolution that expelled the Socialists did not explicitly invoke Congress in the
same way that the Lusk Committee resolution invoked the work of the Overman subcommittee.
The New York Socialists had also already served in the Assembly, whereas Victor L. Berger was
set to serve in Congress for the first time. Berger was under indictment for violating the Espionage
Act, whereas the New York Socialists were not charged with any crime. However, the overall
process in the New York State legislature – delegitimizing the Socialist legislators, establishing a
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special investigation, and settling on the effective disenfranchisement of the people who voted for
Socialists – was clearly modelled on the process in Congress. The little “Red Scare” was inspired
by the big one.
The Red Scare, the Constitution, and the Separation of Powers
Scholars of the Red Scare have repeatedly traced it to executive overreach. In their 2008 study of
war and civil liberties in the United States, Frederick Schwarz and Aziz Huq described the Palmer
Raids as an all-too-common example of “executive officers using unilateral security powers for
political gain.” Palmer, the “chief instigator” of the Raids, ensured that “executive power in the
name of national security, operating without accountability, instead serviced political goals.”96
“During the post–World War I Palmer Raids,” the then ACLU President Susan Herman wrote in
another War on Terror-era work, “thousands of Russian and Eastern European immigrants were
arrested, prosecuted, deported, and sometimes abused because Attorney General Mitchell Palmer
thought that because some anarchists were immigrants, it was logical to assume that any immigrant
… might be an anarchist.”97 “The Attorney General carried through the greatest executive
restriction of personal liberty in the history of this country during the President’s illness,”
Zachariah Chafee argued. For Chafee, the Palmer Raids were reminiscent of how “the British
Cabinet took advantage of the illness of their head, Lord Chatham, to make one of the worst
onslaughts on freedom in modern England, the expulsion of Wilkes from the House of Commons
in 1768.”98
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Palmer deserves much of this criticism. On his watch, the United States Department of
Justice suppressed civil liberties, carrying out sweeping, multi-city arrests aimed at intimidating a
political movement. However, the conservative coalition that dominated Congress after the First
World War provided the legal justification and political pressure that drove Palmer’s actions. We
do not have to believe Palmer’s self-serving excuses after the fact to acknowledge that he was
hardly defying the law or the will of the legislature when implementing his infamous raids.
Contrary to the claims of the scholars who put Palmer on a long list of abusive executive
officials, Palmer was working from within a weak executive branch – politically weak after the
1918 elections, and administratively weak in its fragmented chain of command for deportations.
This fragmented chain of command was a mercy for victims of the Palmer Raids. Their fate was
in the hands of Louis F. Post, not A. Mitchell Palmer, Miles Poindexter, or Lee Overman. Post,
from the seemingly innocuous role of Assistant Labor Secretary, put the brakes on the Red Scare
– and dared congressional conservatives to defy him.
Harlan Fiske Stone played a similar role. Legislators had complained about corruption
within Harry Daugherty’s Justice Department, but they did nothing to rein in the surveillance
activities of the Bureau of Investigation. When this task fell to Stone – on behalf of the Coolidge
Administration – he acted to discipline the Bureau and limit its remit to actual violations of federal
law. Stone’s intervention kept the Bureau of Investigation largely in its box until the 1930s.
Why did the executive, rather than Congress, constrain the Bureau? Harlan Fiske Stone’s
strong and consistent commitment to civil liberties is surely part of the answer. More broadly, it is
not unusual to see Congress struggle to defund or place legal constraints on agencies that it has
become accustomed to living with, especially agencies – like the Bureau of Investigation – that
have some track record of supporting the goals of legislative coalitions. Future chapters will
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explore this dynamic further, particularly with reference to the national security state that emerged
after the Second World War. For now, we can say that in the years following the First World War,
Congress led the way in curtailing civil liberties, and showed no urgency to restore them.
Congress’s role in initiating the Red Scare rested on different tools than those used by the
Reconstruction Congress against recalcitrant white Southerners. Like the Reconstruction
Congress, the Red Scare Congress used its powers over itself to restrict civil liberties. The main
examples were the creation of the Overman subcommittee, the passage of the Poindexter
Resolution, and the exclusion of Victor L. Berger. However, while the Joint Committee on
Reconstruction provided a detailed plan for the continued suspension – and eventual restoration –
of civilian government in the former Confederacy, the Overman subcommittee did little more than
parade horror stories from the Bolshevik Revolution. It produced precisely zero legislative
achievements, and barely even provided coherent legislative recommendations. The Overman
subcommittee’s main achievement was to inspire the creation of similar committees at the state
level, especially the Lusk Committee in New York, whose founders highlighted the influence of
Overman in their founding resolution. Clayton Lusk ended up going far further than Lee Overman,
so it would be a stretch to argue that Lusk was dragged into the Red Scare unwillingly. But
Overman did provide a template for freewheeling and dramatic legislative inquisition – aided by
professional anti-radicals like Archibald Stevenson – that was ripe for emulation.
In excluding Victor L. Berger from Congress, Red Scare legislators repeated the tactic that
Reconstruction legislators had deployed against former Confederate representatives. For the
Reconstruction legislators, this tactic was essential to their political program. For Red Scare
legislators, it was an expression of general distaste for any left-wing political movement. Its main
impacts were on the voters of Berger’s Wisconsin district, who were effectively disenfranchised;
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and on the New York State legislature, which mimicked Congress in its expulsion of its Socialist
Assemblymen.
Red Scare legislators put substantial pressure on the executive branch through the
Poindexter Resolution, which – as a resolution, and not legislation – did not require bicameralism
or presentment. The Poindexter Resolution goaded A. Mitchell Palmer by publicly accusing him
of being soft on “alien radicals.” For a man with presidential aspirations, this charge – which came
from another man with presidential aspirations – probably stung. When we consider the backdrop
of the Poindexter Resolution, the Berger exclusion, and the Overman subcommittee, the Palmer
Raids look more like the product of a year-long partisan campaign rather than the actions of an
executive official emboldened by the late war. This partisan campaign by congressional
Republicans against a Democratic executive shaped the Red Scare more decisively than
Congress’s direct constitutional powers over the executive, such as impeachment.
Executive-legislative relations were less adversarial on the question of the “Red Summer.”
Congressman Byrnes called for surveillance of the black press, and the Bureau of Investigation
obliged. As we will see in the next chapter, this sense of common purpose between Southern
Democrats and the federal government’s police force would deepen after the Second World War
– even in the face of opposition from a Democratic president. The “Red Summer” thus initiated a
political alliance that would come to pose a major long-term threat to civil liberties.
In congressional relations with the judiciary, there is a striking contrast between
Reconstruction and the Red Scare. During Reconstruction, this relationship was hostile, leading
Congress to manipulate the size and jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. During the Red Scare, there
were no such disputes. Wartime statutes were uniformly upheld by the Court.99 Perhaps key
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justices, especially Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., were wedded to judicial restraint after the Court’s
zealous interference with Progressive policies in the preceding decade, and were therefore
unwilling to challenge Congress.100
A commitment to judicial restraint may help to explain the judiciary’s support for wartime
legislation, but this legislation was not the basis for the Red Scare. Legally, the main weapon was
immigration law, and here judicial review had long been severely circumscribed. John Burnett was
correct when he told Congress that “it has been the law for years and years to deport without any
trial.”101 A Massachusetts District Court Judge condemned the brutality of the Palmer Raids in
1920, but even he acknowledged the almost limitless authority of Congress to exclude and deport
non-citizens.102 Criminal prosecutions would have required all the messy barriers erected by the
Sixth Amendment, including a speedy and public trial, an impartial jury, the right to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation, and the right to cross-examine witnesses and to have
legal representation. A deportation would only require a filing by the Commissioner General for
Immigration and approval by the Secretary of Labor.
The relative convenience of the deportation process also helps to explain why Congress
did not replace the Sedition Act. The Justice Department’s Bureau of Investigation believed (or,
at least, said) that “fully 90 per cent of the communist and anarchist agitation is traceable to
aliens.”103 Remove the “aliens” and remove the “agitation” – no need for a new sedition statute.
Indeed, other than the 1918 Immigration Act, the Red Scare Congress did not actually legislate
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against liberties at all. But, through a combination of various weapons, detailed in Table 3.1,
legislators were central to the post-WWI Red Scare. In stark contrast to the legislators of
Reconstruction, they showed no appetite for expanding or protecting civil liberties.
Table 3.1: Congress and the Red Scare
Congressional Tools

Examples during the Red Scare

Powers over itself

Creation of the Overman sub-committee, Poindexter Resolution,
exclusion of Victor L. Berger

Powers over the executive

Failed impeachment of Louis Post, political campaign against A.
Mitchell Palmer in 1919, Byrnes’s campaign to have the Justice
Department investigate black “radicals”

Powers over the judiciary

Judicial review largely evaded through deportation proceedings

Powers over state and local Encouraging “Little Red Scares,” especially the creation of the
government

Lusk Committee and the expulsion of New York socialists

Repressive legislation

1918 Immigration Act

Legislators created the legal foundation for political deportations, the partisan pressure that
encouraged the Palmer Raids, the freewheeling investigative methods that inspired local copycats, and the conspiracy theories about the “Red Summer” that justified surveillance of black
political activists. While the part “Radical,” part “Moderate” post-Civil War legislative coalition
expanded civil liberties, the conservative post-WWI coalition only curtailed them. Another
conservative coalition would behave similarly after the next World War, but with worse and more
lasting consequences for civil liberties. The following chapter explores how and why.
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4. The War on the Left
After the First World War, civil liberties were suppressed through raids and deportations. After
the Second World War, they were suppressed through what Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black
called “humiliation,” “public shame,” “ridicule,” and “social and economic retaliation.” 1 From
1946-1956, at least ten thousand Americans were excluded or expelled from public and private
employment because of their political associations. Many more were traumatized by far-reaching
public inquisitions into their personal affairs. Several hundred also faced deportation and criminal
prosecution.2
Advocates of this Second Red Scare said that it was necessary to counter the Soviet
infiltration of American institutions. This argument was not baseless. Soviet espionage was real,
even if exaggerated.3 Moreover, a series of dramatic domestic and international events from 19451950 gave proponents of a Red Scare valuable ammunition. These included a Canadian Royal
Commission Report alleging the existence of a Soviet spy ring north of the border in 1946, various
defections and public testimonies by former Communists in the United States throughout 1946,
1947, and 1948, the “fall” of China to Communist rule and the first successful Soviet nuclear
weapons test in 1949, and the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950.4
This chapter argues that conservative legislators exploited and exaggerated fears of Soviet
infiltration to launch a far-ranging and long-lasting war on the American left. Their primary
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weapon was the wartime House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC). Their main targets
were the Communist Party USA (CPUSA), labor unions, civil rights activists, left-leaning
educational institutions, and critics of the new Cold War. Despite determined resistance from
President Harry Truman, these legislators largely succeeded in their efforts to crush left-wing
political organizing in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Fundamental rights to free association and
due process were routinely violated.
The powers of Congress were central to this postwar reaction. Internally, HUAC, which
originated as a wartime bulwark against both domestic Fascism and Communism, became the
driving force of the Second Red Scare. Particularly after the dominant victory of the Republican
Party in the 1946 congressional elections, HUAC inflicted both direct punishment through its
authority to hold uncooperative witnesses in contempt, and indirect punishment by tarring labor
leaders, civil rights activists, celebrities, scientists, and educators with allegations of Communist
sympathy and dual loyalty. HUAC also pressured a reluctant Truman Administration into the
prosecution of Communist Party leaders and the establishment of a loyalty program for all federal
government employees.
Although in their struggle with Truman conservative legislators exercised barely any of
their formal, constitutional powers over the executive branch (such as impeachment and the power
of the purse), they established an informal relationship with a crucial executive branch agency, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The FBI director, J. Edgar Hoover, gave these legislators
derogatory information that they could use against their political enemies, informants who could
dig up, share, and publicize dirt on left-wing political groups, and tips on which investigations to
pursue and drop. In return, Hoover received support for his own goals of crushing the left without
having to go to court, and thereby reveal FBI sources and methods. The relationship between
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Hoover and congressional conservatives was mutually beneficial, and it effectively circumvented
and undermined President Truman. The consequences for civil liberties were overwhelmingly
negative.
Finally, when the Supreme Court eventually scrutinized the conduct of conservative
legislators, they reacted by attempting to strip its jurisdiction over so-called “Communist” cases.
No court-curbing legislation was enacted, but the Court stepped back from defending the civil
liberties of leftists after its jurisdiction was threatened by Congress. By this time, the peak of the
Red Scare had already passed, but the threat of court-curbing prolonged its twilight years.5
Throughout the Second Red Scare, civil liberties were often curtailed without the
implementation of repressive legislation. The wartime Smith Act was the basis for postwar
prosecutions of CPUSA leaders and the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act purged labor unions of
Communists, but the law that was seemingly most menacing to civil liberties – the 1950 McCarran
Internal Security Act – was ineffective in practice. The 1952 McCarran-Walter Immigration Act,
which contained promises of a “Deportations Delirium” like that which followed the First World
War, suffered a similar fate.
The foundations of the Second Red Scare were Congress’s powers over itself, its informal
relations with the executive branch through the FBI, and its powers over the judiciary. The
executive branch was not blameless in the assault on civil liberties. Indeed, the next section begins
by documenting the Truman Administration’s complicity in the Second Red Scare, particularly
through its loyalty program for government employees. However, I then document how Truman
himself frequently defended civil liberties, sometimes through his veto pen, but more productively
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through his withholding of information from congressional committees and his refusal to enforce
repressive statutes. After documenting the conflicts between Congress and the Truman
Administration, as well as Congress and the Supreme Court, I conclude the chapter by discussing
how this case study compares with those examined in Chapters 2 and 3.
Executive Abuses: The Loyalty Program and Dennis v. United States
Scholars concerned about the impact of wartime executive power on postwar civil liberties could
construct a plausible narrative about the aftermath of the Second World War. Executive power
took on new dimensions during the war. Under President Roosevelt, 80,000 Japanese-Americans
were thrown in internment camps, along with 30,000 non-citizen residents of Japanese descent;
warrantless wiretapping became a standard surveillance tactic; right-wing critics of the
administration were prosecuted in a dubious sedition trial; a hastily assembled military
commission authorized the execution of alleged saboteurs; and loyalty tests were introduced for
government employment.6 Some of these measures, such as internment, did not outlast the war.
Nevertheless, even temporary measures left dangerous precedents,7 while some powers and
policies did not expire when the war ended. President Truman inherited and utilized two: a loyalty
program for federal government employees and the 1940 Smith Act prohibiting advocacy of
violent revolution.
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The wartime loyalty program was authorized by the 1939 “Act to Prevent Pernicious
Political Activities,” known as the Hatch Act.8 Under the Hatch Act, thorough loyalty
investigations were reserved for sensitive positions within the federal government. Yet in March
1947 – acting on the recommendations of his Temporary Commission on Employee Loyalty –
President Truman expanded these investigations to the entire federal workforce.9 With two million
careers potentially at stake, the Truman “Loyalty Order” provoked fierce criticism. The American
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) was internally divided,10 while Philip Murray, the President of the
Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), told Truman that “the Executive Order should be
repealed outright” because it threatened to bring about “thought police and denial of due process.”
Abram Flaxer of the United Public Workers of America warned that “we cannot have a Civil
Rights Program and a Loyalty Order at the same time.” Walter White of the National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People expressed similar concerns.11
In response, Truman emphasized the program’s safeguards. An employee had to be
informed in writing of any disloyalty charges and reserved the right to an administrative hearing
and to counsel. However, the civil libertarian indictment of Truman focused instead on the use of
confidential informants in loyalty investigations, as well as the wider structure that the loyalty
program created. Central to this structure was the Attorney General’s List of Subversive
Organizations (AGLOSO), which was disseminated across the federal government to assist in
implementing the loyalty order. It initially included forty-seven organizations, ranging from the
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Ku Klux Klan and the Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade to the Macedonian-American
People’s League and the Tom Paine School of Social Science. Another thirty-two were added by
Attorney General Tom Clark in May 1948, including the Negro Labor Victory Committee, the
Peace Movement of Ethiopia, the People’s Institute of Applied Religion, and the United Harlem
Tenants and Consumers Organization. The list continued to grow under Truman’s next two
attorneys general until President Eisenhower’s first, Herbert Brownell, “‘relisted’ all of the
previously designated 192 AGLOSO groups in April 1953, while also proposing sixty-two
additions.”12
We know that from 1947 to 1956, five million federal employees were investigated, 2,700
were dismissed, and 12,000 resigned.13 We do not know how many other employers used the
Attorney General’s List to sift out “radicals.” In any event, the existence of an “American
Blacklist”14 seemed to violate core principles of free political association. The ACLU’s Clifford
Forster, who was sympathetic to the loyalty program because of its procedural safeguards and its
oversight by a neutral Loyalty Review Board, described the List as an “injustice” and “an
application of the unconstitutional doctrine of guilt by association.”15 Hugo Black likened the List
to the “tyrannical” and “odious” bills of attainder that were explicitly prohibited by the
Constitution.16
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Along with the loyalty program and the Attorney General’s List, executive officers
curtailed civil liberties through criminal prosecutions of Communist leaders. The most notorious
of these prosecutions was that of the Communist Party USA leadership in 1948. In its case against
the CPUSA, the government never provided any evidence of a concrete or realistic conspiracy to
carry out a Communist revolution in the United States. The case instead rested on the general
doctrines of the U.S. Communist Party, which, the government argued, amounted to illegal
advocacy of violent revolution. On appeal in 1951, in Dennis v. United States, the Supreme Court
ruled 6-2 in the government’s favor, agreeing that the Communist leaders “intended to overthrow
the Government of the United States as speedily as the circumstances would permit.” “No matter
how it is worded,” Justice Black fumed in dissent, “this is a virulent form of prior censorship of
speech and press, which I believe the First Amendment forbids.” “On this record,” Justice Douglas
added, “no one can say that petitioners and their converts are in such a strategic position as to have
even the slightest chance of achieving their aims.” Eventually, the Supreme Court repudiated the
loose standards laid down in the case, but by then the Communist Party was buried deep
underground.17
Apart from the prosecution of the CPUSA leadership and the loyalty program, the Truman
Administration was accused of one other violation of civil liberties: the nationalization of the steel
industry in 1952, which provoked a rare instance of the Supreme Court invalidating executive
action during a national crisis (in this case, the Korean War). Despite the self-congratulatory
rhetoric in the Supreme Court’s condemnation of Truman – “men have discovered no technique
for long preserving free government except that the Executive be under the law, and that the law
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be made by parliamentary deliberations”18 – the seizure of the steel mills was not a threat to civil
liberties. Truman took the emergency action in an attempt to force a collective bargaining
agreement between the unions and management and to avert the prospect of a strike in a crucial
national industry. He was willing to provide the steel companies with the “just compensation”
required by the “takings clause” of the Fifth Amendment. The steel companies rejected this offer
and demanded that the courts issue an injunction instead. The courts obliged – handing down a
victory to Big Steel and its allies in Congress. This was no victory for civil liberties.19
Overall, the Truman Administration curtailed civil liberties by prosecuting the leaders of a
minor political party and by purging the federal government workforce. These actions were
features of a new Cold War, but they had their roots in the war just fought. Loyalty investigations,
the Attorney General’s List of Subversive Organizations, and Smith Act prosecutions all emerged
under the Roosevelt Administration. After the war, they lingered, and, in some ways, expanded.
For scholars fearful of wartime executive power, none of this should come as a surprise.
Executive Orders, Legislative Leadership
However, behind every executive escalation of blacklisting and purging after the Second World
War, the historical record reveals legislative initiative and pressure, particularly from the House
Un-American Activities Committee. HUAC was created on May 26, 1938, when Texas Democrat
Martin Dies presented a resolution
That the Speaker of the House of Representatives be, and he is hereby, authorized
to appoint a special committee to be composed of seven members for the purpose
of conducting an investigation of (1) the extent, character, and objects of unAmerican propaganda activities in the United States, (2) the diffusion within the
United States of subversive and un-American propaganda that is instigated from
foreign countries or of a domestic origin and attacks the principle of the form of
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government as guaranteed by our Constitution, and (3) all other questions in
relation thereto that would aid Congress in any necessary remedial legislation.
The “said special committee, or any subcommittee thereof” would also be “authorized to sit and
act” anywhere during the United States at any time, and “to hold such hearings, to require the
attendance of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, by
subpoena or otherwise, and to take such testimony as it deems necessary.” These subpoenas “shall
be issued under the signature of the chairman and shall be served by any person designated by
him.” If a subpoena was not complied with, then the chairman could refer the matter to the House
for a contempt of Congress citation, which would in turn be referred to the U.S. attorney in the
District of Columbia for criminal prosecution. Under the 1857 contempt of Congress statute,
contemnors could face a year in jail and a $1,000 fine.20
“I have absolutely no patience with any effort in this country to abridge the rights of
speech,” Congressman Dies told his colleagues. But “I have a mass of information that has been
supplied to me that is shocking, information which shows the extent of the Nazi and Communist
movements in the United States.” “I regard Communism and Nazism and Fascism as having one
underlying principle,” he intoned. That principle was “dictatorship – the theory that government
should have the right to control the lives, the fortunes, the happiness, the beliefs, and every detail
of the life of the human being, and that man is a pawn of the government, rather than the American
conception that government is created for the benefit of mankind.”21
The emphasis on both Nazism and Communism was crucial to winning the support of
liberals in Congress, who feared that Dies (a conservative Southern Democrat) was setting up “a
smelling expedition aimed at liberal organizations in the United States.”22 Franklin Roosevelt’s
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New Deal coalition had transformed the Democrats into a national party, including not just the
traditional stronghold of the Deep South, but also liberal and progressive voters in Northern cities.
Still, the massive 334-88 majority that House Democrats boasted in 1938 displayed a strong dose
of conservative voting patterns (see Figure 4.1). There were Southerners like Martin Dies, who
loathed Communism and was lukewarm about the New Deal, as well as conservative Northerners
like Rules Committee Chairman John J. O’Connor (D-NY), who concluded the May 26 HUAC
debate with a call to “save this country … from this horde of radicals, this horde of Communists,
before the hour becomes too late.”23
Figure 4.1: DW-Nominate Scores in the 75th Congress, House of Representatives

The strength and influence of the conservative faction was magnified by the committee
system. Chairmanships were determined by seniority, and Southern Democrats – thanks to Jim
Crow – did not have to face competitive elections. So, they accumulated years upon years of
service, and watched the most powerful committee assignments roll in. In 1938, 27 of the 47 House
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standing committees were chaired by Southerners, including the crucial Ways and Means, Foreign
Affairs, and – most important for legislation concerning civil liberties and civil rights – Judiciary
Committees.24 Roosevelt had sparred with these Southerners throughout the 1930s, bringing them
along for major pieces of New Deal legislation, but never daring to offend them with efforts at
prohibiting lynching or guaranteeing civil rights.25 They were a formidable faction, and they spoke
with a single, clear voice in voting for the creation of HUAC. That voice, combined with support
from anti-fascist liberals like New York’s Samuel Dickstein, established the Un-American
Activities Committee by a vote of 191 to 41.26
Martin Dies became the chairman of HUAC, and HUAC became known as the “Dies
Committee.” Dies initially showed some interest in domestic Nazis, “issuing a subpoena to the
pro-German propagandist, George Sylvester Viereck” in August 1938 “upon learning that Viereck
was about to pay a call to Adolf Hitler.”27 Dies then aired the claims of John P. Frey, Chair of the
Metal Trades Department of the American Federation of Labor, who alleged that the Congress of
Industrial Organizations (CIO) was awash with Communists.28 Similar claims were made about
the Federal Theatre and Writers Project within the Works Progress Administration (WPA).29 Labor
Secretary Frances Perkins was accused by Dies of shielding the Australian-born President of the

24

Compiled from United States Congress, Official Congressional Directory, 75th Congress, 3rd Session
(Washington: GPO, 1938), 193-205.
25
See Ira Katznelson, When Affirmative Action Was White: An Untold History of Racial Inequality in TwentiethCentury America (New York: WW Norton, 2005). Although Roosevelt never seriously pursued civil rights
legislation, he did use the executive branch for this end. See Kevin J. McMahon, Reconsidering Roosevelt on Race
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010).
26
Cong. Rec., 75th Congress, 3rd Session, 7586.
27
Walter Goodman, The Committee: The Extraordinary Career of The House Committee on Un-American Activities
(New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1968), 26.
28
Ibid, 28.
29
Ibid, 42.

121

International Longshoremen and Warehousemen’s Union, Harry Bridges, from deportation for his
open Communist affiliations.30
As its focus increasingly turned to the left, rather than the right, the Dies Committee went
all in on anti-Communism after the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact in August 1939. Dies,
who had justified the Committee’s creation on the theory that Communism and Fascism were two
sides of the same coin, claimed vindication when he saw Hitler and Stalin collaborating in the
dismemberment of Poland. His cause was helped by the “disarray” that the Molotov-Ribbentrop
pact sowed within the American Communist movement, as Stalinists toed the party line and antiStalinists abhorred any accommodation with Nazism.31
For the remainder of the war, the Dies Committee mainly punched left. In February 1941,
the ACLU accused Dies of “indiscriminately attack[ing] liberal and labor movements,”
“conceiv[ing] un-American activities primarily in terms of the Communist movement” rather than
“Nazis and Fascists,” “hear[ing] an array of accusers with little or no opportunity for the accused
to reply,” “smearing” Eleanor Roosevelt, Vice President Henry Wallace, Attorney General Robert
Jackson, and Interior Secretary Harold Ickes as crypto-Communists, and intervening “in the
election campaigns in Michigan, Minnesota and California in a manner calculated to defeat New
Deal candidates.”32
It was not inevitable that HUAC would outlast the war. Unlike standing committees, which
were permanent, the Dies Committee had to be re-authorized every year. By 1945, its entire
existence was in doubt. Dies himself – who was exhausted and unwell after fourteen years in the
House – had not run for re-election in 1944. Roosevelt had won a convincing and unprecedented
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fourth term. House Democrats improved upon their disappointing performance in the 1942
midterms, picking up a net gain of twenty seats, and securing a 244-189 majority. The House
Speaker, Sam Rayburn, hailed from the same state as Martin Dies, but his politics were decidedly
more liberal. The end of the war was in sight. The end of HUAC – a product of the war – seemed
possible.33
Yet on the first day of the 79th Congress in January 1945, Mississippi Democrat John
Rankin – who had sat on the Dies Committee in the 78th Congress – maneuvered to save and
entrench HUAC. The first order of business for each house is usually adopting the rules of the
previous Congress, subject to minor amendments. However, when Illinois Democratic
Congressman Adolph Sabath moved “that the rules of the seventy-eighth Congress be adopted…
as the rules of the seventy-ninth,” Rankin proposed an amendment that would “extend the life of
the Committee on Un-American Activities… and to make it one of the standing committees of the
House.” This would allow HUAC to “report legislation in order that its recommendations may be
brought to the floor of the House for consideration in the regular way.” HUAC had done
“marvelous work” throughout the war, Rankin added. “It is no time to relax our vigilance.”34
Congressman Sabath objected, saying that a matter of such substance should be considered
by the Rules Committee before coming to the floor. “I do not know when in the history of our
country the National House of Representatives has ever provided by rule for a permanent
investigating committee,” Massachusetts Democrat John William McCormack protested. But
Rankin pressed for a roll-call vote, and succeeded, by a margin of 208 to 186.35 The ayes were
comprised of “137 Republicans and 70 Democrats, 63 of them from the South.”36 The
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entrenchment of HUAC was met with more opposition than its creation (186 no votes in 1945, 41
in 1938), but John Rankin did not mind. He had given the Committee – and conservatives in both
parties – a new lease on life for the postwar era.
As a permanent standing committee, HUAC’s first chairman was New Jersey Democrat
Edward J. Hart, but he was soon replaced by John S. Wood of Georgia. The other members were
Rankin, Herbert C. Bonner (D-North Carolina), John R. Murdock (D-Arizona), J. Hardin Peterson
(D-Florida), J. W. Robinson (D-Utah), Gerald W. Landis (R-Indiana), Karl E. Mundt (R-South
Dakota), and J. Parnell Thomas (R-New Jersey). Mundt, Thomas, and Rankin soon emerged as
the most enthusiastic proponents of a postwar Red Scare.
In 1946, they set their sights particularly firmly on the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Committee (JAFRC), which was founded to provide humanitarian aid to refugees of the Spanish
Civil War and became a consistent voice of opposition to the Franco dictatorship thereafter. There
was never any evidence that the JAFRC participated in Soviet espionage, but there were
Communists in the anti-Franco movement. This was enough to earn the JAFRC a charge of UnAmericanism, and to earn each of its sixteen executive board members and its secretary subpoenas
from HUAC in late March. These subpoenas summoned the board members to testify before
HUAC, and “to bring with you all books, ledgers, records, and papers relating to the receipt and
disbursement of any money by or on account of the [JAFRC]… together with all correspondence
and memoranda of communications by any means whatsoever with persons in foreign countries.”37
The leaders of the JAFRC appeared before HUAC on April 4, 1946, and they did not endear
themselves to the likes of Wood, Rankin, Mundt, and Thomas. Helen R. Bryan, the JAFRC
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Secretary and custodian of the documents requested by HUAC, bluntly told Rankin that “the
subpoena was not valid” because it was so broad as to constitute a fishing expedition.38 In response,
Karl Mundt moved “that we cite all witnesses who have appeared before us today as being in
contempt of Congress.” The motion carried, and the House of Representatives referred the matter
for criminal prosecution.39
Contempt citations and prosecutions followed for Albert E. Blumberg of the Communist
Party in Baltimore, George Marshall of the National Federation for Constitutional Liberties, and
Richard Morford of the National Council for Soviet-American Friendship.40 23 individuals were
cited for contempt between March 1946 and March 1947, compared to just seven in the previous
six years.41 As Walter Goodman recounts, the criminal consequences varied among the individuals
and organizations:
Marshall was given three months and $500; Morford, three months and $350. Five
of the members of the JAFRC resigned and expressed a wish to purge themselves
and so were let off with a fine of $500 and three-month suspended sentences. The
others, with the exception of [JAFRC Executive Board] Chairman Barsky, were
made to serve their three months, and Barsky was given six months along with a
$500 fine.42
HUAC’s attack on these organizations exemplified how it could undermine civil liberties
largely on its own initiative. Under the 1857 contempt of Congress statute, either the House or the
Senate could hold an individual in contempt and seek a criminal contempt prosecution – including
fines and prison time – through the U.S. attorney in the District of Columbia.43 HUAC thus
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required approval from the entire House of Representatives to advance its contempt citations. Here,
HUAC was aided by long-standing norms of deference to congressional committees. Even vocal
liberal opponents of HUAC – such as New York Democrat Emmanuel Celler – routinely voted in
favor of HUAC’s contempt motions.44 Therefore, despite gains for liberals in the 1948
congressional elections, the contempt train kept running. Fifty-six citations were issued in 1950
alone.45
The law bound the U.S. attorney in DC to take the step of bringing criminal prosecutions.
The contempt of Congress statute leaves no room for discretion, clearly stating that “every person”
held in contempt “shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not more than
$1,000 nor less than $100 and imprisonment in a common jail for not less than one month nor
more than twelve months.” The only cases in which the U.S. attorney has refused to bring
prosecutions involve (rare) contempt citations against members of the executive branch, which
arguably violate the separation of powers.46 Lacking the privilege of being U.S. government
employees, almost everyone cited by HUAC was prosecuted, unless they returned to the
Committee to repent for their prior lack of cooperation. By my count from HUAC’s annual reports,
HUAC cited 147 people between 1946 and 1964, including the JAFRC leadership, Marshall,
Morford, Blumberg, Hollywood celebrities, labor leaders, atomic scientists, college professors,
schoolteachers, civil rights activists, and Puerto Rican independence activists (see Table 4.1).
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Table 4.1: HUAC Contempt Citations, 1946-196447
Year Persons held in contempt by HUAC Notable individuals or organizations targeted
1946
23 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee, National
Federation for Constitutional Liberties, National
Council for Soviet-American Friendship
1947
1950

10 The “Hollywood Ten”
56 Leaders of the International Longshore and
Warehouse Union, the United Electrical Workers
Union, and four atomic scientists

1952

2 Sidney Buchman (motion picture industry),
Arthur McPhaul (the Civil Rights Congress)
1 Marcus Singer, Professor of Zoology at Cornell
University
15 Bernard Deutsch, another Cornell Professor; two
Philadelphia school teachers; four alleged
Communists in Portland; John Watkins, United
Automobile Workers organizer

1953
1954

1955
1956
1957

1958

1959
1960
1964

1 John Gojack, United Electrical, Radio, and
Machine Workers organizer
8 Two particularly famous names: playwright
Arthur Miller and musician Pete Seeger
3 Louis Earl Hartman (radio broadcaster), Frank
Grumman (radio reporter), and Bernard Silber
(telegraph writer)
9 Various members of steel industry unions, along
with two members of the National Committee
Against Repressive Legislation
2 Edwin Alexander and Martin Popper. Popper
was active in the National Lawyers Guild
13 Puerto Rican independence activists
3 Donna Allen, Russell Nixon, and Dagmar
Wilson. Allen and Wilson were leaders of
Women’s Strike for Peace; Nixon was editor of
the left-wing paper, the National Guardian
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Less than fifty of these citations resulted in criminal convictions. Yet, in many respects, a
criminal conviction was the mildest harm that a contempt citation could produce. Individuals who
were held in contempt, especially in the early years of the Red Scare, were ostracized, fired, or
denied public and private sector employment. Organizations saw their donations fall off a cliff,
their membership collapse, and their mainstream support evaporate. Hugo Black was correct:
public disgrace and humiliation at the hands of the national legislature was tantamount to a “bill
of attainder.” It was summary legislative punishment that could be inflicted without judicial or
executive participation.48
Along with its contempt power, HUAC was further bolstered by the 1946 Legislative
Reorganization Act (LRA), which Truman signed into law on August 2. The LRA was, in Roger
Davidson’s words, “the most ambitious, comprehensive, and publicized reorganization effort in
the history of Congress.” Reformers both inside and outside Congress had long bemoaned the
messy committee system, which was beset by overlapping and confused jurisdictions, unclear
responsibilities, and ill-defined powers. The LRA grappled with these problems by reducing the
number of standing committees in both houses and increasing their staffing. The LRA was not
intended to strengthen HUAC, specifically, but because HUAC was now a standing committee, it
stood to benefit from the broader strengthening of standing committees under the LRA. 49 HUAC
emerged from the LRA as the only House standing committee with subpoena and contempt
powers. “Rankin’s coup”50 in making HUAC permanent was thus ratified.
While Congress was controlled by Democrats, HUAC avoided open confrontation with the
Truman Administration. However, the 1946 midterm elections brought Republican control of both
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chambers for the first time since 1928. These elections were a perfect opportunity for
conservatives. As in 1918, they railed on the campaign trail against the economic controls that
Democrats had enacted to sustain the war effort. HUAC had already investigated the Office of
Price Administration (OPA) – which implemented price and rental controls – in June 1945. John
Rankin accused the OPA of peddling socialistic propaganda on its radio programs. “It’s about time
we got rid of the OPA,” he said. “I am tired of these commissars attempting to tell the American
people how naked they shall go.”51
Republicans were further aided by the greatest strike wave in American history. In 1946,
Irving Richter notes, “a total of 4.6 million workers were directly involved in stoppages, a figure
larger than in any previous year on record.” Coal, steel, meatpacking, and the railroads were all
shaken by strikes.52 The disruption caused by these strikes, along with the continued austerity of
wartime economic controls, and Truman himself – the “accidental” president who was struggling
to succeed an undisputed political giant53 – became central thrusts of the Republican election
campaign.
The Republicans gained 55 seats in the House and 12 in the Senate, giving them majorities
of 246-188 and 51-45. HUAC would welcome three new members: John McDowell (RPennsylvania), Richard B. Vail (R-Illinois), and Richard M. Nixon (R-California). The Chairman
was now J. Parnell Thomas, who had always been more aggressive in pursuit of “reds” than his
predecessor, John S. Wood. Under Thomas, HUAC began a sustained and aggressive
confrontation with Harry Truman, who believed that international Communism was a threat to
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U.S. strategic interests but did not believe that domestic Communism was a threat to U.S.
democracy.54
HUAC’s first major threat to Truman was the establishment of an “independent
commission with authority to investigate and to order the discharge of any employee or official of
the Federal Government whose loyalty to the United States is found to be in doubt.”55 From
Truman’s perspective, this was a dangerous and credible threat. The evidence of the previous seven
years did not suggest that HUAC or the conservatives who now controlled Congress would
proceed judiciously on the question of employee loyalty, or with much respect for the civil liberties
of allegedly disloyal federal government employees. HUAC had undermined any notion of
innocent until proven guilty from the outset by calling for a commission that would “discharge”
anyone “whose loyalty” was merely “in doubt.” Truman thus faced an unpleasant choice: allow
Congress to establish a loyalty program with barely any procedural safeguards for the accused
(who were also his employees) or establish his own program.
Truman’s loyalty program – established in March 1947 – attempted to outmaneuver and
preempt HUAC, even if Truman never publicly admitted as much. Privately, in explaining the
rationale for the loyalty program to Federal Communications Commissioner, Clifford Durr,
Truman said that “I’ve got to take the ball away from Parnell Thomas. If he has his way and gets
legislation through, we will have the damndest Gestapo any country ever had and I don’t want J.
Edgar Hoover running this country. What I want is to protect these people… I’ll amend this order,
if necessary. I’ll repeal it.” Charges of disloyalty, Truman added, were “a bunch of crap.
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Government employees are as loyal a bunch of people as there ever was. All I want to do is to
protect these people.”56
On some level, this logic made sense: by creating an executive loyalty program, Truman
could protect government employees and get J. Parnell Thomas off his back. At first, the strategy
seemed to work. John Rankin conceded that “the President’s Executive order goes a long way
toward meeting the situation,” as did J. Parnell Thomas.57 However, Thomas soon became restless.
Just a month after the loyalty order was issued, he told the president that “it will be sheer folly to
spend $50,000,000 to purge the Government of communists, or $400,000,000 to stop the
communists in Greece, if our Department of Justice is not going to face this issue squarely at
home.” The loyalty program was all well and good, but “now is the time for you to step in and take
a hand in this matter and direct your Attorney General to throw the full weight of his Department
behind an effort to bring these criminals and conspirators before the bar of justice.”58
Thomas was telling Truman to revive the 1940 Smith Act, which was passed by Congress
amid Hitler’s invasion of France.59 Title I of the Smith Act prohibited advocacy of violent
revolution, and Roosevelt’s attorneys general feared that this was a threat to free expression. As a
result, they scarcely enforced it, and closely supervised their U.S. attorneys to make sure that no
rogue prosecutions took place. As the ACLU would cheerfully reflect in 1945, “in sharp contrast
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with World War I, the federal government has brought comparatively few prosecutions for
utterances or publications alleged to obstruct the conduct of the war.”60
Truman’s attorney general, Tom Clark, initially seemed to take the same position as his
predecessors, telling HUAC in February 1948 that the Smith Act could not be used against the
CPUSA because it only applied to individuals, rather than organizations. J. Parnell Thomas and
Richard Nixon responded by threatening to outlaw the Party.61 Rather than face this prospect –
which would have constituted a direct and sweeping assault on political association – Clark had
the U.S. attorney for the Southern District of New York, John McGohey, prepare for a grand jury
a Smith Act case against the national CPUSA leaders in April 1948. They were formally indicted
on July 20.62 According to US historian Ellen Schrecker, “there is no evidence that the President
was ever consulted about the pending action.”63
Tom Clark had tried to do with the Smith Act what Truman had done with his loyalty order:
move before HUAC could. Neither man believed that domestic Communism was a national
security threat. But, they reasoned, if they did nothing, congressional Republicans would seize the
initiative, creating their own loyalty programs, and quite possibly their own repressive legal
framework for crushing the Communist Party and its “fronts.” On balance, Truman and Clark felt
that it was better to preempt HUAC and maintain executive control. At least on the question of
employee loyalty, given the respective records of the executive and legislative branches since
1945, it seems reasonable to conclude that executive control was better for civil liberties than
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congressional control. Truman’s loyalty order was flawed, but it included procedural safeguards
that would have been unimaginable in a HUAC loyalty program. Likewise, Smith Act prosecutions
of the CPUSA leadership were a less sweeping attack on political association than a new law
completely banning the CPUSA and its “fronts.” To the extent that Truman and Clark were
responsible for restrictions on civil liberties, their primary error was tactical: attempting to
outsmart legislators whose commitment to the cause of red-baiting was unshakable.
Executive Obstruction
Despite the maneuvers of Clark and Truman, HUAC continued to flourish throughout 1948. On
May 19, the House passed “the Subversive Activities Control Act” by a margin of 319 to 58. The
bill’s principal sponsors were HUAC members Richard Nixon and Karl Mundt. As the Senate
considered the “Mundt-Nixon Bill” – which would effectively destroy the Communist Party and
its “fronts” through compulsory registration with the attorney general – vice-president and
Progressive Party presidential nominee Henry Wallace organized a march on Congress, which was
attended by between 3,500 and 5,000 people who denounced the bill as “fascism.”64 Although
Truman said that “I never make comments on bills that are pending until they come before me,”
he clearly hinted at a veto. “As to outlawing political parties in the United States,” he told a reporter
who asked for his opinion on the Mundt-Nixon bill, “I think that is entirely contrary to our
principles. I don’t think the splinter parties do any harm, and if there is conspiracy to overthrow
the Government of the United States, we have laws to cover that.”65 The Mundt-Nixon bill then
stalled in the Senate until the end of the legislative session.66
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Threatening a veto is a fairly typical executive action, but Truman also engaged in outright
obstruction, invoking executive privilege to keep the government’s loyalty files out of the hands
of legislators.67 In March 1948, he issued a directive declaring that “the efficient and just
administration of the Employee Loyalty Program…requires that reports, records, and files relative
to the program be preserved in strict confidence.” Therefore, “any subpensa [sic] or demand or
request for information, reports, or files of the nature described, received from sources other than
those persons in the executive branch of the Government who are entitled thereto by reason of
their official duties, shall be respectfully declined.”68 On August 4, 1948, Truman’s cabinet
elaborated on how this directive would operate. “All unclassified, routine papers” were fair game,
but “no information of any sort relating to the employee’s loyalty… shall be included in the
material submitted to a congressional committee.” The directive “should be regarded as covering
the records of former Federal employees, as well as present employees and applicants for
employment.”69
The Truman Administration went on to reject information requests from all the
congressional committees that were seeking to expose and smear government employees, as well
as individual requests from Senator Joseph McCarthy, who had claimed in February 1950 that the
State Department was harboring 205 disloyal employees. McCarthy complained to Truman that
the administration was improperly guarding “the files of the individuals whom I have listed as bad
security risks,” and hypocritically only using the files to “clear innocent people,” rather than to
expose the guilty.70 J. Parnell Thomas had earlier fumed that “your administration has failed to
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keep the people informed about this dangerous situation,” and Homer Ferguson (R-Michigan) of
the Senate Investigations Subcommittee was told that he could not expect from the administration
“any information relating to the loyalty of an employee or any investigative data relating to such
employee.”71
Loyalty files would have been red meat to these legislators. The files contained raw,
unfiltered intelligence – gossip, rumor, innuendo, or whatever tidbits J. Edgar Hoover had dug up.
In the hands of Joseph McCarthy, Homer Ferguson, or J. Parnell Thomas, this information would
have been put on stark public display, with predictably terrible consequences for federal
government employees. Truman pushed back because he believed in “fair play” and saw people
like McCarthy as “insolent” and a “pathological liar” – the embodiment of a Congress comprised
of “more morons than patriots.”72 Truman was also protecting his turf. Few self-respecting
presidents would allow their political enemies to rummage freely through sensitive executive
branch documents. Regardless of whether his primary motive was the protection of civil liberties,
Truman’s obstructive actions ultimately saved an untold number of individuals from invasive and
damaging inquisitions into their past political associations.
When a revised version of the Mundt-Nixon bill eventually came to his desk in September
1950 – this time under the sponsorship of Nevada Democratic Senator Pat McCarran – Truman
vetoed it with fury. The McCarran Act gave a five-member Subversive Activities Control Board
(SACB) the power to compel members of the Communist Party and “front organizations” to
register with the attorney general. It also permitted summary internment of “subversives” during
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a national emergency.73 This legislation “would put the Government of the United States in the
thought control business,” Truman argued. Worse, “it would give Government officials vast
powers to harass all of our citizens in the exercise of their right of free speech… no considerations
of expediency can justify the enactment of such a bill as this, a bill which would so greatly weaken
our liberties and give aid and comfort to those who would destroy us.”74 Although the Republicans
had lost their congressional majorities by 1950, Truman’s veto was overturned by a coalition of
Republicans and Southern Democrats, with some liberals, shaken by the 1949 Soviet atomic bomb
test and the outbreak of the Korean War, also turning on the president.75
In the end, the McCarran Act was blunted not by a veto but by non-enforcement. Truman
never invoked the internment provision, nor did any of his successors.76 The compulsory
registration provision, which had the potential to cripple “subversive” organizations through the
manifold legal consequences associated with an official “subversive” designation,77 was barely
enforced, either. “After five years of operation,” writes Francis Thompson, “not one organization
had registered under the Act, nor had any received final order to register.”78 Moreover, as Tom
Clark correctly predicted when the registration provision was first floated in the 1948 MundtNixon bill, the whole process was vulnerable to litigation because it offended the Fifth
Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination. The “subversive” designation came from the
Justice Department, which had openly pursued Smith Act prosecutions against “subversive”

73

See Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 382 U.S. 70 (1965).
Harry Truman, Veto of the Internal Security Bill, September 22, 1950, Public Papers of Harry Truman, Truman
Library Online Collections, https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/library/public-papers/254/veto-internal-security-bill
75
On the overall political context in 1950, see Goodman, The Committee, 291. There were 48 votes to sustain
Truman’s veto in the House; 10 in the Senate.
76
Masumi Izumi, “Prohibiting ‘American Concentration Camps’,” Pacific Historical Review 74, No. 2 (2005): 165194.
77
Justice Hugo Black summarizes the consequences of registration in Communist Party v. Subversive Activities
Control Board, 367 U.S. 1, 142 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting).
78
Francis H. Thompson, The Frustration of Politics: Truman, Congress, and the Loyalty Issue, 1945-1953
(Cranbury, NJ: Associated University Presses, 1979), 153.
74

136

organizations, most notably the CPUSA. Registration forced a potential defendant to cooperate
with their potential prosecutor. At best, such a requirement was constitutionally questionable,
allowing the Communist Party to fight its “subversive” designation in court, until the Supreme
Court eventually accepted the Party’s Fifth Amendment defense in 1965.79
In his final year as president, Truman also resisted a renewed “Deportations Delirium.” Pat
McCarran was, again, the adversary. As chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, McCarran
convinced his colleagues to authorize a “complete investigation” of the nation’s immigration laws
in 1947. Part of the motivation for this was anti-Communism, part of it was a practical effort to
clean up and clarify what was becoming an unwieldy web of immigration statutes. In April 1950,
the Committee produced its findings in “Senate Report 1515,” which then became the basis for the
McCarran-Walter Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952.80
The McCarran-Walter Act was the product of a Senate bill sponsored by McCarran and a
House bill sponsored by Francis E. Walter (D-Pennsylvania). McCarran said in joint hearings
before the House and Senate Judiciary Committees that his bill was designed to address “many
inequities, weaknesses, loopholes, and inconsistencies in our present hodgepodge immigration and
naturalization system.” The matter was urgent because the immigration and naturalization system
was “the conduit through which a stream of humanity flows into the fabric of our society. If that
stream is healthy the impact on our society is salutary, but if that stream is polluted our institutions
and our way of life become infected.” Part of the task was “eliminat[ing] the deadwood from our
present immigration and naturalization laws” and “making numerous technical and minor
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changes,” but McCarran also underlined the bill’s strengthening of “exclusion and deportation
procedures” and “naturalization and denaturalization procedures,” which would serve to “weed
out subversives and other undesirables.” Walter said his bill was “not very much different” from
McCarran’s.81
The final version of the McCarran-Walter Act affirmed and greatly expanded the 1918
Immigration Act’s provision of deportation for “aliens who are anarchists” and “aliens who
advocate or teach, or who are members of or affiliated with any organization that advocates or
teaches, opposition to all organized government.”82 Truman was disgusted. “These provisions are
worse than the infamous Alien Act of 1798,” he wrote in his veto message. In “empower[ing] the
Attorney General to deport any alien who has engaged or has had a purpose to engage in activities
‘prejudicial to the public interest’ or ‘subversive to the national security’,” the Act provided “no
standards or definitions… to guide discretion in the exercise of powers so sweeping. To punish
undefined ‘activities’ departs from traditional American insistence on established standards of
guilt. To punish an undefined ‘purpose’ is thought control.”83
Yet again, Truman’s veto was overturned by a coalition of the usual suspects – Southern
Democrats and Republicans.84 What followed, however, was not an anti-Communist
“Deportations Delirium” like that of 1919 and 1920. As Ellen Schrecker notes, “Most of the men
and women slated for expulsion because of their communist ties never left the United States.
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Between 1946 and 1966 only 253 aliens were officially deported as political subversives.”85 In
December 1919, 249 were deported on a single day. This contrast cannot be explained by the
development of the deportation bureaucracy. After the First World War, deportation proceedings
were awkwardly split between the Justice and Labor Departments, with Labor having the final
word. Since 1940, however, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) was part of the
Justice Department. If the attorney general wanted mass deportations, he should have been able to
get them.
Did he not want them? Tom Clark, for one, had told HUAC back in 1948 that he wanted
“deportation, through established procedure, of all aliens adhering to subversive principles.”86 His
successor and his subordinates, J. Edgar Hoover and INS commissioner Watson Miller, shared this
view.87 Truman did not (as his veto indicated), but he could not temper the McCarran-Walter Act
through non-enforcement because he left office less than a year after its enactment. The judiciary,
for its part, held the same basic stance that it held during the First Red Scare: bluntly, the federal
government could deport whomever it wanted for whatever reason it saw fit.88
In the end, the dampener on deportations did not come from a thoughtful executive official
or a high-minded judge, but, as Ellen Schrecker recounts, from “an INS regulation that did not
allow it to send undesirable aliens back to their home countries if these countries refused to accept
them.” Many of these “undesirables” were “Jews from Eastern Europe; and neither the Soviet
Union nor the other Eastern Bloc countries would agree to take them back.” Thus, “most of the
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people actually deported were natives of countries friendly to the United States, like Great Britain
and Canada.”89
The Hoover Factor
Although the executive branch hindered congressional attacks on civil liberties through a
combination of internal agency regulations, vetoes, withholding of information, and nonenforcement of repressive statutes, the executive branch was not a unified actor under the Truman
Administration. Despite the president’s clear antipathy toward congressional conservatives, his
FBI director, J. Edgar Hoover, was their friend and ally.
Hoover had an amicable relationship with Joseph McCarthy, labelling him – mostly in
private – a “stalwart American citizen,” a “fine friend” of the FBI, and “a very earnest man.” He
even gave McCarthy advice on which “completely American,” “non-denominational” college
McCarthy’s friend’s daughter should attend.90 Loyalty files were a different matter. Politely, but
firmly, Hoover insisted that “the confidential character of our files must be inviolate.” In internal
Bureau conversations, Hoover intimated that he was willing to risk contempt proceedings for
“hold[ing] tight” to this position – not that this was ever a real possibility from a senator who felt
that “the American people” should be congratulated “for their good fortune in having J. Edgar
Hoover as the head of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.” Unfortunately for McCarthy, the
feeling was not completely mutual. “Extend usual courtesies,” Hoover advised to a subordinate in
a 1953 memo, “but use caution and avoid any disclosure of confidential files.”91
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This stance suited Hoover on several levels. First, and most obvious, it avoided open
defiance of Truman’s March 1948 directive to withhold loyalty files from Congress. Second, the
“courtesies” kept McCarthy in Hoover’s camp, at least for what he was worth: gushing public
praise of the FBI, occasional tips and gossip, and continuation of a Red Scare that Hoover
supported. Third, the red-baiters were not the only members of Congress seeking loyalty files.
McCarthy’s main adversary, Maryland Democratic Senator Millard Tydings, hoped that the files
would allow for fair scrutiny of McCarthy’s numerous public accusations. Hoover did not want
Tydings looking through FBI files, especially because these files included information about FBI
“investigative sources and methods” – many of which were illegal.92
Hoover assisted the Red Scare in other ways. Quietly, and through Assistant Director Lou
Nichols, he authorized the production of summary memoranda describing the contents of Bureau
files to HUAC – notably in the “Hollywood Ten” investigation. Nichols assisted McCarthy’s
Senate committee by running name checks on persons of interest for the senator and his lead
counsel, Roy Cohn.93 FBI informants also testified dramatically in several high-profile HUAC
investigations. Matthew Cvetic was an especially priceless asset, infiltrating Midwest labor unions
throughout the 1940s before naming and shaming their allegedly Communist members before
HUAC in 1950. Cvetic’s activities became the inspiration for the popular 1951 Warner Brothers
film, I Was a Communist for the FBI.94
Then there were outright leaks. In 1947, the Bureau gave “certain key men in the House
and Senate” derogatory information about former State Department employee Alger Hiss, whom
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HUAC had accused of dual loyalties.95 Tom Clark later alleged that FBI documents were regularly
furnished to Republican Homer Ferguson of the Senate Investigations Committee. “He had a direct
pipeline to the F.B.I,” Clark suspected. “No question in my mind about that.” Indeed, “he was
getting reports before I got them; before they were announced.”96 At a minimum, Ferguson relied
on FBI intelligence in his July 1948 cross-examination of former Commerce Department
employee, William Remington.97
An exchange between J. Parnell Thomas and Richard Nixon hinted at both the depth and
secrecy of FBI collaboration with HUAC. After Nixon suggested that testimony from exCommunists against their former comrades might need to be corroborated by the FBI, Thomas
replied that “the closest relationship exists between this committee and the FBI . . . It is something,
however, that we cannot talk too much about. I am quite certain that if they felt they could give us
anything, without endangering their own position, or in any way endangering their sources of
information, they would be glad to cooperate.”98
The Bureau did gladly cooperate in two further ways. First, Hoover smeared and harassed
critics of congressional investigators. The National Lawyers Guild was a notable target in 1950.99
Frank Wilkinson, who campaigned to abolish HUAC and was Executive Director of the National
Committee Against Repressive Legislation, earned himself a 132,000 page FBI file.100 These
campaigns against critics were supplemented by J. Edgar Hoover’s “extracurricular ventures,”

Kenneth O’Reilly, “The FBI and the Origins of McCarthyism,” The Historian 45, No. 3 (1983): 375.
Jerry N. Hess, “Oral History Interview with Tom C. Clark, Washington, D.C., October 17, 1972,” 210-211,
Truman Papers.
97
O’Reilly, “The FBI and the Origins of McCarthyism”: 377.
98
HUAC, Hearings Regarding Communist Espionage in The United States Government, (Washington: GPO, 1948),
561. Parts of this exchange are also quoted in O’Reilly, “The FBI and the Origins of McCarthyism”: 379.
99
See Theoharis, Chasing Spies, 91.
100
Frank Wilkinson, “FBI Crackdown on Opposition to HUAC,” in Bud Schultz and Ruth Schultz (eds.), It Did
Happen Here: Recollections of Political Repression in America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989),
265.
95
96

142

which included “speaking on the anti-communist circuit; appearing before HUAC in March
1947…and writing hundreds of magazine articles on the red menace.” In total, according to
Kenneth O’Reilly, “from 1940 until his death in 1972, Hoover published some 400 major items –
263 articles, 66 speeches, interviews in nationally syndicated magazine, reports, pamphlets – and
many lesser items in obscure dailies and periodicals in the American heartland.”101
Although it is hard to measure the impact of these “ventures” on the Red Scare, they were
surely valuable to the public image of Capitol Hill’s inquisitors. J. Edgar Hoover and the FBI
commanded respect across the political spectrum. McCarthy’s leading critic, Millard Tydings,
trusted the FBI to honestly report on Communist infiltration. Tydings called Hoover to testify as
an expert before his Subcommittee on the Loyalty of State Department Employees, and he
considered asking the FBI to assign agents who could directly aid the subcommittee’s work.102
Bipartisan appreciation of Hoover extended beyond Congress. In February 1950, for instance,
George Gallup’s Public Opinion News Service published a poll indicating that 79% of voters felt
J. Edgar Hoover “has done a good job” as head of the FBI. Only 2% felt he had “done a poor job.”
The numbers barely varied among Republicans, Democrats, and Independents, with approval
ratings reaching 83%, 77%, and 78% respectively; and disapproval at only 2%, 2%, and 3% in
each category.103
Finally, Hoover was the essential link between Congress and the executive in initiating the
loyalty program and the Smith Act prosecution of CPUSA leaders. As early as November 1945,
Hoover was warning Truman of “a number of persons employed by the Government” allegedly
“furnishing data and information to persons outside the Federal Government who are in turn

O’Reilly, “The FBI and the Origins of McCarthyism,” 382.
Memorandum for the Attorney General, March 10, 1950. FBI Records: The Vault – Senator McCarthy.
103
See General Memoranda – Department of Justice, FBI, February 24, 1950, ACLU Papers, Years of Expansion.
101
102

143

transmitting this information to espionage agents of the Soviet Government.”104 The President’s
Temporary Commission on Employee Loyalty then cited “information received from the reports
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation” in support of its conclusion that “the employment of
disloyal or subversive persons presents more than a speculative threat to our system of
government.”105 HUAC was pushing the executive branch from the outside; Hoover from the
inside.
Hoover was also central to the Justice Department’s Smith Act case against the CPUSA.
He was initially leery about the case because a full criminal process could lead to the opening of
FBI files. But Hoover had planted an informant in the CPUSA back in 1944, and her reports had
helped him write a 1,350 page document describing the party’s goals and internal workings. When
Tom Clark’s attorneys pursued their indictment of the CPUSA, Hoover’s document was the perfect
brief for a grand jury. Hoover’s informant was then a perfect witness. In these ways, even though
the president loathed HUAC, J. Edgar Hoover advanced HUAC’s objectives within the executive
branch.
Bullying the Supreme Court
Eventually, the Supreme Court attempted to check the activities of HUAC, most notably in the
1957 case, Watkins v. United States. John Watkins, an organizer for the Automobile Workers
International Union, was summoned by HUAC in April 1954, and while he agreed to answer
questions about current Communist Party members, he refused to answer any about people who
were no longer affiliated with the party. After HUAC and the House of Representatives held
Watkins in contempt, he argued that HUAC lacked the constitutional authority to inquire so widely
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into his political associations. The Supreme Court heard his plea in 1957, and held that “there is
no congressional power to expose for the sake of exposure.” The Court did not go so far as to
invalidate HUAC’s existence, but it did hold – by a 6-1 margin – that Watkins was not properly
informed of which questions were and were not pertinent to HUAC’s inquiry. He thus had no idea
whether he had to answer or not, and no fair opportunity to challenge a line of questioning. This
violated the due process guaranteed by the Constitution’s Fifth Amendment.106
Watkins v. United States was accompanied by ten other rulings defending the civil liberties
of accused Communists and Communist “front” group members during the Court’s 1956-57 term,
four of which came down on a single “Red Monday” in June 1957.107 These rulings represented a
shift from the Court’s initial acquiescence in the “Red Scare,” which was embodied in its decisions
to sustain or decline to review contempt convictions from 1945-1957, and to uphold the Smith Act
prosecution of CPUSA leaders in 1951.108 The Court had showed signs of discomfort in two
decisions handed down on April 30, 1951. Bailey v. Richardson was tied 4-4. By then, Tom Clark
was an associate justice, and he recused himself because he had been attorney general when
Dorothy Bailey was fired from the Department of Labor under the Truman loyalty order. By
convention, tied Supreme Court votes automatically uphold the decision below without a written
opinion explaining why. This was no consolation for Dorothy Bailey – whose dismissal stood –
but it did suggest that the justices were becoming more amenable to civil liberties defenses. More
meaningfully, the Court’s decision in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath declared
that organizations included on the Attorney General’s List could sue to have their designation
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removed, even if it was unclear how favorably the courts would treat subsequent lawsuits against
the List.109
The major turning point for the Court came after Chief Justice Fred Vinson died in
September 1953 and was replaced by Earl Warren. Under Warren’s leadership, the Court began to
question the Red Scare on several fronts. On April 30, 1956, in Communist Party of the United
States v. Subversive Activities Control Board, the Court required the Subversives Activities
Control Board to reconsider its “subversive” designation of the Communist Party because its
original hearings included testimony from perjurious witnesses.110 The following day, in the
House, Alabama Democrat George Andrews responded by asking, “how much longer will this
Congress continue to permit the Supreme Court to usurp the powers of Congress, write the laws
of this land, destroy States’ rights, and protect the Communist Party?”111
The mention of “States’ rights” is telling. It certainly referred to the Warren Court’s 1954
decision in Brown v. Board of Education, which Southern governors and legislators promised to
meet with “massive resistance.”112 But “states’ rights” were also set aside in Pennsylvania v.
Nelson (1956), when the Court invalidated the state sedition conviction of Steve Nelson, an
admitted Communist Party member, on the grounds that Pennsylvania’s sedition statute was
superseded (or “preempted”) by the federal Smith Act. By holding that the Smith Act and state
sedition laws could not coexist, the Warren Court also invalidated all the other 41 state sedition
laws that were on the books across the country – a dramatic reversal that Justice Reed bemoaned
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in his dissent (in which he was joined by Justices Burton and Minton).113 Aggravating
conservatives further, the Warren Court ruled – on statutory rather than constitutional grounds –
in favor of a Food and Drug Administration employee dismissed because of his alleged
associations with Communists.114 By the end of the congressional session in July 1956, both the
Senate and House judiciary committees had reported favorably on bills that would effectively
overrule Nelson, and strip the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over state sedition laws.115
For conservative legislators, Watkins v. United States and “Red Monday” in 1957 added
insult to injury, and support for legislation curbing the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction then became
mainstream. The chairman of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee drafted a bill – warmly
supported by Judiciary Committee Chairman, James Eastland (D-MS) – that would have stripped
the Supreme Court of its appellate jurisdiction in all cases involving “contempt of Congress, the
federal loyalty-security program, state antisubversive statutes, measures adopted by boards of
education to deal with subversion among teachers, and admission to the practice of law in any
state.”116 “The objective of my bill,” Senator William Jenner (R-Indiana) stated, “is to check
judicial legislation in certain fields where it has been damaging to the internal security of the
United States.”117 Jenner’s colleague on the Senate Judiciary Committee, John Marshall Butler (RMaryland), amended the bill to focus more narrowly on repealing the Court’s decisions in Watkins
and Nelson, and the Jenner-Butler bill was brought to the floor of the Senate alongside the 1956
bills that aimed to insulate state sedition laws from judicial review. By 1958, Senate Majority
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Leader Lyndon B. Johnson (D-Texas) had on his plate “an assortment of court-curbing bills” that
had “moved through the congressional maze.”118
Johnson opposed all “court-curbing” efforts, fearing that they would split the Democratic
Party, embarrass the Senate, and damage his prospects of a future run for the White House.
President Eisenhower’s position was muddled: he loathed the Warren Court and deeply regretted
his decision to appoint Warren as chief justice, but he also said nothing in favor of the courtcurbing bills.119 In any event, the president did nothing to oppose them, so this task was left to
Johnson, who structured the Senate calendar to delay consideration of the Jenner-Butler bill and
H.R. 3 (the final state sedition law bill) for as long as possible. He gave his colleagues the famous
Johnson “treatment”: gently telling some to vote the right way over glasses of whiskey in his office;
furiously threatening others of the consequences if they voted the wrong way. In the end, the
Jenner-Butler bill was tabled by a narrow vote of 49-41; H.R. 3 by a vote of 41-40. The Court
narrowly survived.120
However, the threats from Congress influenced the Court’s behavior. The Court agreed to
hear a steadily declining number of contentious “Communist cases” in 1958 and 1959. In the most
substantial case it did hear, Barenblatt v. United States, it ruled 5-4 in favor of HUAC investigators
who were accused of violating First and Fifth Amendment rights. 121 HUAC praised Barenblatt in
its 1959 annual report, and then set off to Puerto Rico in November 1959, determined to investigate
links between the Puerto Rican independence movement and international Communism.122 There,
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it held thirteen witnesses in contempt after they argued that the Committee was not authorized to
conduct investigations in U.S. territories – only U.S. states.123 HUAC later hounded the antinuclear group, Women’s Strike for Peace, holding its leaders in contempt in 1964.124
No Supreme Court justice will ever admit to capitulating in the face of congressional
pressure, but Earl Warren came close to such an admission in his memoirs. The court-curbing
legislation, he recalled, “came dangerously close to passing,” and embodied “the atmosphere of
the Cold War hysteria.”125 The events of 1958 are comparable to the events of 1937, when
congressional allies of President Roosevelt threatened to pack the Supreme Court in the aftermath
of several decisions that endangered the New Deal. Congress did not fulfill the threat, but, after it
was issued, the Court backed down, and began to uphold almost all the state and federal economic
regulations that it had previously invalidated.126 Likewise, after the threats to its jurisdiction in
1958, the Court stepped back from its attempts to defend the civil liberties of “Communists.”
There are differences between 1937 and 1958. In 1937, the court-packing plan was initiated
by the president; in 1958, the president was scarcely involved at all. In 1937, the court-curbing
bills barely survived the Senate Judiciary Committee; in 1958, two bills made it to the floor of the
Senate and were tabled by narrow margins. In 1937, court-curbing sought to protect the New Deal;
in 1958, it sought to protect the Red Scare. But both 1937 and 1958 illustrate how Congress can
influence judicial behavior by threatening to exercise its constitutional powers over the Supreme
Court. Indeed, these powers reflect the Court’s lowly status in the constitutional structure. The
Court’s only constitutional protections are life tenure for justices and small realms of original
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jurisdiction.127 Appellate jurisdiction and the structure of federal courts below the Supreme Court
are defined by Congress; appointments are reserved to the president and the Senate. As the weakest
branch, the Court has always relied on the other branches to see that its decisions and its authority
are respected and implemented. In 1958, a powerful coalition in the legislative branch was
determined to challenge this authority, and the Court took notice.
This campaign against the Court did not cause the Second Red Scare, which had already
flourished for over a decade with minimal judicial interference. Yet the threats made by legislators
against the Court’s jurisdiction prompted the Court to step back from its defense of civil liberties.
This gave HUAC the green light to continue its crusade until as late as 1964. The only consolation
for civil liberties was the fact that the Court never explicitly overruled Watkins. A crucial principle
therefore endured: “there is no congressional power to expose for the sake of exposure.”128 As the
next two chapters will demonstrate, this principle helped prevent the re-emergence of invasive
legislative inquisitions during the Vietnam War and the War on Terror. Future restrictions on civil
liberties would have to come in other forms.
The Second Red Scare in Historical Perspective
Executive actions undoubtedly underpinned the Second Red Scare. Truman established the loyalty
program and his Justice Department prosecuted the CPUSA. Indirectly, Truman’s foreign policy
also played into the hands of red-baiting politicians. The “Truman Doctrine” defined the Soviet
Union as a threat that required a U.S. military presence abroad. How, J. Parnell Thomas asked,
could Truman fight Communism in Greece and Korea without fighting it in the United States? It
was a fair question. Truman wanted to have his cake and eat it, too, escalating a Cold War abroad
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while dampening a Cold War at home. His political enemies seized on this contradiction
throughout his presidency.129
Nevertheless, Truman, like Louis Post after the First World War, used executive power to
obstruct a repressive legislature. Some of this obstruction – like Post’s – was based on nonenforcement of repressive laws, especially Title II of the McCarran Act. Truman also invoked
executive privilege to keep loyalty files away from J. Parnell Thomas, Homer Ferguson, Joseph
McCarthy, and other right-wing legislators – a maneuver that frustrated their ambitions and
protected their potential victims. The original Mundt-Nixon bill was stalled by a veto threat, but
vetoes of the McCarran Act and the McCarran-Walter Act were overridden. Truman seemed to
gain more leverage from powers that are not written in the Constitution – prosecutorial discretion
and executive privilege – than he did from the veto power enshrined in Article I, Section 7.
To the extent that Truman participated in the Red Scare, he did so in response to
congressional pressure. After James Rankin rescued and entrenched HUAC at the beginning of the
79th Congress, the Committee had a permanent mandate to investigate “subversives.” Throughout
1946, HUAC acted on this mandate, throwing around subpoenas, blacklists, and contempt
citations. Particularly following the Republican victories in the 1946 elections, HUAC was in an
extremely powerful position at the beginning of 1947. Truman knew this and devised his loyalty
program in this context.
As in the aftermath of the Civil War and the First World War, Congress reorganized its
committees and rules after the Second World War. By contrast, the Joint Committee on
Reconstruction and the Overman Subcommittee on “Bolshevik Propaganda” were temporary
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committees created for specific purposes. HUAC – a permanent standing committee after 1945 –
had no such limits. Legislators were thus equipped with a formidable internal machinery for their
attacks on civil liberties – a machinery that was supported by the traditional deference of each
chamber to the contempt citations issued by their committees.
The most consequential form of congressional influence over the executive branch was
informal and constitutionally unusual. While HUAC accused Communists and their “fronts” of
surreptitiously influencing the government, HUAC and its Senate counterparts were
surreptitiously collaborating with the FBI. The FBI never openly conspired with legislative redbaiters, but its collection and dissemination of derogatory information about their targets gave the
congressional committees priceless encouragement, publicity, and legitimacy. J. Edgar Hoover,
meanwhile, realized that smears and accusations could be more freely expressed in Congress –
where the “Speech or Debate” clause of the Constitution gave legislators a right to slander – than
in courts, where demanding standards of proof and procedure applied. The FBI-HUAC
relationship served both sides well.
With friends like Hoover in the executive branch, did legislators need legislation to execute
the Second Red Scare? The McCarran and McCarran-Walter Acts were paper tigers. The only
other major piece of legislation that curtailed civil liberties during this period was the 1947 TaftHartley Act, which required union officers to repudiate Communist beliefs or lose their collective
bargaining privileges. Hugo Black was probably correct that this “anti-Communist affidavit”
violated the First Amendment, but the opponents of Taft-Hartley – including President Truman,
whose veto of the bill was overturned – focused their ire on its multiple mechanisms for reversing

152

the gains earned by unions in the 1935 National Labor Relations Act.130 The law’s biggest longterm blow to labor was probably its provision that allowed employers to campaign against
unionization on employee time. Union organizers are obviously disadvantaged – more accurately,
knee-capped – when the boss can tell a captive audience of workers why they should not form a
union. Unsurprisingly, since Taft-Hartley, unionization in the United States has steadily
declined.131 But Taft-Hartley was not, overall, a repressive piece of legislation akin to a sedition
act – it was a rebalancing of the scales in favor of business, after the New Deal had tipped them
towards labor.
The Supreme Court belatedly began to constrain the Second Red Scare in the mid-1950s.
But congressional conservatives knocked the Court into line by threatening its jurisdiction over
so-called “Communist cases.” As we saw in Chapter 2, Congress successfully manipulated the
jurisdiction of the Court during Reconstruction. Largely thanks to Lyndon Johnson, Congress
failed to do the same in 1958. However, the Court’s subsequent behavior, essentially ducking all
“Communist cases,” suggests that the threat of court curbing had the desired effect: HUAC
continued to harass its enemies and hold them in contempt until 1964.
Like the legislators of the First Red Scare, the legislators of the Second Red Scare primarily
influenced local actors by example. Southern state legislatures, in particular, established
investigating committees and compulsory registration laws that harassed and intimidated civil
rights groups on the grounds that they were “subversive” or Communist-affiliated.132 Other state
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legislatures created Un-American Activities Committees aimed at left-wing academics and
schoolteachers.133 It is difficult to measure the damage done to civil liberties by this generation of
local copycats. In the South, at least, they severely hampered the ability of the National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) to organize for the desegregation of public
schools. Across the country, in their relentless pursuit of schoolteachers and academics, they
menaced academic freedom.134 At a minimum, state HUACs did the national HUAC proud.
Table 4.2: Congress and the Second Red Scare
Congressional Tools

Examples during the Second Red Scare

Powers over itself

Entrenchment of the House Un-American Activities Committee
through James Rankin’s parliamentary maneuver, strengthening
of

all

standing

committees

through

the

Legislative

Reorganization Act
Powers over the executive

Collaboration with J. Edgar Hoover and the FBI

Powers over the judiciary

Court curbing bills after “Red Monday”

Powers over state and local General encouragement to state and local actors
government
Repressive legislation

1950 McCarran Act, 1952 McCarran-Walter Act

Despite their limited legislative achievements, the architects of the Second Red Scare
suppressed American civil liberties on a massive scale, through the variety of tools outlined in
Table 4.2. In 1919, an accused subversive could face public exposure and, possibly, deportation –
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but even the supposedly simple process of deportation was hindered by the need for Labor
Department approval. In 1946, an accused subversive could face deportation, public exposure, a
flurry of invasive subpoenas, loyalty hearings, confidential informants, vast FBI dossiers, officially
sanctioned blacklists, and loss of employment. These subversives were not victims of an imperial
presidency, but powerful conservative legislators aligned with a calculating national security
bureaucrat.
It is difficult to pinpoint precisely when the Second Red Scare ended. Most of this chapter
has focused on the years of the Truman Administration from 1945-1952, because this is the period
when HUAC – the primary driver of postwar assaults on civil liberties – consolidated itself.
However, the fact that the United States Supreme Court was still hearing cases about the civil
liberties of alleged Communists in the early 1960s suggests that at least some form of “Red Scare”
persisted long after Truman and long after the demise of Senator Joseph McCarthy in the wake of
his ill-considered investigations of the U.S. army in 1954. In retrospect, the Supreme Court’s
decision in Watkins v. United States – handed down on June 17, 1957 – was a watershed because
it questioned the constitutional basis of freewheeling congressional investigations. Even though
the Court was reluctant to extend the promise of Watkins to other cases after the court-curbing
scare of 1958, Watkins was never overruled. As the next chapter will demonstrate, the Watkins
principle – that “there is no congressional power to expose for the sake of exposure” – necessitated
the development of new, more covert restrictions on civil liberties during the Vietnam War.
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5. The Vietnam War and the War on Crime
Unlike after the two World Wars – when legislators doubled down on wartime violations of
constitutional rights – legislators seemed to confront, expose, and rein in these violations after the
Vietnam War. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),
the National Security Agency (NSA), U.S. Army Intelligence, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS),
and Richard Nixon’s rogue White House thugs were all investigated by Congress. Often on live
television,

Americans

learned

of

numerous

sinister-sounding

operations,

including

“COINTELPRO,” “Minaret,” “CHAOS,” and “SHAMROCK.” In 1975 and 1976, Idaho
Democratic Senator Frank Church became particularly renowned for the work of his select
committee on the activities of the intelligence agencies, which not only illuminated far-reaching
domestic surveillance programs, but also wild assassination and coup plots against foreign
leaders.1
Although a similar inquiry in the House, led by New York Democrat Otis Pike, became
mired in controversy after its draft report was leaked to the press in February 1976,2 the postVietnam Congress could claim real results. The 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)
created a special court to review executive branch national security surveillance requests. Congress
also required the intelligence agencies to regularly report on their activities to new, permanent,
specialized intelligence committees in the House and the Senate.3
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This history has presented scholars with a plausible narrative of civil liberties being
restored at the hands of an assertive postwar Congress. Kim Lane Scheppele argues that “following
the intense political battles over Vietnam and Watergate in the 1970s, when the presidency itself
came into disrepute, Congress reclaimed some of its powers in the perpetual state of emergency”
– an “emergency” that had involved near-limitless executive power and wartime violations of civil
liberties.4 Aziz Huq and Frederick Schwartz praise the Church Committee for confronting an
“unchecked and unbalanced” executive.5 Bruce Ackerman cautiously commends Congress for its
post-Watergate, post-Vietnam assertiveness, while regretting that “it didn’t go further to revise the
disorganized, but massive grants of substantive authority to declare emergencies that the
presidency had accumulated over the decades.”6 For Samuel Walker, the post-Vietnam Congress
was central to “the greatest upsurge of public concern about civil liberties and the abuse of
government power in American history.”7 “Congress,” according to Arthur Schlesinger, was
“seized by a temporary passion to prevent future Vietnams and Watergates,” and “enacted laws
designed to reclaim lost powers, to dismantle the executive secrecy system and to ensure future
presidential accountability.”8
To what extent did the post-Vietnam Congress constrain executive power? To what extent
did this Congress revive civil liberties? This chapter begins by describing the wide variety of
repressive programs implemented by the federal government during the Vietnam War. Then I
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evaluate the role of Congress in ending these programs. With few exceptions, I find the
congressional role to be marginal. The Church Committee produced priceless documentation, but
it focused overwhelmingly on past abuses, and it largely cooperated with the national security state
that it was charged with investigating. The Committee’s two main reforms – FISA and the creation
of permanent intelligence oversight panels in Congress – legitimized rather than constrained
invasive surveillance tactics. Finally, I document a legacy of Vietnam that scholars have often
overlooked: congressional support for a “War on Crime,” which began during the war and
outlasted it, creating a long-term threat to civil liberties.
Civil Liberties, the Imperial Presidency, and Vietnam
For scholars concerned with the impact of wartime executive power on American civil liberties,
the Vietnam War is a compelling cautionary tale. The war was part of the larger Cold War, but it
prompted its own problems for civil liberties, especially during its most turbulent years between
1965 and 1973.9 At almost every juncture, these problems were caused by the executive branch,
often without the knowledge of Congress. They only seemed to recede when legislators finally
confronted the “imperial presidency” in the final years of the war and after.
The first and most extensive violation of civil liberties came from the FBI’s
Counterintelligence Programs (COINTELPROs), which began in the mid-1950s, and grew in
scope and number during the Vietnam War.10 By 1971, there were seven different
“COINTELPROs” focused on “Espionage,” the “New Left,” “Disruption of White Hate groups,”
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“Communist Party USA,” “Counterintelligence and special operations,” “Black extremists,” and
the “Socialist Workers Party.”11 The key words in COINTELPRO planning documents – from
“black extremism” to “white hate” – were “expose, disrupt, misdirect, discredit or otherwise
neutralize.”12 In practice, this meant constant physical and electronic surveillance, blackmail, and
infiltration and exploitation of organizational factions. As stated with great candor in one of the
first COINTELPRO documents to be made public, these tactics were designed to “enhance the
paranoia” and give the impression of “an FBI agent behind every mailbox.”13 Overall, the various
COINTELPROs yielded around 500,000 intelligence files.14
Although the fruits of warrantless surveillance were inadmissible in court under the Fourth
Amendment, J. Edgar Hoover had creatively convinced successive attorneys general and
presidents that the surveillance itself was not necessarily illegal.15 There was no legal defense for
another signature COINTELPRO tactic: “black bag jobs.” Otherwise known as “surreptitious
entries,” these were, basically, burglaries. They were straightforward: break in, grab the
incriminating documents, plant the incriminating evidence, or leave a bug. Their full extent is
clouded by Hoover’s destruction of many relevant files, though the FBI did admit to the Church
Committee in 1975 that it “conducted over two hundred ‘black bag jobs’” involving theft between
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1948 and 1966 and “more than five hundred warrantless surreptitious microphone installations
against intelligence and internal security targets” between 1960 and 1975.16
COINTELPRO tactics differed from J. Edgar Hoover’s collaborations with the House UnAmerican Activities Committee (HUAC) in the 1940s and 1950s. Then, Hoover had relished the
opportunity to set HUAC against his enemies without ever having to reveal his surveillance
methods in a courtroom. However, the Supreme Court’s curtailment of HUAC in 1957 – embodied
in the Watkins mantra that “there is no congressional power to expose for the sake of exposure”17
– made the legislative strategy far less appealing for the FBI director. COINTELPRO retained the
basic idea of keeping FBI secrets out of courtrooms, but it provided for an entirely Bureau-run
operation without the need for congressional assistance.18
COINTELPRO’s deeply damaging impact on civil liberties was well summarized by
Supreme Court Justice William Douglas in 1972. After describing the totalizing surveillance of
the FBI – including the 1:5.7 ratio of FBI informants to members in the Black Panther Party –
Douglas warned that “we have as much or more to fear from the erosion of our sense of privacy
and independence by the omnipresent electronic ear of the Government as we do from the
likelihood that fomenters of domestic upheaval will modify our form of governing.”19 If this
assessment sounds dramatic, it is worth remembering that Hoover’s war against the Black Panthers
culminated in the assassination of Fred Hampton, whose apartment the FBI mapped out for the
Chicago police in December 1969. How else the Bureau acted on its stated mission to “prevent the
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rise of a ‘messiah’ who could unify, and electrify, the militant black nationalist movement” may
never be fully known.20
The FBI was not alone in its wartime surveillance activities. The National Security Agency
(NSA) had been shrouded in mystery since its establishment by Harry Truman in 1952. The NSA’s
primary remit was signals intelligence – radio and telegraphic communications among foreign
adversaries – but its role was never fully defined by statute or executive order. Absent meaningful
constraints or oversight, the NSA developed three major surveillance programs that targeted
Americans during the Vietnam War.21
The first was “Project Minaret.” NSA Director General Lew Allen told the Church
Committee that this began in October 1967 when the military asked the NSA to “obtain
communications intelligence regarding foreign control or influence over certain U.S. individuals
and groups.” Allen added that, over the next six years, “about 1,900 reports were issued covering
the three areas of terrorism, Executive protection and foreign influence over U.S. groups. This
would average about two reports per day.” Most of the reports involved “at least one foreign
communicant.”22 An NSA internal history declassified in 2013 goes further than Allen, admitting
that “the watch list eventually contained over 1,600 names and included such personages as
columnist Art Buchwald, journalist Tom Wicker, civil rights leaders Martin Luther King [Jr.] and
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Whitney Young, the boxer Muhammed Ali, and even politicians such as Frank Church and
Howard Baker.”23
A longer-running NSA program was “SHAMROCK.” This, as Frank Church relayed,
“was the cover name given to a message-collection program in which the Government persuaded
three international telegraph companies, RCA Global, ITT World Communications, and Western
Union International to make available in various ways their international telegraph traffic to the
U.S. Government.” From 1945 to 1975, “copies of most international telegrams originating in or
forwarded through the United States were turned over to the National Security Agency and its
predecessor agencies.”24 “At the outset,” Church continued, “the purpose apparently was only to
extract international telegrams relating to certain foreign targets. Later, the Government began to
extract the telegrams of certain U.S. citizens” – those citizens on the Minaret watch lists. “Of all
the messages made available to NSA each year,” Church concluded, “it is estimated that NSA in
recent years selected about 150,000 messages a month for NSA analysts to review.”25
Finally, “from 1970 to 1973, at the request of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs
(BNDD), NSA monitored selected telephone circuits between the United States and certain
countries in South America to obtain information relating to drug trafficking.” This program
involved something of an inter-agency merry-go-round: “BNDD submitted the names of 450
Americans to NSA for a ‘drug’ watch list. This list resulted in the dissemination of about 1,900
reports on drug traffickers to BNDD and CIA.”26
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How did these programs affect civil liberties? On the one hand, being on an NSA watch
list would surely feel less invasive than being blackmailed by the FBI. Indeed, you could end up
on an NSA watch list without ever knowing it. Nevertheless, the watch lists were transparently
aimed at political dissidents and they were shared with and compiled on behalf of other
government agencies, including the BNDD, the CIA, and the Pentagon. By today’s standards, the
NSA’s Cold War programs were technologically primitive, but, at the time, they were cutting edge.
SHAMROCK, especially, represented an enormous, sustained, and sophisticated collaboration
among private communications companies and the U.S. government. It is no surprise that J. Edgar
Hoover had coveted these tools for the FBI after the Second World War.27
Generally, orders came from the top, as the NSA recounts in its internal history of Project
Minaret:
In 1967 the country appeared to be going up in flames. Vietnam War protests were
becoming common, and “ghetto riots” in America’s urban centers had virtually
destroyed sections of Detroit and Los Angeles. President Johnson wanted to know
if the domestic antiwar movement was receiving help from abroad, and he
commissioned Richard Helms at CIA to find out. CIA came up with very little, but
in the process of mobilizing the intelligence community, the Army was tasked with
monitoring communications for the purpose of answering Johnson's question. On
October 20, Major General William P. Yarborough, the Army chief of staff for
intelligence, informed NSA of the effort, in which ASA [Army Security
Intelligence] was involved, and asked for help.28
This deadpan bureaucratic summary conveys the complete absence of checks on executive action.
Johnson asked Helms, Helms asked the Army, the Army asked the NSA, and the NSA proceeded
to build a sprawling watchlist including journalists, sports personalities, and members of Congress.
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Unlike the vaguely defined role of the NSA, the CIA was legally prohibited from spying
on Americans.29 Like the NSA, however, the CIA encroached on the domestic realm. The Agency
“conducted four mail opening programs in four cities within the United States for varying lengths
of time between 1953 and 1973.” The most egregious abuses occurred during the Vietnam War,
when “numerous domestic dissidents, including peace and civil rights activists, were specifically
targeted for mail opening.”30 Over the twenty years of the New York program, “a total of
28,322,796 letters were made available to CIA agents,” 2,705,706 were photographed, and
215,820 were opened. “The height of the project in terms of volume was 1967, when a total of
23,617 letters were opened and analyzed.”31
The CIA also compiled its own watch list, under the ominous code-name “Operation
CHAOS.” CHAOS tracked American radicals abroad, hoping to catch a Black Panther or a
member of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) in a foreign plot. From 1967 to 1973,
“300,000 individuals were indexed in a CIA computer system and separate files were created on
approximately 7,200 Americans and over 100 domestic groups.”32 CHAOS was supplemented by
MERRIMAC and RESISTANCE, which involved, respectively, “the infiltration by CIA agents of
Washington-based peace groups and black activist groups” and “a broad effort to obtain general
background information for predicting violence which might create threats to CIA installations,
recruiters or contractors and for security evaluation of CIA applicants.”33
As with Minaret, CHAOS was initiated from the White House. President Ford’s
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concluded that presidents Johnson and Nixon “made continuing and insistent requests of the CIA
for detailed evaluation of possible foreign involvement in the domestic dissident scene” despite
“the Agency’s repeated conclusions in its reports” of “no significant foreign connection with
domestic disorder.” CHAOS was characterized by “excessive secrecy” and “removal from the
normal chain of command,” preventing “any effective supervision and review of its activities by
officers not directly involved in the project.”34
The bluntest presidential weaponization of the national security state occurred under
Nixon. Tom Charles Huston, an aide to President Nixon, attempted (unsuccessfully) to resurrect
“black bag jobs” in 1970, prompting an acrimonious turf war with J. Edgar Hoover.35 The “Huston
Plan” was matched in clumsiness only by the work of Nixon’s ham-fisted “Plumbers,” whose
greatest hits included the bungled Watergate burglary in June 1972 and the pilfering of files from
the office of Daniel Ellsberg’s psychiatrist – actions that succeeded in forcing Nixon out of office
and getting Ellsberg acquitted in his Espionage Act prosecution arising from the leak of the
Pentagon Papers.36
With somewhat greater subtlety, Nixon enlisted the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in
pursuit of his domestic enemies. Between 1969 and 1973, the IRS collected intelligence files “on
more than 11,000 individuals” and “tax investigations were started on the basis of political rather
than tax criteria.”37 An IRS “Special Service Staff” ran this program, whose targets included “the
American Civil Liberties Union, the American Library Association, the Conservative Book Club,
the Ford Foundation, the Headstart program, the NAACP, the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights
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Under Law, the University of North Carolina, and approximately 50 branches of the National
Urban League.”38
The last federal agency that practiced covert surveillance was the United States Army.
“After the army was called upon to quell civil disorders in Detroit and to cope with an antiwar
demonstration at the Pentagon in 1967,” the Church Committee recounted, “the army Chief of
Staff approved a recommendation for ‘continuous counterintelligence investigations’ to obtain
information on ‘subversive personalities, groups or organizations’ and their ‘influence on urban
populations’ in promoting civil disturbances.”39 In the end, “an estimated 100,000 Americans were
the subjects of United States Army intelligence files created between the mid-1960’s and 1971.”40
This surveillance over civilians – initiated in response to antiwar protests – was an obvious
violation of the army’s proper role, even though there is no concrete evidence that the files were
used (by the army or by other government agencies) to actively suppress dissent.
Overall, the restrictions on civil liberties that occurred during the Vietnam War were, in
one way or another, traceable to executive overreach. Some programs – such as Minaret, CHAOS,
and the Huston Plan – were obviously orchestrated from the White House. Others – especially
COINTELPRO – emerged from other corners of the national security bureaucracy. Either way, the
executive branch substantially restricted civil liberties during the Vietnam War. These restrictions
are summarized in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Executive Branch Curtailments of Civil Liberties During the Vietnam War
Actor/agency

Program(s)

Estimated number of targets

Years of operation

FBI

COINTELPRO(s)

500,000

1956-1971

38
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39
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NSA

SHAMROCK

Hundreds of thousands

1945-1975

Minaret

1,400

1967-1973

Drug surveillance

450

1970-1973

Mail opening

215,000

1953-1973

CHAOS

300,000

1967-1973

MERRIMAC

Unknown

1967-1973

RESISTANCE

Unknown

1967-1973

Huston Plan

Unknown

1970

“Plumbers”

Dozens

1971-1973

IRS

Special Service Staff

11,000

1969-1973

U.S. Army

Surveillance

100,000

1967-1971

CIA

White House

Explaining the Rollback
A crucial difference between Vietnam-era restrictions on civil liberties and those of earlier wars is
their end date. None of the Vietnam programs outlasted the war, whereas martial law outlived the
Civil War, harsh deportation legislation outlived the First World War, and HUAC outlived the
Second World War. Why was Vietnam different?
A resurgent Congress may be part of the answer. The Watergate investigation drove Nixon
from office and exposed the machinations of the White House “plumbers,” the NSA terminated
Project SHAMROCK in the middle of the Church Committee hearings in 1975, and the U.S army
ended its surveillance programs after their exposure by the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional
Rights in 1971.41
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However, legislators did nothing to terminate the program that most directly violated civil
liberties on a large scale: COINTELPRO. Although the Church Committee memorably exposed
the FBI’s infamous blackmail letter to Martin Luther King, Jr.,42 it did not expose COINTELPRO,
which was first revealed when the self-anointed “Citizens’ Commission to Investigate the FBI” –
eight antiwar activists led by physics professor William Davidon – ransacked a Bureau office in
Media, Pennsylvania, on March 8, 1971. The “Commission” stole several thousand documents
that spoke primarily to FBI activities in Pennsylvania, while hinting at the scope of national
operations. The Media files included the broad strategy documents emphasizing the need to
“enhance paranoia,” as well as specific plans to recruit informants in black student organizations
to counter “increased campus disorders involving black students” that “pose a definite threat to the
Nation’s stability and security.”43 There was also a “STAG” file on “Student Agitation,” describing
surveillance of a War Resisters International conference at Haverford College and the wide variety
of FBI informants (“a campus security officer, a switchboard operator, the town’s chief of police,
and the postmaster”) monitoring would-be radicals at Swarthmore College.44
The Media files only scratched the surface of COINTELPRO. Indeed, the acronym itself
was not fully defined in the Media files, prompting NBC News journalist Carl Stern to sue the
Justice Department for further documents under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Stern
prevailed in 1973,45 two years before the Church Committee began its “staff study of more than
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20,000 pages of Bureau documents, depositions of many of the Bureau agents involved in the
programs, and interviews of several COINTELPRO targets.”46
Why did Congress take so long to investigate COINTELPRO? In 1971, the Media burglars
sent copies of their documents to South Dakota Democratic Senator George McGovern and
Maryland Democratic Representative Parren Mitchell in the hope that these liberal-minded
lawmakers would launch an official inquiry. Both men instead immediately handed the documents
to the FBI and condemned the burglary. As Betty Medsger notes, referencing the files from the
FBI’s “MEDBURG” investigation, this response apparently led J. Edgar Hoover to briefly
consider “ask[ing] a select group of members of Congress to help the FBI solve this important
crime.”47 Hoover’s audacious plan was never implemented, but the fact that he considered it at all
speaks to his supreme confidence in Congress having his back.
Under the “Speech or Debate” clause of the Constitution, McGovern, Mitchell, or others
could have read portions of the Media files into the Congressional Record, as Senator Mike Gravel
(D-Alaska) would do in June 1971 with the Pentagon Papers.48 “Once they have a document, the
Speech and Debate clause means there is no way we can prevent its release,” Gerald Ford’s White
House counsel would later warn in a candid conversation.49 The only thing stopping congressional
dissemination of the Media files was self-censorship.
In any event, all COINTELPROs had already been terminated immediately after the Media
burglary – a panicked action documented in internal FBI memoranda.50 Other programs were also
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terminated by the executive branch before legislators started investigating them. The NSA’s
Minaret and drug surveillance programs, though first revealed to the public by the Church
Committee,51 had been discontinued by NSA Director Lew Allen on the advice of the attorney
general in 1973.52 The IRS’s Special Service Staff (SSS) was abolished by the new Commissioner
of Internal Revenue, Donald Alexander, in August 1973. Alexander told the Church Committee
that he abolished the SSS because it was involved in “activities which are antithetical to proper tax
administration.”53 The Huston Plan was quashed by the FBI.54 CIA documents suggest that
Operation CHAOS was scaled back in 1972 and ended in 1973 due to declining antiwar protest
activity and legal concerns raised in an internal Inspector General report.55
In the final National Security Council (NSC) meeting of the Ford Administration, the
president and his advisors blamed the Justice Department for the rollback of wartime surveillance
programs. “We are dealing with an adversary in Justice,” claimed CIA Director George Bush.
“The Justice Department’s role today is a threat to national security,” claimed Henry Kissinger.
“The Justice Department treats us like an adversary rather than a client,” Deputy Defense Secretary
William Clements joined in. Several complaints were overblown or inaccurate, such as Kissinger’s
notion that “classification no longer means anything or is accepted in law.”56 However, the general
thrust contained truth: the Justice Department – which had questioned the legality COINTELPRO,
Minaret, and CHAOS – was trying to clean up the government’s act.
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Reformist impulses within the Justice Department stemmed from judicial pressure. In his
letter to Lew Allen recommending the termination of Project Minaret, Attorney General Elliot
Richardson cited “a case entitled United States v. Keith, 407 U.S. 297,” which held “that the
Federal Government could not conduct electronic surveillance on citizens of this country without
a warrant in certain circumstances.” Richardson feared that the Keith case “raises a number of
serious legal questions which have yet to be resolved,” potentially threatening “your current
practice of disseminating to the FBI and Secret Service information acquired by you through the
use of electronic devices.” Thus, “it is requested that you immediately curtail the further
dissemination of such information to these agencies.”57
“Keith” was a District Court judge in the Eastern District of Michigan, and, in 1972, the
Justice Department asked the Supreme Court to set aside his ruling in United States v. Sinclair,
which held that the government had violated the Fourth Amendment when it wiretapped a cofounder of the “White Panther Party” without a warrant.58 The Justice Department maintained that
it did not need a warrant because the White Panthers were a threat to the nation’s domestic security,
but Keith retorted that this position had no basis in the Constitution or Supreme Court precedent.
The Supreme Court upheld the position of Judge Keith.59 When he became attorney general in
May 1973, Elliot Richardson accepted the implications of the Court’s decision and told the
National Security Agency that it would have to do the same by terminating Project Minaret.
Although the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights can claim credit for exposing
and ending the Army’s surveillance programs, the Church Committee can claim credit for ending
Project SHAMROCK, and the Watergate investigators can claim credit for sinking President
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Nixon’s political career, the available documentary evidence indicates that Congress played no
meaningful role in prompting the termination of CHAOS, Minaret, or – the biggest menace to civil
liberties – COINTELPRO. To the extent that civil liberties were restored in the latter years of the
Vietnam War, they were primarily restored at the hands of executive branch officials. The
motivations of these officials varied. In the IRS, Donald Alexander seemed to be genuinely
revolted by his agency’s political activities. In the Justice Department, Elliot Richardson was
concerned about the legal consequences of the Keith case. In the CIA, the terminators of Operation
CHAOS seemed to believe it was no longer useful. In the FBI, the end of COINTELPRO was a
hurried response to its dramatic public exposure. Whatever their motivations, these officials
ensured that wartime restrictions on civil liberties did not outlast the war.
The Fruits of the Church Committee
It would be harsh to judge the post-Watergate Congress on its inability to dismantle the various
surveillance programs of the executive branch, especially when several of the programs were
secret. The yardstick that post-Watergate legislators erected for themselves was, instead, about the
future: by studying the abuses of the national security state during the Vietnam War, they could
stop them from happening again.
The 94th Congress, which was elected three months after Nixon’s resignation, seemed like
the perfect vehicle for reform. After the passage of the Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts under
the Johnson Administration, the Democratic Party was shaking off the Southern segregationists
who had shaped it so significantly since the Civil War. To be sure, the DW-Nominate scores of
the 94th Congress (displayed in Figures 5.1 and 5.2) indicate persistent conservatism among
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Democrats in both houses, and long-serving Southerners like Senators James Eastland (DMississippi) and John Sparkman (D-Alabama) were still in office.60
Figure 5.1: DW-Nominate scores, 94th Congress, House of Representatives

Figure 5.2: DW-Nominate scores, 94th Congress, Senate
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Nevertheless, as Kathryn Olmsted recounts, the post-Watergate, 1974 elections seemed to
signal a deepening liberalism in the Democratic Party:
Ten new senators won seats in that election, but the greatest changes occurred in
the House. Not only did the Democrats hold an overwhelming advantage of 291–
144 in the House, but they also had within their ranks 75 freshmen determined to
exert their new power against the executive – and against the traditional,
hierarchical Democratic leadership. As the House organized for the next term, these
upstart freshmen combined to shake up business as usual in Washington. The
Democratic insurgents deposed four elderly committee chairmen, including
longtime CIA friend and overseer Edward Hébert of the Armed Services
Committee.61
At the very least, the 1974 elections were not a repeat of the conservative triumphs of 1918 or
1946. And while those conservative triumphs were followed by congressional efforts to retain and
expand wartime restrictions on civil liberties, the post-Watergate – and soon-to-be post-Vietnam
– Congress began by investigating and condemning wartime restrictions on civil liberties.
The Senate created the Church Committee on January 27, 1975. The primary sponsor of
the resolution establishing the Committee, Senator John Pastore (D-Rhode Island), framed it
cautiously. “I wish to make it abundantly clear at the outset that the FBI, the CIA, and Military
Intelligence are absolutely necessary to the security and the survival of this Republic,” Pastore told
his colleagues. Nevertheless, Pastore conceded “that there have been some very serious abuses.”
The press was “replete with… charges and countercharges,” some of which were “exaggerated,”
others that “minimized some of the wrongs.” Now, “the important thing here is to restore public
confidence so that these agencies, in the final analysis, will be responsive. That is what this is all
about.” By “creat[ing] a select committee consisting of 11 members – 6 from the majority, 5 from
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the minority,” the intelligence agencies could be investigated in a bipartisan, measured, and sober
way. The Pastore resolution passed with 82 yeas, 4 nays, and 11 abstentions.62
Pastore himself had no ambitions to join the committee, and its members – appointed by
their respective party leaders – were the Chairman, Frank Church (D-Idaho), Vice Chairman, John
Tower (R-Texas), Philip Hart (D-Michigan), Walter Mondale (D-Minnesota) Walter Huddleston
(D-Kentucky), Robert Morgan (D-North Carolina), Gary Hart (D-Colorado), Howard Baker (RTennessee), Barry Goldwater (R-Arizona), Charles Mathias (R-Maryland), and Richard Schweiker
(R-Pennsylvania). Church and Tower disagreed over how aggressively the committee should
examine covert actions by the intelligence agencies abroad. Tower wanted to “make sure we do
not hobble ourselves and render ourselves at such a disadvantage that we cannot maintain the kind
of international posture we need,” whereas Church was willing to pry more deeply into covert
action.63
Church and Tower agreed on the need to investigate the domestic activities of the
intelligence agencies, but, from the beginning, they clarified that they would only investigate past
activities, would not hold anyone accountable for these activities, and would only make future
recommendations for how these activities could be better regulated. There would be no reckoning
for the national security state. As Church told Gerald Ford and Henry Kissinger in March 1975,
“if the work is well done it will clear the air and restore the agencies to the good position they
should enjoy.”64 On the floor of the Senate, Barry Goldwater struck a similar chord. “Because the
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attacks on the intelligence community persist,” he said, “I am supporting Senate Resolution 21
[authorizing the Church Committee] as a way to clear the air and set the record.”65
This was the spirit in which the Church Committee conducted its business over the
subsequent sixteen months. Unlike the Pike Committee in the House of Representatives – which
was primarily concerned with covert action abroad, rather than abuses at home – the Church
Committee did not threaten a single executive official with a contempt citation. The biggest dispute
both within the Church Committee and in its relations with the executive branch concerned the
public testimony of NSA Director Lew Allen, which threatened to lift the lid on an agency that
had long been almost completely secret. But Allen agreed to testify – and, just like the FBI, CIA,
and other officials who appeared before the Committee, he spoke honestly about what his agency
had been up to throughout the Vietnam War. Everyone, it seemed, was happy to “clear the air.”66
The hearings and reports of the Church Committee were and still are extremely valuable
to anyone concerned with the history and development of American intelligence agencies. My
footnotes are testament to this fact. Still, the caution exercised by the Church Committee was
reflected in its tepid legislative recommendations.67 The two most notable recommendations taken
up by the wider Congress were the creation of permanent intelligence committees in both chambers
and the passage of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) in 1978. FISA aimed to
regulate surveillance of individuals whom the executive branch had identified as national security
threats – people like the “White Panther Party” leader in the Keith case. Indeed, FISA was as much
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a response to the Keith case – which had thrown domestic electronic surveillance practices into
doubt – as it was to the recommendations of the Church Committee.68
Massachusetts Democratic Senator Edward Kennedy’s initial proposal for a Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act, as he explained it in 1976, “would, for the first time, substitute
carefully prescribed accountability and oversight for the arbitrariness of the past.” Now, “for an
American citizen to be surveilled, there must be probable cause that he is an agent of a foreign
power, a citizen acting pursuant to the direction of a foreign power, and engaging in sabotage,
terrorism, or clandestine intelligence activities.”69 Kennedy passionately argued that “the abuses
of recent history sanctioned in the name of national security and documented in detail by the
Church committee, highlight the need for more effective congressional oversight,” and he
commended the “cooperative and helpful” approach of the Ford Administration “in the drafting of
this legislation.”70
The bipartisan and amicable environment buckled somewhat as the bill edged closer to
law. The administration had conceded that some form of oversight was desirable, but did this mean
that the president or the attorney general would require a warrant for an intelligence investigation
that was just as demanding as warrants in criminal proceedings? If so, the Fourth Amendment’s
stipulation that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized” posed problems. Perhaps oaths or affirmations were only small burdens for presidents and
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attorneys general, but “particularly describing” places to be searched and persons or things to be
seized could risk the disclosure of sensitive information.71
On this concern, a compromise was struck. If the executive branch wished to conduct
national security surveillance on American soil, it could apply for a special warrant from a special
court. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) would differ from regular federal courts
in two major respects. First, its seven (later, eleven) judges would not be appointed by the president
with the advice and consent of the Senate, but by the chief justice of the Supreme Court. Second,
its proceedings would not be adversarial, but secret and ex parte – only involving the government’s
legal team and the judge. Thus, prior judicial approval was now required where it previously was
not, but in a way that protected state secrets and limited outside scrutiny. Under FISA, the attorney
general would also have to issue regular reports on surveillance activities to new permanent
intelligence committees in the House and the Senate.72
In the 1976 hearings on FISA, Delaware Democratic Senator Joseph Biden surmised that
“this is the best that we are going to get, and what we are going to get in this bill is much better
than what we have.”73 From a separation of powers standpoint, the permanent intelligence
committees (engaging Congress) and the FISC (engaging the judiciary) undoubtedly represented
an improvement. Yet from the standpoint of civil liberties, FISA was underwhelming at best.
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First, the FISC hardly distinguished itself as a forceful check on surveillance. As Emily
Berman notes, “over its first two and a half decades, the FISA Court approved nearly every single
[warrant] application without modification.”74 Defenders of FISA argue that this success rate is
due to the care and diligence that the Justice Department has taken – and must take – when devising
FISA Court warrant requests.75 Yet, given the intense secrecy surrounding the FISA Court’s
procedures, it is almost impossible to cross-examine this argument. More troublingly, the FISA
Court’s secrecy impedes the ability of anyone who is subject to a FISA warrant to challenge it:
their lawyers cannot introduce suppression motions in the ex parte FISA Court, and the
government is under no obligation to give anyone notice that they are under FISA surveillance.
All of this amounts to a process that falls far short of the protections offered by the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments.76
Civil libertarian arguments in support of FISA have met this objection by emphasizing how
FISA warrants (before the 2001 PATRIOT Act) had to have the “primary purpose” of national
security surveillance, rather than regular law enforcement. This “Wall” between intelligence and
criminal prosecution supposedly ensured that FISA warrants – at least between 1978 and 2001 –
were reserved for a narrow category of targets.77 However, neither the “Wall” nor the “primary
purpose” doctrine were actually written into the FISA statute. Indeed, as the FISA Court of Review
underscored in 2002, both the text and the legislative history of the statute clearly indicate that
“the FISA as passed by Congress in 1978 clearly did not preclude or limit the government’s use
or proposed use of foreign intelligence information, which included evidence of certain kinds of
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criminal activity, in a criminal prosecution.”78 Instead, the “Wall” and the “primary purpose”
doctrine emerged from a Fourth Circuit case in 1980, which other circuit courts then followed,
before the Justice Department incorporated the “Wall” into its own internal guidelines in 1995.79
Both the executive branch and the Government Accountability Office (which is independent of the
executive) identified these guidelines, rather than FISA, as the principal source of the “Wall” prior
to 9/11.80 The PATRIOT Act amended FISA to explicitly encourage the integration of intelligence
gathering and regular law enforcement after legislators and executive officials blamed the “Wall”
for the intelligence failures that lead to 9/11. But the “Wall” could have been broken down without
changes to FISA for the simple reason that it was never required by FISA.
Apart from legalizing government surveillance practices, FISA further benefited the
national security state by empowering the congressional intelligence committees. A prime example
of this dynamic was on display in December 2005, when the New York Times revealed that the
Bush Administration had allowed the NSA to monitor domestic electronic communications
without a FISC warrant. Yet the Times also indicated that select members of Congress were in the
loop from the beginning.81 These members constituted the “Gang of Eight”: the majority and
minority leaders in each chamber, and the chairs and ranking members of the intelligence
committees in each chamber. Unsurprisingly, the Bush Administration emphasized its
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consultations with the intelligence committees in its legal defense of the “Terrorist Surveillance
Program” (TSP).82 The NSA would later report that it conducted 49 briefings with members of
Congress throughout the TSP’s duration, “17 of which took place before the December 2005 media
reports.”83
Some “gang” members claimed that they protested the program privately, but they either
did not protest it vigorously enough or deliberately inflated their protests after the Times story.84
Why were the intelligence committees so deferential to the agencies they were supposed to be
regulating? This ostensibly surprising dynamic makes sense when we consider how FISA defined
the relationship between the committees and the agencies. The committees have special – and, in
Congress – exclusive access to classified information. Members of these committees could publish
such information and (under the Speech or Debate clause) be immune from legal prosecution.
However, they would be biting the hand that feeds them, losing not only future information, but
also one of the few committee assignments that provides access to the inner reaches of the national
security state.
FISA made a special club of legislators feel like part of the intelligence community, and it
created a thin façade of judicial review. If the goal was to restore and strengthen civil liberties after
the Vietnam War, Senator Biden was wrong when he argued that FISA was better than nothing.
FISA placed electronic surveillance on a stronger legal footing. “Any lingering doubts as to the
legality of proper intelligence activities will be laid to rest,” Attorney General Griffin Bell
anticipated as FISA approached its final passage. “The dedicated and patriotic men and women
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who serve this country in intelligence positions, often under substantial hardships and even danger,
will have the affirmation of Congress that their activities are proper and necessary.”85
FISA was a fitting capstone to the work of the Church Committee. Like the resolution
authorizing the Church Committee, it was passed by a liberal Congress with bipartisan support.
Like the work of the Church Committee, it was the product of compromise and cooperation
between Congress and the executive. Above all, both FISA and the permanent intelligence
committees were the perfect embodiment of what Frank Church and Barry Goldwater called
“clearing the air.” The domestic activities of the intelligence agencies had been put into serious
jeopardy by the Keith case and by the exposure of COINTELPRO and other surveillance programs.
Now, these activities, which had so sweepingly violated American civil liberties, were given a
statutory and regulatory framework. Far from being eliminated, they were legalized.
Still, in comparative perspective, the post-Vietnam Congress was more protective of civil
liberties than other postwar Congresses in this dissertation. Even if the post-Vietnam Congress
was less committed to a confrontation with the national security state than the existing literature
suggests, the work and legacy of the Church Committee stands in stark contrast to HUAC or the
Overman subcommittee of the First Red Scare. The post-Vietnam Congress can be criticized for
failing to reverse wartime restrictions on civil liberties, but it can also be commended for its refusal
to revive them.
The War on Crime
While Congress helped to rehabilitate the national security state after the Vietnam War, it created
a parallel threat to civil liberties. This was the so-called “War on Crime.” In their intense focus on
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Watergate, the Church Committee, and FISA, scholars of the Vietnam War and civil liberties have
overlooked the emergence of this other war, and its consequences for civil liberties.86
The War on Crime was closely related to the war in Vietnam. Vietnam was economically
costly and socially divisive, leading not only to mass protests, but also riots and uprisings. When
the Johnson Administration asked the CIA and the NSA to help find evidence of foreign influence
over “civil disturbances” in October 1967, the targets were both the crowds who marched on the
Pentagon and the suspected instigators of uprisings in Detroit and Newark. The NSA director said
as much in an October 1967 memo to the CIA, FBI, Army, and State Department, which described
the NSA’s efforts to “obtain SIGINT” detailing “indications that foreign govts or individuals and
orgs acting as agents of foreign govts are controlling or attempting to control or influence activities
of US ‘peace’ groups and ‘black power’ orgs.”87 The expansion of COINTELPRO in 1967 and
1968 was similarly aimed at the combined threat of antiwar protests and urban uprisings – “New
Left” and “Black Extremism,” in the FBI’s internal lingo.88
These events – and earlier uprisings, such as in Watts in 196589 – also prompted a
legislative response. None of the sedition, espionage, or internal security acts described in previous
chapters were passed during the Vietnam War. In the twilight years of the Second Red Scare, the
Supreme Court had strongly suggested that such overtly repressive laws were unconstitutional.
Yates v. United States, in 1957, and Noto v. United States, in 1961, both overturned the Smith Act
convictions of lower-level Communist officials, finding that the First Amendment protected their
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rights to believe and advocate Communist doctrines. Later, in 1969, Brandenburg v. Ohio fully
repudiated the Court’s initial grounds for accepting Smith Act prosecutions of political parties.90
With sedition legislation off the table, the primary legislative response to social unrest
involved what became known as “crime bills.” Some of these bills were aimed at reversing
Supreme Court decisions that favored criminal defendants, especially Mallory v. United States
(1957) and Miranda v. Arizona (1966), which had invalidated rape convictions in cases where
voluntary confessions were obtained before defendants were informed of their constitutional
rights.91 A notable early example was a 1966 crime bill for the District of Columbia, which was
supported most enthusiastically by Republicans and Southern Democrats, but passed with
comfortable majorities in both chambers: 251-131 in the House, and 86-7 in the Senate.92
Attorney General Ramsey Clark believed that the bill “contained some very repressive and
in my judgment several unconstitutional features”: reversing Mallory (which was a D.C. case) and
providing “among other things for the prevention of publications on the ground that they would be
pornographic before they were printed, which is contrary to our constitutional principles.”93
Clark further suggested that “the emotional climate in the country about crime had been so
great and people had focused so much on the nation’s capital in my judgment from racist
motivations in part.” Indeed,
it was really a continuation of the old southern belief that the blacks were incapable
of self-government. Of course, they never had a chance for self-government or even
for government in the District of Columbia. People always liked to focus on the
nation’s capital as a crime center. The statistics never supported it although there's
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more crime here than you’d like, as there is in every place in the country. The crime
bill that was presented put a heavier burden on us in drafting… legislation to satisfy
the growing militant interest in harsh measures.94
In his veto message on the D.C. crime bill, President Johnson said that it “would create
problems instead of solving them.” Specifically, “this bill provides that a policeman may pick up
a person and question him for 4 hours without making an arrest – 6 hours, exclusive of
interrogation, after an arrest – perhaps 10 hours of questioning – without taking him before a
judicial officer.” This violated the basic principle that “after a person is deprived of his freedom –
after he is arrested – the police must take him before a magistrate who will determine whether his
arrest is arbitrary or based on probable cause. This must be done without unnecessary delay.” Then,
“in the case of a material witness, the bill contains provisions even more extreme than those
applicable to suspects themselves,” providing that “any citizen at the scene of a crime – including
the victim – can be taken into custody as a material witness.” They could be held for six hours
without a subpoena or presentment to a magistrate. “In effect, the person can disappear from sight
merely on an individual policeman’s judgment that he is a material witness, and that there is a
reasonable probability that he will not be available to testify at the trial.” When they finally were
presented to a magistrate, “material witnesses” could only be released “by posting bond or
collateral as security” – a procedure harsher than what existed for criminal suspects.95
Johnson went on to condemn the bill’s attempt to “stop the traffic in obscene pictures and
literature.” Although “no one can have sympathy for those who pander to degraded instincts in
man… this provision is phrased so broadly that it clearly threatens freedom of the press,”
authorizing the U.S. attorney in D.C. to permanently enjoin any publication that he deemed
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obscene. Finally, Johnson described the bill’s creation of “mandatory minimum sentences on
conviction of certain crimes” as “a step backward in judicial and correction policy,” not least
because D.C. already imposed some of the harshest criminal sentences in the country.96
Johnson and Clark responded with an alternative approach based on federal aid to local
police forces. Publicly, they argued that this was the best way for the federal government to combat
crime without compromising federalism and civil liberties.97 Privately, they perceived political
benefits. Local aid, Clark told Johnson on the phone, would allow the administration to argue that
they were the ones who were really “helping the police – giving the police more money,” while
legislators were only “talking about crime, talking about wiretapping, talking about confessions,”
and trying to “slap the Supreme Court.”98
A comprehensive program of federal support to local police was eventually included in the
1968 Omnibus Crime and Safe Streets Act, but there was much else in the Act that was not to
Johnson’s liking and was not in Johnson’s original proposal to Congress. First, House Republicans
ensured that most federal funds were distributed as block grants to states, rather than directly from
federal to local authorities. Second, a quasi-independent Justice Department agency – the Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) – would distribute the funds, rather than the
attorney general himself. Both measures limited the Johnson Administration’s control over the
rollout of the new law. Third, funding was prioritized for “riots and civil disorders.” Fourth, local
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police were given “emergency” warrantless wiretapping powers. Fifth, Johnson’s proposed gun
control measures were largely rejected. Sixth, the promise to overturn Mallory v. United States in
the 1966 crime bill was resurrected, as were provisions to undercut Miranda v. Arizona and U.S.
v. Wade (1967) by making admissible in court voluntary confessions without the reading of
Miranda rights and eyewitness line-up testimony provided in the absence of counsel.99 “Taken as
a whole,” the Congressional Quarterly Almanac surmised, “passage of the bill was a major defeat
for the Johnson Administration and congressional liberals.” Johnson pondered a veto, but
ultimately chose to sign it.100
Johnson was in a far weaker political position in 1968 than he was when the D.C. crime
bill came across his desk in 1966. Republicans had won net gains of 47 House and 3 Senate seats
in the 1966 midterms. The war was going badly at home and in Southeast Asia – so badly that
Johnson announced that he would not seek his party’s nomination for a second term as president.
Republican nominee Richard Nixon was running on a tough-on-crime platform and pulling ahead
in the polls. Four years after one of the most dominant election victories for liberals in American
history, conservatives were striking back. The Safe Streets Act was their prize, although
congressional liberals – with the help of some phone calls from the president101 – did succeed in
removing provisions that would have abolished Supreme Court appellate and habeas corpus
jurisdiction over all state cases involving confessions or eyewitness identifications.102 In the end,
there were only 23 votes against the Safe Streets Act in the House and 4 in the Senate.103
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Overall, Ramsey Clark’s post-hoc assessment of the Safe Street Act as a response to the
“growing militant interest in harsh measures” seems accurate.104 Conservative reaction gripped
Congress after the World Wars; it came early during the Vietnam War, and it managed to recruit
some liberals. What was its impact on civil liberties? The “court slapping” provisions of the Safe
Streets Act did not achieve much. Police forces across the country came to realize that the reading
of Miranda rights was not an intolerable burden, and Earl Warren’s eventual successor as chief
justice, Nixon nominee Warren Burger, oversaw several decisions narrowing the scope of the
Miranda rule. By 2000, Reagan-appointed Chief Justice William Rehnquist would conclude that
“Miranda has become embedded in routine police practice to the point where the warnings have
become part of our national culture.”105
The wiretapping provisions of the Safe Streets Act also became largely toothless. They
permitted “emergency” warrantless wiretaps for up to forty-eight hours, but they did not fully
specify what an “emergency” was. This problem soon reared its head in the Keith case, when the
Supreme Court essentially told Congress to go back to the drawing board. As we have seen,
Congress responded with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which did not do much to
restrain electronic surveillance, but at least cleaned up the legal mess created by the Safe Streets
Act.
The most consequential component of the Safe Streets Act for civil liberties was the
funding for local police forces. On its face, this seemed mundane and harmless. Before the Vietnam
War, the federal government did not provide any systematic financial or logistical support for local
policing. The Johnson Administration was willing to provide such support, apparently for practical
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as well as political reasons. However, conservative legislators crafted the Safe Streets Act in a way
that would allow state governments the freedom to define their War on Crime and incentivize them
to invest in “riot control and civil disorders.” These measures endangered civil liberties over the
long-term by giving local police forces a new capacity to curtail protest activity and to arrest,
surveil, and incarcerate citizens.
After the passage of the Safe Streets Act, the LEAA – the agency that distributed grant
money – received annual appropriations of $63 million for fiscal year 1969, $268 million for 1970,
$529 million for 1971, and $699 million for 1972. By 1976, the LEAA’s annual appropriation
exceeded $1 billion.106 Block grants were distributed on the basis of population. Thus, California
received a generous $2.4 million in 1969 and earmarked it for a wide variety of purposes, including
“a thorough examination of the entire court system,” “narcotics, drugs, and alcohol abuse,”
“organized crime,” and “special projects.” California invested most heavily, however, in “civil
disorders.” Nearly a quarter of nationwide LEAA grants were directed toward this purpose in 1969,
more than what was spent on “detection and apprehension” and “prevention of crime” combined
(see Figure 5.3).107
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Figure 5.3: Distribution of LEAA funds in 1969 (%)
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The focus on “riots and civil disorders” was not included in President Johnson’s original
proposal for a Safe Streets Act, but legislators added Section 307(b) to put “special emphasis” on
civil disorders, and to waive the requirement – spelled out elsewhere in the law – that “action
grants” could only be doled out to states with an LEAA-approved law enforcement plan.108 Forty
states received Section 307(b) grants in 1969. Itemized descriptions are imprecise in LEAA
documents, but – in various states – there were investments in “correctional institution riot
control,” “state patrol riot control,” “local riot control,” “riot control equipment,” “specialized
training for special units,” a “riot control state plan,” “riot control operations plan development,”
a “mobile riot control unit,” “riot readiness,” and a “mobile riot control supply unit.”109
As the LEAA’s resources expanded, State Planning Agencies (SPAs) diversified their
operations. In fiscal year 1971, police helicopters were purchased for Riverside and Richmond,
California; the District of Columbia; Charlotte, North Carolina; Seattle, Washington; Huntsville,
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Alabama; and “more than 30 police agencies” in Texas.110 In February 1971, the Justice
Department reported that twenty-two state and local police agencies had operational helicopter
teams. Some of their functions were relatively mundane, including “ambulance escort,” “search
and rescue,” “disaster warning,” and “traffic control.” However, twelve teams were engaged in
“riot control,” seven were used for “preventive night patrols with lights,” and nineteen were
engaged in “surveillance.”111 The deployment of helicopters for “riot control” had been
foreshadowed by the Los Angeles Police Department as early as 1965, during the Watts uprising.
Then, helicopters provided aerial intelligence for officers on the ground, and residents of Watts
shot futilely at the helicopters in imitation of guerillas in Vietnam.112 A more dramatic and violent
use of police helicopters occurred on May 13, 1985, when the Philadelphia police dropped two
bombs from a helicopter onto a house full of members of the anti-government MOVE group,
killing eleven people and destroying sixty neighboring homes.113 While helicopter teams can assist
police forces in important tasks of search and rescue, they can also enable serious violations of
civil liberties.
In addition to helicopters, LEAA money also supported the creation or upgrading of
Narcotics Squads in Tucson, Arizona; Atlanta, Georgia; Minneapolis, Minnesota; and Elizabeth,
New Jersey.114 Such squads would soon become notorious for violent dawn raids.115 Everywhere,
LEAA money was put toward more patrol vehicles, prisons, juvenile delinquency, and drug
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enforcement. Proportionally, riot control received less emphasis in 1971 than it did in 1969, but
almost every SPA allocated some portion of its funds to civil disorders, despite the decline of
protests and uprisings. The logic described by Alabama’s SPA director, Robert Davis, may have
applied elsewhere. “Alabama has had very little trouble with civil disorders during the past year,”
he conceded. “This is no indication, however, that the state will not have trouble during the coming
year.” Thus 4.5% of the state’s LEAA allocation was still reserved for “four 50-man civil disorder
units.”116
The continual investment in riot control reflected a deeper logic: once the spigot of federal
support for local policing was turned on, it was never shut off. Even when the post-Johnson
conservative revival was interrupted by Nixon’s resignation and the liberal triumph in the 1974
elections, there was no collective legislative effort to end – or regulate – federal funding to local
police forces. No one, it seemed, wanted to run on “defund the police.” Thus, by the end of the
1970s, the United States had transformed from a country with no federal financial support for local
policing into a country where the federal government was subsidizing everything from local
prisons and jails to undercover “sting” operations, helicopters, surveillance programs, and
narcotics squads.117
To be sure, in 1979, LEAA funding comprised only four percent of total criminal justice
and police spending by state and local governments.118 Congress was not thrusting money onto
unwilling recipients, but its role in transforming American policing was decisive. The original Safe
Streets Act directly and explicitly incentivized investment in riot equipment. States continued to
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purchase this equipment – and supplement it with every latest technological development, such as
the helicopter – even as the tumultuous protests and uprisings of the 1960s receded into history.
Although Richard Nixon is often identified as the architect of the War on Crime, 119 this
war preceded him, and it originated in Congress. The Safe Streets Act was wartime legislation, but
it was not emergency legislation. It was not a hurried grant of authority to the executive branch.
Indeed, it was the product of a lengthy battle between Congress and the executive, in which
Congress arguably fired the first shot through the 1966 D.C. crime bill. Congressional
conservatives led this charge, but liberals – who had their own fears about crime – went along for
the ride. Studies of war and civil liberties tend to caution against delegations to the executive
branch that are sold as temporary but become permanent. In the Safe Streets Act, the danger
stemmed, instead, from financial support to state and local governments. This support was
conceived in the context of urban uprisings and antiwar protests. It long outlasted both.
Was the Vietnam War a necessary condition for the passage of the Safe Streets Act? The
fact that various crime bills have passed through Congress since 1968 may indicate that a War on
Crime can be orchestrated without a war abroad. However, the Vietnam War clearly created
favorable conditions for the Safe Streets Act in at least three ways. First, as the war became
increasingly frustrating and self-defeating, the Johnson Administration became more politically
vulnerable. By 1968 – especially after the shock of the Tet Offensive – Johnson and his liberal
allies could no longer set the congressional agenda as they had done so effectively when
constructing the “Great Society” and the War on Poverty in 1964 and 1965.120 Conservative
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legislators capitalized on this weakness. Second, the war threw fuel on the already smoldering fire
of protest generated by the civil rights movement. Although most antiwar and civil rights protests
were strictly nonviolent, even nonviolent protests frequently involved deliberate law breaking. For
congressional conservatives, violent crime was a natural consequence of this broader law-breaking
culture – a culture that could only be confronted through more aggressive policing. Third, the war
exacerbated divisions on the left of American politics, as progressives and liberals fought bitterly
over the justice and necessity of U.S. military intervention in Southeast Asia. All of this added up
to a resurgent conservative movement that was able and willing to initiate a War on Crime.
Conservative legislators were advocating for a War on Crime before the Vietnam War.
Hostility towards the Warren Court’s criminal procedure “revolution” began at least as early as
the Mallory decision in 1957, when the Court unanimously invalidated the rape conviction of
Andrew Mallory after he was interrogated prior to arraignment. However, just as the legislative
campaign against the Warren Court in the late 1950s stemmed from the Court’s so-called
“Communist” decisions as well as its attack on school segregation, the Safe Streets Act represented
both long-standing anger with the Court’s criminal procedure decisions and the heightened anxiety
caused by the domestic consequences of the Vietnam War. In 1958 and 1968, Chief Justice Warren
faced perfect storms of conservative hostility. In neither case was war the sole cause of his
problems, but, at a minimum, war made his problems worse.
Indeed, a similar confluence of war and non-war crises shaped the First Red Scare. The
legislators who drafted the 1918 Immigration Act and who advocated for the Palmer Raids argued
that the First World War had exposed the disloyalty of foreign-born “radicals,” but they were also
reviving fears about Anarchism on Capitol Hill that emerged after the assassination of William
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McKinley in 1901 (in fact, these fears could plausibly be traced further back to the 1870s).121 The
Immigration Act itself was wartime legislation, but it was not designed to aid the war effort and it
claimed to address a wide variety of flaws in the immigration system that long predated the war.
In each of these case studies, conservative legislators exploited a wartime or postwar moment to
implement policies that would have been more difficult, if not impossible, during calmer times.
Vietnam in Historical Perspective
In comparative historical perspective, it is possible to take positives out of the Vietnam era. There
were no espionage or sedition acts. There were no legislative show trials. There was no martial
law. There was no wave of raids and deportations, like those that besmirched the country after the
First World War. And while in the cases I have examined so far, Congress has curtailed civil
liberties in the aftermath of war, the post-Vietnam Congress confronted the national security
bureaucracy and re-established checks and balances on the executive branch.
However, in assessing the legacy of the post-Vietnam Congress, we must not confuse a
commitment to the separation of powers with a commitment to civil liberties. FISA brought
legislators and judges into the decision-making process surrounding electronic surveillance, but it
did so in a way that would not actually limit the surveillance. The permanent intelligence
committees in the House and the Senate gave legislators a seat at the table, and a formal, permanent
relationship with the national security bureaucracy. Predictably, this relationship, which offered
the prospect of exclusive access to classified information, became cooperative, rather than
adversarial. Congress, in the final analysis, reorganized itself after the Vietnam War to sustain –
not to constrain – the intelligence community.
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None of the executive officials who carried out the abuses of the Vietnam era were held to
account by Congress. No one was impeached and no one was held in contempt. The man who was
truly in the dock – J. Edgar Hoover – was long dead by the time Congress got around to
investigating his actions. None of the intelligence agencies were defunded or abolished. The
Church Committee made some executive officials uncomfortable, but many – especially in the
FBI – were content to indict their predecessors on national television. Once legislators were done
with Watergate, they handled the executive branch with kid gloves.
The relationship between Congress and the judiciary was more contentious. Conservative
legislators led the charge against the perceived liberalism of the Supreme Court under Chief Justice
Earl Warren. Beyond Mallory, Miranda, and Wade, the Court had strengthened protections for
criminal defendants through several landmark decisions in the 1960s. In 1961, Mapp v. Ohio made
evidence seized through warrantless home searches inadmissible in state courts. In 1963, Gideon
v. Wainwright required states to provide counsel to indigent defendants. In 1967, Katz v. United
States extended the protections of the Fourth Amendment to situations where there is a “reasonable
expectation of privacy,” including conversations on public telephones.122 In Congress, the picture
seemed simple: The Supreme Court was taking handcuffs off the criminals and putting them on
the police. The 1966 D.C. crime bill and the 1968 Safe Streets Act crystallized congressional anger
with the Warren Court.
In the end, however, Congress’s most meaningful reshaping of the judiciary was the
creation of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC). Article I, Section 8 of the
Constitution gives Congress the power to “constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court.”
Generally, these “inferior tribunals” are the nation’s district and appellate courts, which hear most
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federal cases. The FISC, on the other hand, is a unique “inferior tribunal” that has different rules
of procedure and evidence, as well as appointments from the chief justice, rather than the president
with the advice and consent of the Senate. The FISC – with its intense secrecy, its ex parte
procedures, and its insulation from political scrutiny – was designed to legitimize and legalize
electronic surveillance. It was not designed to revive American civil liberties.
A distinguishing feature of the post-Vietnam era compared to my previous case studies was
the emergence of a liberal legislative coalition that investigated and condemned wartime
restrictions on civil liberties carried out by the national government. Another distinguishing feature
of Vietnam was the new system of congressional support for local policing. While the Church
Committee was investigating the abuses of the nation’s intelligence agencies, Congress was
throwing ever-increasing amounts of money at the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration.
While Project Minaret, COINTELPRO, and other repressive programs were rolled back after the
Vietnam War, the War on Crime continued. While civil liberties curtailed by the national security
state were partially restored, civil liberties curtailed by regular law enforcement were under greater
threat. As we will see in the next chapter, these federally funded and locally administered restraints
on civil liberties only intensified during the War on Terror.
Table 5.2: The Vietnam Congress
Congressional Tools

Examples during the Vietnam era

Powers over itself

Creation of the Church Committee, creation of the permanent
intelligence committees

Powers over the executive

Church Committee investigations – voluntary testimony, rather
than subpoenas
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Powers over the judiciary

“Court slapping” in the Safe Streets Act, creation of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court in 1978

Powers over state and local Financial and logistical support to local police forces through the
government

Safe Streets Act

Repressive legislation

N/A
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6. The War on Terror
It is no coincidence that the War on Terror has stimulated renewed scholarly interest in the dangers
of wartime executive power. In the United States, Congress has allowed presidents of both major
parties to spy and detain at will. To the extent that legislatures in Western democracies have
constrained their executives, they have done so sporadically.1 If there was any doubt before
September 11, 2001, it now seems increasingly clear that this is an era of endless (undeclared) war,
executive domination, and curbed civil liberties.
In this chapter, I argue that individual rights have suffered under the weight of the War on
Terror, but not because power has been transferred from Congress to the executive. Instead, I
demonstrate the crucial role of legislators in authorizing and sustaining mass surveillance, the
detention and interrogation regime at Guantanamo Bay, terrorism prosecutions that violate free
association, accelerated police militarization, and a brutal regime of deportations. Although the
21st Century has been described by many scholars as an era of intense congressional dysfunction,2
I argue that Congress has curtailed American civil liberties decisively and effectively since 9/11.
Indeed, when we compare the War on Terror with previous wars, Congress seems to have
deployed the kitchen sink of its institutional powers in the post-9/11 era. Internally, the House and
Senate intelligence committees investigated the 9/11 attacks and called for a more centralized and
aggressive national security state to prevent future attacks. In relation to the executive branch,
legislators reorganized the federal bureaucracy on a scale not seen since the National Security Act
of 1947. This reorganization involved the creation of the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), which became a permanent weapon against the civil liberties of non-citizens on American

1

See, especially, Benjamin Wittes (ed.), Legislating the War on Terror: An Agenda for Reform (Washington, DC:
Brookings Institution Press, 2009).
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See, especially, Thomas Mann and Norman J. Ornstein, The Broken Branch: How Congress is Failing America
and How to Get it Back on Track (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).
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soil. In relation to the judiciary, legislators stripped the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over
habeas petitions from Guantanamo, and immunized telecommunications companies and torturers
from criminal prosecution. In relation to state and local governments, legislators deepened the
militarization of local police forces. The War on Terror has not resurrected sedition legislation,
but it has seen Congress turn a striking range of nonviolent activities into “material support” for
terrorism, thereby criminalizing previously protected forms of free association.
Many of these measures were supported by the executive branch, particularly in the early
years of the War on Terror. However, many also encountered executive resistance, particularly
under the Obama Administration. With varying levels of enthusiasm, Obama attempted to close
Guantanamo, provide relief and stability for undocumented immigrants, and rein in police
militarization. On each of these issues, Republican legislators stood in his way. Much like the
Republicans who controlled Congress during the Truman years, these lawmakers accused the
president of going soft on national and public security threats. Increasingly, they became dedicated
to untrammeled police authority and the persecution of undocumented immigrants and Muslims.
This was Trumpism before Trump: incessant talk about freedoms and liberties, accompanied by
growing contempt for the civil liberties of racial and ethnic minorities. The powers of Congress
were deployed in service of this political program.
In examining this recent history, this chapter seeks to perform similar analytical tasks to
my preceding chapters; however, it is not blessed with anything near the same quantity or quality
of primary source material. This is the cost of studying the present. Thankfully, national security
journalism remains robust, and litigation has compelled the disclosure of crucial official
documents throughout the War on Terror. Along with available records from the U.S. Congress,
these journalistic and legal sources form the backbone of this chapter. Below, I integrate these
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sources as I analyze post-9/11 violations of civil liberties in three broad issue areas: detention and
interrogation, surveillance and drone strikes, and immigration and criminal justice.
The Politics of Detention and Interrogation
In the realm of detention and interrogation, the argument that civil liberties were damaged by
executive overreach since 9/11 rests on solid footing. On November 13, 2001, President Bush
announced that he would establish a system of military tribunals for “international terrorists.”3
Under his authority as commander-in-chief of the armed and naval forces, the Department of
Defense constructed a detention facility at the Guantanamo Bay U.S. Navy base. Aside from the
commander-in-chief clause of Article II of the Constitution, Bush’s constitutional justification
rested on the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) resolution passed by Congress
one week after the 9/11 attacks, as well as the precedent set by Ex parte Quirin during the Second
World War, when the Roosevelt Administration tried, convicted, and executed eight Nazi
saboteurs by military commission.4
780 people have since been detained at Guantanamo. At the time of writing, forty people
remain there. Nine have died in custody, and the remainder have been either repatriated or
transferred to third countries.5 For civil libertarians, Guantanamo is odious not just because of how
many people have passed through it, but also because of who they are and how they have been
treated. A large proportion of the early detainees – the exact number unknown – were handed over
to American forces in Afghanistan by various less-than-reliable allies, including the Northern
Alliance. Even before President Obama began to reduce the Guantanamo population, the Bush
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Administration privately conceded that some detainees “had little or no terrorist sponsored or
related training” and lacked “the intent to organize, coordinate, participate or support acts against
the US, its interests, or allies.”6 This finding was reinforced by President Obama’s Guantanamo
Review Task Force, which approved 126 of the remaining 240 detainees for transfer to third
countries or release, 44 for prosecution in military or civilian courts, and labelled only 48 “too
dangerous to transfer but not feasible for prosecution.”7
The whole notion of “too dangerous to transfer but not feasible for prosecution” posed a
problem for civil libertarians because it endorsed indefinite detention – a dangerous proposition
even when applied primarily to non-citizens.8 Moreover, those who did get the chance to contest
their detention were funneled through military commissions that admitted hearsay evidence, were
closed to public scrutiny, and admitted confessions obtained under duress.9 Compounding this
dilution of due process, detainees were waterboarded, force-fed, and subjected to other forms of
inhuman and degrading treatment.10
The Bush Administration tried to argue that civil liberties were not at stake because most
Guantanamo detainees were not American citizens, and because Guantanamo was not technically
U.S. territory. Yet, as the United States Supreme Court correctly concluded, Guantanamo was de
facto U.S. territory, and this precluded the Bush Administration from treating Guantanamo as a

“JTF-GITMO Threat Index,” May 29 2008, Wikileaks: The Guantanamo Files,
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law-free zone.11 Moreover, although the AUMF gave the president sweeping authority “to use all
necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001,
or harbored such organizations or persons,”12 a majority on the Court mandated that a more specific
congressional authorization was needed for the establishment of military tribunals.13
At this juncture – June 2006, with the Iraq War going poorly – Congress could have
curtailed the Bush program. Instead, hours before the end of the 2006 congressional session, with
the support of 218 Republicans and 32 Democrats in the House, and 53 Republicans and 12
Democrats in the Senate, Congress passed the Military Commissions Act (MCA).14 The MCA
authorized “the use of military commissions to try alien unlawful enemy combatants engaged in
hostilities against the United States for violations of the law of war and other offenses triable by
military commission,” and it broadened the definition of “unlawful enemy combatants” to include
indirect “material support” to terrorism.15 The Act emphasized that the provisions of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice relating to “speedy trial,” “compulsory self-incrimination,” and “pretrial
investigation” “shall not apply to trial by military commission under this chapter.” Furthermore,
“No alien unlawful enemy combatant subject to trial by military commission under this chapter
may invoke the Geneva Conventions as a source of rights.”16 Finally, “No court, justice, or judge
shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on
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behalf of an alien detained by the United States who has been determined by the United States to
have been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination.”17
Regarding interrogation, the MCA made an important amendment to the 1996 War Crimes
Act. Under that Act, any U.S. person responsible for torture could be sued in the United States –
including, presumably, U.S. officials who mistreated Guantanamo detainees. The MCA foreclosed
this avenue of litigation – prospectively and retroactively.18 As the White House gleefully stated,
this “provide[d] legal protections that ensure our military and intelligence personnel will not have
to fear lawsuits filed by terrorists simply for doing their jobs.”19
It is not uncommon for the president to act unilaterally and for Congress to ratify his actions
after the fact. This “act first, ask questions later” approach was typical of “Lincoln’s Constitution”
during the Civil War.20 Yet the MCA did more than ratify what Bush had already done. It invited
the entrenchment and expansion of the Guantanamo legal regime – by curbing the jurisdiction of
federal courts, immunizing interrogators, and cutting away the due process protections that the
Supreme Court had tried to provide for detainees.
Most of these provisions of the MCA were well-grounded in Congress’s constitutional
powers. Article I grants Congress the authority to “make Rules concerning Captures on Land and
Water,” to “make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces,” and to
“define and punish… Offences against the Law of Nations.”21 Article III allows Congress to create
“Regulations” and “Exceptions” to the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction.22 Article I, Section
9 prohibits ex post facto laws, but it does not prohibit all retroactive legislating. As the Supreme
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Court acknowledged back in the founding era, the ex post facto clause only applies to laws that
retroactively impose punishments. Congress may immunize or reduce criminal and civil
punishments after-the-fact.23
The MCA did eventually run into legal trouble because of its attempts to limit the writ of
habeas corpus. In June 2008, in Boumediene v. Bush, the Supreme Court found the habeasstripping provision of the MCA unconstitutional.24 By then, it was election season, and Democratic
presidential nominee Barack Obama was running on a promise not only to obey Boumediene, but
also shutter Guantanamo completely. After Obama’s electoral triumph, one small step in this
direction was a 2009 amendment to the MCA, passed by the new, Democratic-controlled
Congress, which marginally improved the due process rights of detainees.25
The larger step of Guantanamo closure proved more difficult. On December 19, 2009,
Congress passed the Department of Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2010. As ever,
this defense spending bill was generous in its overall outlays. However, it was unusually stingy in
one area:
None of the funds made available in this or any other Act may be used to release
an individual who is detained, as of June 24, 2009, at Naval Station, Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba, into the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, or the District of
Columbia, into any of the United States territories of Guam, American Samoa (AS),
the United States Virgin Islands (USVI), the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and
the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI).26
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Funding was also prohibited for the transfer of Guantanamo inmates into other detention facilities,
or “for the purposes of prosecuting such individual” in U.S. courts. Transfer to any foreign country
would require certification from Congress.27
The problem for Obama began in May 2009, when “conservative Republicans attacked
[him] after word leaked that he was planning to release several Guantánamo detainees onto
American soil.” The detainees were Uighur Muslims from Western China, who had been captured
in Afghanistan. The government never claimed – let alone demonstrated – that the Uighurs were
affiliated with Al-Qaeda, so they seemed like a safe bet for release. But when Republican
Congressman Frank Wolf learned that two Uighurs were set to be released into his Northern
Virginia district, he publicly told Obama that “the American people cannot afford to simply take
your word that these detainees, who were captured training in terrorist camps, are not a threat.”
Other prominent Republicans, including former House Speaker Newt Gingrich, denounced the
planned release. Obama, with one eye on his plans to push healthcare reform through Congress,
backed down and shipped the Uighurs off to Bermuda. Following this political humiliation,
congressional Democrats bluntly told their own president that they would not fund his plan to close
Guantanamo.28
After the 2009 defense funding bill, Congress repeated the same formula throughout the
Obama Administration, wielding the power of the purse to keep Guantanamo open. Obama still
substantially reduced the Guantanamo population, and boldly circumvented congressional
restrictions in May 2014 when he exchanged five Taliban detainees for Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl.29
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Obama had previously displayed impatience with Congress in his signing statement on the
National Defense Authorization Act for 2014, insisting that “the executive branch must have the
flexibility, among other things, to act swiftly in conducting negotiations with foreign countries
regarding the circumstances of detainee transfers.”30 In promising not to comply with part of a law
that he signed, Obama arguably violated his constitutional obligation to “take care that the laws be
faithfully executed.” But with congressional obstinacy an unshakable fact since the Republican
midterm victories in 2010, Obama had little choice other than to stretch his authority to its limits.31
Perhaps he could have pushed further. Yet, considering the Constitution’s explicit
injunction that “no Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of
Appropriations made by Law,”32 it is risky for a president to defy the legislature’s power over the
national purse strings. Although it is also risky for legislators to play a game of brinkmanship with
funds for the federal government, the power of the purse is simple, direct, effective, and easier to
wield than ordinary legislation.33 If, for instance, legislators wished to pass a “Guantanamo
Preservation Act,” it would have required passage through both legislative chambers and
presidential approval. The power of the purse flips the equation. Because Congress must
affirmatively approve new spending, a single chamber – or even a powerful coalition of legislators
within a single chamber – can threaten to starve the federal government. When an appropriations
bill reaches the president’s desk, a veto is still possible, but – as Obama well understood – it may
not be wise to deny money to an entire department of government over one objectionable section
or sub-section.
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Legislators kept Guantanamo open, but they did eventually lead an important inquiry into
the treatment of detainees (at Guantanamo and Central Intelligence Agency [CIA] “black sites”
abroad). The Senate Intelligence Committee sharply condemned the CIA’s “enhanced
interrogation” programs in its 2014 “Torture Report.” The Report was, essentially, a catalogue of
CIA lies: interrogation techniques were far more brutal than reported or admitted, they provided
little actionable intelligence, and overseers – including in Congress – were repeatedly misled over
the scope, purpose, and effectiveness of “enhanced interrogation.”34
In many ways, however, the Torture Report was rather tame, despite the high drama of the
CIA spying on Senate staffers during the Report’s development.35 Indeed, the public has not seen
the actual Report – only the executive summary. This executive summary is riddled with
redactions. The Report did not recommend legal punishments for those who perpetrated the worst
acts, such as “rectal feeding.” No member of Congress has taken the step of reading the full Report
into the Congressional Record, even though they could do so without any legal repercussions,
thanks to the Speech or Debate clause of the Constitution.36 The full Report may finally see the
light of day in 2028.37
The Senate committee’s investigation of the CIA may indicate a growing congressional
interest in restoring the civil liberties that the War on Terror curtailed. However, the overall picture
surrounding detention and interrogation is bleak. The Supreme Court opened the door to improving
the conditions and procedures of Guantanamo in 2006, and legislators responded by expanding
and entrenching the existing regime. When a new president promised to end this regime, legislators
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fell back on their power of the purse to sabotage him. This historical record does not inspire
confidence in the idea of an assertive Congress restoring the civil liberties that have been curtailed
during the War on Terror.
It is hard to escape the conclusion that Republican legislators exploited Guantanamo for
partisan reasons. Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Kentucky) introduced the Military
Commissions Act just over a week before the end of the pre-election congressional session in
2006. This left almost no time for amendments and forced Democrats into a test of their national
security credentials just before voters went to the polls. As it happened, Democrats won those
elections convincingly. But McConnell’s gambit ensured that President Bush would have a solid
legal foundation for his detention program for the remainder of his second term. Later, the partisan
impulse behind the resistance to Obama’s Guantanamo closure plan was obvious.
In this effort, Republican lawmakers were faithfully representing their constituents, who
never supported the closure of Guantanamo. Yet the support of congressional Democrats – who
controlled both houses during Obama’s first two years in office – is more puzzling. After all,
Guantanamo closure was an Obama campaign promise.38 The evidence suggests that, after the
Uighur fiasco in 2009, Democrats reasoned that a prolonged fight over Guantanamo would
jeopardize their other legislative goals, especially health care reform.39 Their filibuster-proof
Senate majority was wafer-thin, and was, in fact, erased, when Massachusetts Senator Edward
Kennedy died in August 2009. As a result, the looming threat of a healthcare filibuster gave
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Republicans more leverage in the Guantanamo fight than their numbers or their popularity
warranted.40
Assassinations, Surveillance, and the Intelligence Committees
Another feature of the War on Terror – lethal drone strikes – poses different legal and constitutional
issues. Because drone strikes have never occurred on U.S. soil, the primary civil liberties
controversy involves the assassination of U.S. citizens abroad. This controversy was ignited in
September 2011, when Anwar al-Awlaki – a U.S. citizen born in New Mexico – was killed by a
Predator Drone in Yemen. Only in May 2013 did Attorney General Eric Holder admit that alAwlaki was deliberately targeted, claiming that the cleric “repeatedly made clear his intent to
attack U.S. persons and his hope that these attacks would take American lives.” Taking out such a
target was consistent with “generations-old legal principles and Supreme Court decisions.” Holder
added that three other U.S. citizens killed by U.S. forces – al-Awlaki’s sixteen-year old son, ‘Abd
al-Rahman, as well as Samir Khan, and Jude Kenan Mohammed – “were not specifically targeted
by the United States.”41
In 2014, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals compelled the Obama Administration to
release a more thorough justification for al-Awlaki’s killing. This justification came in the form of
an Office of Legal Counsel memorandum that emphasized the U.S. government’s right to defend
itself from imminent national security threats – from citizens and non-citizens alike. It would have
been better to capture, prosecute, try, and convict al-Awlaki, but that was not possible due to his
persistent elusiveness and the incapacity of the Yemeni government to find him. The president did
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not – contrary to the claims of his harshest critics42 – claim the right to kill anyone, anywhere, at
any time. But he did claim the right to kill American citizens who posed a threat to the United
States when they could not plausibly be detained.43
From the perspective of civil liberties, there were two main problems with al-Awlaki’s
killing. First, the evidence against al-Awlaki was not conclusive. The 2009 Christmas Day
“underpants bomber” Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab implicated al-Awlaki in terrorist plots and
training. Al-Awlaki also told Muslims in the United States that “jihad against America is binding
upon myself just as it is binding upon every other able Muslim.”44 However, Abdulmutallab’s
claims were not subjected to cross-examination and verification, and it is not a crime – let alone a
capital crime – for an American citizen to advocate violence against the United States.45 Additional
allegations against al-Awlaki – that he was involved in “numerous other plots against U.S. and
Western interests” – rested on “information that remains classified to protect sensitive sources and
methods.”46 In other words, the rest of the charge sheet was secret and therefore – again –
unverifiable.
More troublingly, the Obama Administration appeared to embrace a loose definition of
“imminent threat.” As the Justice Department noted in a 2011 White Paper, “the condition that an
operational leader present an ‘imminent’ threat of violent attack against the United States does not
require the United States to have clear evidence that a specific attack on U.S. persons and interests
will take place in the immediate future.” Instead, “imminence must incorporate considerations of
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the relevant window of opportunity, the possibility of reducing collateral damage, and the
likelihood of heading off future disastrous attacks on Americans.”47
Congress never explicitly approved the killing of U.S. citizens abroad, although the openended 2001 AUMF resolution arguably authorizes such killings.48 Legislators from both parties
pressured the Obama Administration to release its legal justification for the al-Awlaki killing and
threatened to issue subpoenas to obtain these “drone memos.”49 In the Senate, Oregon Democrat
Ron Wyden and Kentucky Republican Rand Paul threatened to obstruct the confirmation of John
Brennan as CIA director if Obama continued to conceal the drone memos from Congress. This
bipartisan effort bore fruit.50 Partly in response to congressional pressure, Obama also created a
more rigorous interagency review process for drone strikes, improving upon the gung-ho approach
of the Bush Administration.51
Yet, on the question of substance – could the president kill an American citizen? –
legislators were clear. “The decision to use lethal force against Anwar al-Awlaki was a legitimate
use of authority granted to the President,” Wyden and two other critics of the drone program
concluded after reading the memos.52 By 2015, members and staff of the permanent congressional
intelligence committees were regularly travelling over to CIA headquarters to watch videos of
drone strikes and learn about the intelligence behind them. Committee members criticized the
strikes in closed sessions, but “to express their dismay that the C.I.A. is not being aggressive
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enough in its killing operations.”53 In 2013, for instance, “senior Republicans on the House and
Senate intelligence committees were furious after they heard that the C.I.A. had not yet
killed Mohanad Mahmoud Al Farekh, an American citizen who had become a top Qaeda
operations officer and was hiding in Pakistan.”54 Neither the Obama nor the Trump
Administrations killed other U.S. citizens under the al-Awlaki precedent. Future drone strikes
raised questions about civilian casualties, international law, and the authority of the president to
have his own “kill list,” but not civil liberties.55
Civil liberties were more directly implicated by the startling scheme of mass, suspicionless
executive branch surveillance revealed by Edward Snowden in 2013. Even before Snowden, the
Bush Administration had conducted its own warrantless “Terrorist Surveillance Program” (TSP)
that was exposed by the New York Times in 2005 and described in Chapter 5. “Although the
specifics remain undisclosed,” the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals summarized in 2007,
it has been publicly acknowledged that the TSP includes the interception (i.e.,
wiretapping), without warrants, of telephone and email communications where one
party to the communication is located outside the United States and the NSA has ‘a
reasonable basis to conclude that one party to the communication is a member of al
Qaeda, affiliated with al Qaeda, or a member of an organization affiliated with al
Qaeda, or working in support of al Qaeda.’56
In Chapter 5, I explained how members of the congressional intelligence committees signed off
on the TSP. Telecommunications companies were even more complicit, because they were
providing the NSA with all the data. After the TSP was exposed, these companies were sued by
their customers under Section 109 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which threatened
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fines and imprisonment of up to five years for anyone who “engages in electronic surveillance
under color of law except as authorized by statute.” Danger loomed for AT&T, and others.57
Until Congress bailed them out. Title II of the 2008 FISA Amendments Act offered up
“Protections for Electronic Communication Service Providers.” Upon certification by the attorney
general, “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a civil action may not lie or be maintained
in a Federal or State court against any person for providing assistance to an element of the
intelligence community, and shall be promptly dismissed.”58
Just as the MCA retroactively immunized interrogators, the FISA Amendments Act
retroactively immunized telecommunications companies that participated in government
surveillance programs. In an abortive attempt to filibuster the FISA Amendments Act, Wisconsin
Democratic Senator Russ Feingold called Title II a “get out of jail free card,” and his colleague,
Chris Dodd of Connecticut, tried to remove the immunity provisions. Channeling the talking points
of the intelligence committee chairs, Republican Senator Kit Bond retorted that Feingold and Dodd
displayed “a lack of understanding about the intelligence community’s dependence upon our thirdparty partners.” Without getting “their voluntary cooperation by giving them liability protection,”
electronic surveillance would become virtually impossible.59 One of the committee chairs
themselves – Senator Jay Rockefeller (D-WV) – warned that without the FISA Amendments Act,
the intelligence community would miss out on the “new opportunities” created by the evolution of
digital technology.60 With bipartisan support, the Senate passed the bill by a filibuster-proof 6928 margin.61
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Given this effort at advancing electronic surveillance, legislators from both parties should
not have been surprised when Edward Snowden revealed the NSA’s mass surveillance programs
in 2013, the indiscriminate scope of which were encapsulated in the internal agency motto,
“Collect it All.”62 Indeed, as with the TSP, members of the congressional intelligence committees
knew about what the NSA was doing long before the public did. Senator Ron Wyden hinted at this
in May 2011, alarmingly predicting, “When the American people find out how their government
has secretly interpreted the Patriot Act, they will be stunned and they will be angry.” 63 After the
Snowden revelations, Rolling Stone reporter Janet Reitman asked Wyden why he did not blow the
whistle on the Senate floor. “If you want to play a watchdog role, you try to work within the rules,”
Wyden replied. “I can see why plenty of people would criticize me – progressives and others. I
can understand why plenty of people who have views similar to mine would say they would have
done it differently.”64
Meanwhile, the leaders of both intelligence committees whole-heartedly defended the mass
surveillance programs, called for criminal retribution against Snowden (as they did against other
government leakers and whistleblowers), and did their best to sabotage the USA FREEDOM Act,
which placed modest limits on bulk metadata collection and finally passed both houses of Congress

62

Quoted in Glenn Greenwald, No Place to Hide: Edward Snowden, the NSA, and the US Surveillance State (New
York: Macmillan, 2014), 97. See also Nicole Perlroth, Jeff Larson, and Scott Shane, “N.S.A. Able to Foil Basic
Safeguards of Privacy on Web,” The New York Times, September 5, 2013; Ewen MacAskill, Julian Borger, Nick
Hopkins, Nick Davies and James Ball, “GCHQ taps fibre-optic cables for secret access to world's communications,”
The Guardian, June 21, 2013; James Ball, “NSA monitored calls of 35 world leaders after US official handed over
contacts,” The Guardian, October 25, 2013. A live data collection tracker can be found in Ewen MacAskill and
Gabriel Dance, “The NSA Files Decoded,” The Guardian, November 1, 2013
https://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/nov/01/snowden-nsa-files-surveillance-revelationsdecoded#section/1.
63
Ron Wyden, In Speech, Wyden Says Official Interpretations of Patriot Act Must be Made Public, May 26, 2011.
https://www.wyden.senate.gov/news/press-releases/in-speech-wyden-says-official-interpretations-of-patriot-actmust-be-made-public
64
Janet Reitman, “Q&A: Senator Ron Wyden on NSA Surveillance and Government Transparency,” Rolling Stone,
August 15, 2013.

215

in June 2015. The FREEDOM Act still permits the NSA to hoover up large quantities of electronic
data.65
In the realm of electronic surveillance, the executive branch collaborated with a special
club of legislators to chip away at civil liberties. The story is similar in the development of physical
surveillance after 9/11, especially the terrorism watch lists and No-Fly lists that have constrained
the movement of thousands of citizens and non-citizens alike, often with no notice or opportunity
to challenge the designation.66 Although the Bush Administration needed no second invitation to
construct these programs, both the “Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities before
and after the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001” (conducted by the congressional
intelligence committees) and the 9/11 Commission (an independent, bipartisan panel created by
statute) recommended the creation and centralization of terrorism watch lists so that intelligence
agencies could better “connect the dots” to prevent future attacks.67 9/11, according to the
intelligence committee investigation, in particular, could have been prevented with more robust
interagency coordination. This was a powerful argument for centralized watch lists.
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Congress reshaped the criminal justice system after 9/11 in ways that endangered civil liberties.
The 2001 USA PATRIOT Act was a classic example of legislating under emergency conditions.
It became law on October 26, 2001, and, running to 132 pages with numerous alterations to the
U.S. criminal code, it pushed dissident legislators into a corner. They may have objected to the
bill’s most draconian provisions but feared the political cost of voting against the bill just over a
month after the worst terrorist attack in American history. The PATRIOT Act was essentially the
handiwork of Attorney General John Ashcroft, who sprung his bill upon Congress for an up-ordown vote that bypassed committee consideration. The entire legislative process surrounding the
PATRIOT Act was rushed, panicked, and executive-dominated, though the PATRIOT Act
amendments to FISA – alluded to in Chapter 5 – did contain sunset provisions.68
First Amendment scholars expressed alarm at how the PATRIOT Act expanded the legal
definition of “material support for terrorism” – a criminal offense.69 After the PATRIOT Act,
Section 2339b of the federal code defined “material support” as:
any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or monetary
instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert
advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identification,
communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives,
personnel… and transportation, except medicine or religious materials.70
The words “expert advice or assistance” were the key contributions of the PATRIOT Act, along
with heavier legal penalties. The remainder of the definition was created in 1996, through the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), which was passed by Congress a year to the
day after the Oklahoma City bombing. A U.S.-based non-profit – the Humanitarian Law Project
(HLP) – sought to enjoin the statute in 1998, suing the Justice Department on the grounds that
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“material support” was defined so broadly as to threaten nonviolent advocacy, including the legal
advice that HLP provided to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and the Kurdistan Workers
Party (“terrorist organizations,” according to the Secretary of State). After a “complicated 12 year
history,” the HLP litigation reached the Supreme Court in 2010, and, in Holder v. Humanitarian
Law Project, the Court ruled 6-3 in favor of the Justice Department.71
According to Chief Justice John Roberts, the material support statue rationally concluded
that almost every association with a “terrorist” group – even something as apparently mundane as
legal advice – was “fungible”: that is, without the need to pay for lawyers, the proscribed group
could redirect its resources to explosives. The consequence of this reasoning was that the
government could imprison someone under a counter-terrorism statute when they never came
anywhere near to committing or plotting an actual act of terrorism.72 It is not easy to quantify the
impact of Humanitarian Law Project. The danger seemed to lie less in the decision itself – which
did not send anyone to prison, only rejected a pre-enforcement challenge to the law – and more in
the logic of defining any association with “terrorists” as criminal. Empirically, we do know that,
as of 2021, 54% of the 972 people charged with terrorism offenses by the Department of Justice
since 9/11 have been accused of “material support.”73 We cannot assume that every “material
support” case is the type of scenario feared by the Humanitarian Law Project. However, cases such
as the 2008 “material support” conviction of the Holy Land Foundation – the largest Muslim
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charity in the United States, which was charged with funneling donations to Hamas “front groups”
– have fed accusations of a “New McCarthyism” under the guise of counter-terrorism.74
Unlike the PATRIOT Act, which expanded “material support for terrorism” prosecutions,
the 2002 Department of Homeland Security Act was not a typical emergency law. President Bush
unveiled his DHS proposal to Congress in June 2002, selling it as “the most significant
transformation of the U.S. government in over a half-century.” It would “transform” and “realign”
“the current confusing patchwork of government activities into a single department whose primary
mission is to protect our homeland.” Bush envisioned “a clear and efficient organizational structure
with four divisions”: “Border and Transportation Security,” “Emergency Preparedness and
Response,” “Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures,” and “Information
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection.” These “homeland” responsibilities that had been dispersed
among twenty-two federal agencies would now be consolidated.75
However, Bush came to this position belatedly and reluctantly. At first, he established, on
October 8, 2001, “within the Executive Office of the President an Office of Homeland Security…
to be headed by the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security.” This Office was responsible
for “develop[ing] and coordinat[ing] the implementation of a comprehensive national strategy to
secure the United States from terrorist threats or attacks.”76 On October 11, the chairman of the
Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Connecticut Democrat, Joseph Lieberman, expressed
his fear that Bush’s Office of Homeland Security lacked authority and resources. With
Pennsylvania Republican Arlen Specter, Lieberman introduced S.1534, which proposed a
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permanent, cabinet-level Secretary and Department of Homeland Security. The bill transferred to
the new Department
the authorities, functions, personnel, and assets of the Federal Emergency
Management Agency, the U.S. Customs Service, the Border Patrol of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service, the U.S. Coast Guard, the Critical
Infrastructure Assurance Office and the Institute of Information Infrastructure
Protection of the Department of Commerce, and the National Infrastructure
Protection Center and the National Domestic Preparedness Office of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation.77
“We need a robust, executive-level department to carry out the core functions of homeland defense,
which are prevention, protection and preparation,” Lieberman explained. “There is a need for
governmental structure in regard to homeland defense. That is the job of the Congress, and this
legislation provides that structure,” Specter added.78
Bush stood by his executive order, and his Assistant for Homeland Security, former
Pennsylvania Governor, Tom Ridge. As a member of the presidential staff, rather than a cabinet
appointee, Ridge was not subject to the usual oversight of a cabinet secretary, who is required to
regularly testify and report to Congress. For some legislators – especially Democrats – this
arrangement was troubling. In April 2002, West Virginia Democrat Robert Byrd, the chairman of
the Senate Appropriations Committee, chided Bush and Ridge for providing only informal
briefings rather than formal testimony on Ridge’s funding requests. When the administration
offered closed-door hearings as a compromise, Representative Dennis Kucinich (D-Ohio) stormed
out of the House Committee on Government Reform in protest. He and seven colleagues wrote to
the Republican committee chairman demanding a more public process.79
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The dispute was not just about oversight and control. Democratic legislators had wanted a
permanent, cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security before 9/11. Lieberman, in particular,
was enamored with the recommendations of the United States Commission on National Security
in the 21st Century, which was chartered by the Clinton Defense Department in 1998. This
Commission was co-chaired by former Democratic Senator Gary Hart and former Republican
Senator Warren Rudman. The “Hart-Rudman” Commission released its final report in February
2001, and it bluntly warned that “the combination of unconventional weapons proliferation with
the persistence of international terrorism will end the relative invulnerability of the U.S. homeland
to catastrophic attack.” Hart-Rudman concluded that “in the face of this threat, our nation has no
coherent or integrated governmental structures.” As a result, “we therefore recommend the
creation of an independent National Homeland Security Agency with responsibility for planning,
coordinating, and integrating various U.S. government activities involved in homeland security.”80
The Bush Administration was not enthusiastic about the Hart-Rudman recommendations.
From a post-Reagan Republican perspective, a big, new bureaucracy was instinctively
unappealing, betraying the promise of lean administration and small government. Privately,
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld also had doubts about the very concept of “Homeland
Security.” “The word homeland is a strange word,” he wrote to his deputy after the release of the
Hart-Rudman report. “Homeland Defense sounds more German than American. Also it smacks of
isolationism which I am uncomfortable with.”81
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What President Bush proposed – and eventually signed into law in November 2002 – was
not the product of executive branch crisis leadership. From a constitutional perspective, the
Department of Homeland Security Act was exemplary. Legislators and executive branch officials
negotiated and debated a major reform of the federal bureaucracy. Their blueprint was the most
extensive review of the national security state since 1947. Unlike the hurried and haphazard USA
PATRIOT Act, the Department of Homeland Security Act was patient, considered, and consistent
with how the legislative process is described in textbooks.
DHS has since become a major threat to civil liberties. It has presided over the deliberate
separation of immigrant families. It has subjected hunger strikers in its detention centers to forced
feeding. It has stalked undocumented immigrants outside courthouses. It has forced children to
appear before immigration courts without counsel. It has threatened immigration activists with
detention and deportation. And it has deputized state and local law enforcement officers in all these
abuses. At a more systematic level, backlogged immigration courts do not provide a serious
opportunity to fight deportation. Although this “deportation machine” is often criticized in moral,
rather than constitutional, terms, a constitutional argument can be made: the Fourteenth
Amendment grants non-citizens on U.S. soil the elementary civil liberties of due process, humane
treatment, and equal protection of the laws.82 These liberties have been violated by DHS since
9/11.83
The mere fact that the immigration bureaucracy was reorganized by the Department of
Homeland Security Act did not cause violations of civil liberties. Much of the statutory framework
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for mass deportations in the 21st Century was constructed prior to 9/11, particularly through the
1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, which created “expedited
removal” procedures outside the immigration courts and the 287(g) program encouraging
collaboration between federal immigration and local law enforcement agencies.84
However, the resources that Congress pumped into DHS after 9/11 were unprecedented.
The budget of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) was $6.2 billion in fiscal year
2002. The budget for DHS’s immigration enforcement agencies reached over double this figure in
the next four years, and further increased by 43 percent between 2006 and 2012. In a more direct
threat to civil liberties, Congress specifically incentivized the expansion of immigration detention,
providing for minimum numbers of detainee beds in its post-9/11 DHS appropriations bills.
Congress provided appropriations for 20,800 beds in fiscal year 2006, 33,400 in fiscal year 2009,
and 34,000 in fiscal year 2012. Congress was so aggressive in its support for immigration detention
after the rise of the Tea Party that President Obama’s Homeland Security Secretary asked for a
reduction in detention-specific appropriations for her own agency in fiscal year 2013.85
Congress also encouraged DHS to deepen its collaborations with local law enforcement
agencies. This process began just before the INS became Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE), with the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 requiring that “the
President shall develop and implement an interoperable electronic data system” sharing
information about “an alien’s admissibility to or deportability from the United States” across law
enforcement and immigration agencies. This “interoperability” requirement became the
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foundation for ICE’s “Secure Communities” program, which allowed local police forces to
automatically share fingerprints and booking information with the FBI whenever they arrested and
booked someone at a police station or jail – information that the FBI would automatically share
with ICE. While, on its face, Secure Communities appeared innocuous, it was not. As the Obama
Administration’s 2011 Task Force on Secure Communities documented in a study of 1,508 local
jurisdictions participating in the program, “Secure Communities has resulted in the arrest and
deportation of minor offenders and non-criminals,” and “disrupt[ed] police-community
relationships that are important to public safety and national security.”86
The ACLU provided a more pointed assessment in 2010, arguing that Secure Communities
deterred “immigrants – including lawful immigrants and permanent residents – from reporting
crimes, seeking protection from domestic violence, serving as witnesses in criminal prosecutions,
and receiving equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment,” enabled
“unlawful and extended detentions by local jails” that could hold a detainee for an extra 48 hours
upon request by ICE, and – because data was shared when someone was booked, not when they
were convicted of a crime – Secure Communities allowed “local law enforcement agencies to
arrest ‘foreign-looking’ individuals for minor infractions or for no reason at all, purely in order to
transmit their fingerprints to ICE and trigger their possible deportation.”87 Created in 2008, Secure
Communities was eventually terminated by the Obama Administration in 2014.
Congress built, sustained, and bolstered the post-9/11 deportation machine. Was this
machine the product of the War on Terror or of a broader upsurge in nativist politics? The answer
is both. As I will demonstrate further below, conservative legislators took an opportunity to
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demonize immigrants – hardly an unusual break from the patterns of U.S. history.88 On the other
hand, the architects of the Department of Homeland Security Act broke new ground by merging
immigration enforcement with counter-terrorism. Punitive immigration enforcement could thus
feed off a fresh national security rationale – a rationale that lawmakers explicitly invoked in their
early efforts to expand DHS funding and which was strengthened by the fact that the 9/11 hijackers
had slipped into the United States despite numerous problems with their visa applications.89 Just
as the flow of federal money and equipment to local police forces proved difficult to contain once
it was unleashed during the Vietnam War, the DHS deportation machine, once established, became
a permanent weapon for conservative forces in Congress, even as the strength of its original
national security rationale seemed to fade in the decades following 9/11. This dynamic was vividly
illustrated during the Obama presidency.
The text, history, and structure of the Constitution, as well as Supreme Court precedents,
unequivocally vest the power to make immigration policy in the hands of Congress, so, when
Obama entered office promising immigration reform, he needed congressional support.90 Even
when Democrats controlled both houses of Congress, he needed Republican support because of
the Senate filibuster. His proposals were not radical. He did not declare that no human is illegal,
nor did he propose sweeping programs of amnesty and citizenship. Instead he supported some
version of the DREAM Act, first proposed in 2001, which would have provided a path to
permanent residency for undocumented immigrants who entered the United States as minors.
President George W. Bush had supported similar measures, as did Senators Marco Rubio (RBrendan O’Connor, Blood Red Lines: How Nativism Fuels the Right (Chicago: Haymarket, 2021).
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Florida) and John McCain (R-Arizona). The DREAM Act would not have abolished ICE or DHS,
but it would have alleviated the threat of deportation for hundreds of thousands of people, sparing
them the painful experience of immigration detention and immigration courts, while lessening
pressure on both by reducing the number of people facing deportation. Overall, the DREAM Act
was promising for the civil liberties of undocumented immigrants.91
In 2010, the proposed DREAM Act, after passing the Democratic-controlled House, fell
five votes short of a filibuster-proof majority in the Senate, with five Democrats voting against the
bill, and three Republicans voting for it.92 After an influx of Tea Party Republicans in the 2010
midterms, the prospect of bipartisan immigration reform became increasingly remote. House
Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio) – who had a notoriously difficult time managing his antiimmigration Tea Party faction93 – eventually settled on what seemed like a politically workable
position: he would consider supporting immigration reform if President Obama first “earned the
trust” of Congress through vigorous immigration enforcement.94
Obama sought to earn this trust through accelerated deportations of felons and of people
who had only just arrived in the country. He hoped that this “felons, not families” approach would
get Republicans off his back, in the same way that Truman saw his loyalty program for federal
employees as a preemption of his adversaries in Congress. Both men were wrong, as the loyalty
program failed to placate the House Un-American Activities Committee, and the Obama
deportations failed to bring the Republicans around to immigration reform. Indeed, Obama got the
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worst of both worlds: in trying to earn Boehner’s trust, he lost the support of immigration activists,
who soon gave him the nickname, “Deporter-in-Chief.”95
Without any hope of legislation, Obama tried his hand at executive action through the
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) and Deferred Action for Parents of Americans
(DAPA) programs, which together promised to remove the threat of deportation from the lives of
nearly half the nation’s undocumented population. DACA, announced in 2012, was essentially an
executive repackaging of the DREAM Act, aimed at stabilizing the lives of people brought to the
United States as minors. DAPA, announced in 2014, recognized that millions of undocumented
immigrants have started families in the United States. The children have become citizens by
birthright, but the parents have remained deportable. DAPA sought to suspend this threat to family
unity.96
Both programs were constitutionally vulnerable. Obama never contested the “plenary
power” of Congress to make immigration policy. Rather, he argued that he was exercising
prosecutorial discretion. He could not realistically deport all 11-12 million “illegal” immigrants,
so he had the right and the duty to enforce the law flexibly. He was correct in arguing that other
presidents have repeatedly done the same thing, and we have seen in Chapter 3 how prosecutorial
discretion protected deportable immigrants during the First Red Scare. Obama was not providing
anything close to amnesty or citizenship-by-decree, as his harshest critics charged. But he was also
doing much more than deferring deportation. DACA and DAPA recipients could receive social
security numbers, work permits, and driver’s licenses. So long as they did not commit any serious
crimes, they could remain in the United States subject to renewing their DACA and DAPA status.
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No previous deferred action program affected anywhere near as many people. Could the president
decline to enforce legal sanctions on millions of people, and then provide those same people with
public benefits? What if this logic applied to the enforcement of tax law? Or health and safety
legislation? The President of the United States “faithfully executes” the law, he does not make it.
DACA and DAPA seemed to push this core principle to its outermost limits.97
The state of Texas launched legal challenges to DACA and DAPA. A Texas district court
declared that DAPA was unconstitutional, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district
court, and then, in 2016, following the death of Justice Antonin Scalia, the 8-member Supreme
Court divided 4-4. By default, a tie upheld the lower court decisions, and the DAPA program was
rendered null and void.98
DACA, on the other hand, was resilient. Somewhat surprisingly, a Trump-packed Supreme
Court prevented the Trump Administration from rescinding DACA in June 2020. Writing for a 54 Court, Chief Justice Roberts argued that Trump’s DHS Secretary violated the Administrative
Procedures Act by rescinding DACA without adequately considering the costs of doing so.99 This
ostensibly technical decision reflected a more fundamental political reality. DACA had already
been in effect for nearly a decade, and half a million people benefited from it. The institutions in
which these people worked, lived, and studied bombarded the Supreme Court with amicus briefs
defending DACA.100 Moreover, sealing DACA’s death warrant may not have been a politically
attractive proposition for Chief Justice Roberts. Thus, through some combination of strained
judicial reasoning and political calculation, DACA survived Trump. Obama, like Louis Post after
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the First World War, and Harry Truman after the Second World War, created facts on the ground
through executive action that proved difficult for his political enemies to reverse.
Nevertheless, in their fierce opposition to Obama’s executive actions, congressional
Republicans moved towards a position of outright hostility toward undocumented immigrants.
Party leaders in Congress, such as Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, did not immediately
embrace the anti-immigration rhetoric that would define the Trump years – instead they accused
Obama of abusing his office and of placing intolerable burdens on the state governments that
would have to provide services to DACA recipients.101
The lurch to the right was led by the House Freedom Caucus, which was created in January
2015, soon after South Carolina Representative Mick Mulvaney was defeated in his campaign for
chair of the Republican Study Committee (RSC) “amid allegations of interference by the GOP
leadership.”102 Frustrated with what they saw as a betrayal of Tea Party principles by Speaker John
Boehner, eight Republican representatives joined Mulvaney in creating the new Caucus: Scott
Garrett (R-New Jersey), Jim Jordan (R-Ohio), John Fleming (R-Louisiana), Matt Salmon (RArizona), Justin Amash (R-Michigan), Raúl Labrador (R-Idaho), Ron DeSantis (R-Florida), and
Mark Meadows (R-North Carolina). The Caucus never kept an official, public membership list,
but, by October 2015, the Pew Research Center managed to identify 36 members. Their voting
records placed them far to the right of the party median, and they were fresh-faced: “72% were
first elected in 2010 or later, compared with 54% of other House Republicans.”103
The Republicans held 247 of the 435 House seats in the 116th Congress. This amounted to
a 29 seat majority. So, if the Freedom Caucus could remain unified, it could block legislation. As
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Matthew Green recounts, “the first instance of Caucus policy success occurred on a border security
bill.” The bill was introduced by the Republican Chairman of the House Homeland Security
Committee in January 2015, and it promised to ramp up immigration enforcement on the Southern
border. House Democrats opposed the bill, but their opposition could have been defeated by a
party line vote. The Freedom Caucus had other ideas, sinking the bill because it did not promise
to overturn DACA and DAPA, and it contained no provisions for deporting undocumented
immigrants who were already in the United States.104 The Caucus repeated the trick the following
month, refusing to vote for a DHS appropriations bill if it did not include measures rolling back
DACA and DAPA. “GOP leaders would eventually pass another DHS funding bill,” Green writes,
“but the Freedom Caucus’s short-term policy victory had sent a strong signal that its members
were not afraid to vote against leadership-endorsed bills on the floor it deemed too moderate, and
it had the numbers to defeat them.”105
When it comes to legislation, the Freedom Caucus has not achieved much more than shortterm, symbolic victories. A “senior GOP aide” put it rather more bluntly in an off-the-record
comment to the Roll Call news service in February 2015: “They’re not legislators, they’re just
assholes.”106 Yet as we saw in Chapter 4, “assholes” can still have influence in Congress, even
without any legislative achievements, and the crucial influence of the Freedom Caucus was
moving the Republican Party in the direction of Trumpism – a central component of which is
animosity towards undocumented immigrants. Not all of this animosity has translated into assaults
on civil liberties. The big, beautiful, border wall, for instance, did not harass or terrorize
undocumented immigrants living in the United States. But the other Freedom Caucus plans –
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revoking DACA, expanding the narrow enforcement priorities of the Obama Administration (that
is, beyond felons and people who recently crossed the border), and reviving local police
collaboration with ICE – promised to overflow the immigration courts, swell ICE detention
facilities, and set ICE agents loose against immigrants who had established themselves in the
United States over many years and not committed any crimes (other than unlawfully crossing the
border).107
By 2016, the Republican Party had gone from seriously entertaining bipartisan immigration
reform to unfettered hostility towards undocumented immigrants. Joining the Freedom Caucus and
Candidate Trump were DHS employees themselves, who endorsed Trump’s presidential bid
through their unions. Trump earned the first endorsement that the ICE union had ever given, and
it was couched in no uncertain terms. The union praised Trump for promoting “core policies
needed to restore immigration security – including… increased interior enforcement and border
security, an end to Sanctuary Cities, an end to catch-and-release, mandatory detainers [which
would force local police to hold suspects for ICE], and the canceling of executive amnesty and
non-enforcement directives.”108
The border patrol union – the National Border Patrol Council (NBPC) – also broke with
tradition in endorsing Trump. “Unlike his opponents, Donald Trump is not a career politician, he
is an outsider who has created thousands of jobs, pledged to bring about aggressive pro-American
change, and who is completely independent of special interests,” the NBPC gushed. “The fact that
people are more upset about Mr. Trump’s tone than about the destruction wrought by open borders
tells us everything we need to know about the corruption in Washington.” Trump stood in stark
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contrast to “a young, articulate freshman senator who never created a job as an attorney and under
whose watch criminal cartels have been given the freest border reign ever known.”109
The ICE and CBP unions remained strong allies of Trump and of Republicans in Congress
throughout his presidency. After Trump lost the 2020 presidential election, both unions remained
loyal to their former commander-in-chief and far from enthusiastic about their new one. In
September 2021, the NBPC accused the Biden Administration of “dismantling effective measures
that deterred people from illegally entering the country” and of “shameless hypocrisy” for
criticizing agents who were filmed whipping Haitian migrants in Del Rio, Texas, on horseback.110
More concretely, in Trump’s lame-duck period, he struck an agreement with the ICE union that
required “prior affirmative consent” from the union for any policy changes that would affect ICE
agents. As an agency whistleblower put it, this agreement effectively gave the union
“unprecedented veto authority” over President Biden’s future ability to reshape the agency’s
policies and regulations.111
What began as a Tea Party-inspired congressional revolt against the Obama Administration
evolved into a political alliance between Trump Republicans and the ground troops of immigration
enforcement agencies. This alliance promoted attacks on the civil liberties of undocumented
immigrants before Trump became president, implemented many of these attacks when Trump was
president, and showed early signs of fighting to sustain these attacks after Trump was no longer
president. While it is easy to blame Trump for these developments, both the original Homeland
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Security Act and the subsequent expansion and emboldening of DHS clearly bear the imprint of
Congress.
Congress was also central to the militarization of American police forces after 9/11, though
partly through legislation passed prior to 9/11. After Michael Brown was shot, killed, and left in
the middle of the street by Ferguson, Missouri, police officer Darren Wilson in August 2014,
residents of the St. Louis suburb exercised their First Amendment right to protest police brutality.
As the Washington Post reported, the Ferguson police rolled up to the protests with “armored
vehicles, noise-based crowd-control devices, shotguns, M4 rifles like those used by forces in Iraq
and Afghanistan, rubber-coated pellets and tear gas.” Despite the police chief’s claim that “it’s not
military, it’s tactical operations,” the reports and images from Ferguson prompted an
unprecedented public debate about an obscure section of the National Defense Authorization Act
for 1997: “Section 1033.”112
Section 1033 gave the Secretary of Defense the authority to “transfer to Federal and State
agencies personal property of the Department of Defense, including small arms and ammunition”
that was “(A) suitable for use by the agencies in law enforcement activities, including counterdrug and counter-terrorism activities; and (B) excess to the needs of the Department of
Defense.”113 As the House National Security Committee that conceived the 1033 program in 1996
recounted, “Section 1208 of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1990 and
1991… established a one year program to provide excess personal property to law enforcement
agencies for use in drug enforcement activities,” and “this provision was extended until September
30, 1997 by section 1005 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991.”
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Because “this program appears to be beneficial to many law enforcement agencies, the committee
recommends that the program be made permanent and that it be expanded to include all law
enforcement activities with a priority for drug enforcement activities.” Along with “drug
enforcement,” the House Committee highlighted the need for greater local counter-terrorism
assistance following the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, and in response to the alleged global
proliferation of chemical and biological weapons after the fall of the Soviet Union.114
In the aftermath of Ferguson, President Obama created an interagency Law Enforcement
Equipment Working Group to review the 1033 program. This Working Group proceeded quickly,
and its recommendations were implemented by Obama in May 2015. Most impactfully, it
recommended the “Establishment of Federal Government‐wide Prohibited Equipment Lists,”
which would identify “categories of equipment that LEAs [Law Enforcement Administrations]
will not be able to acquire via transfer from Federal agencies or purchase using Federally‐provided
funds.” These included “Tracked Armored Vehicles, Bayonets, Grenade Launchers, Large Caliber
Weapons and Ammunition.” The Working Group also recommended the “Establishment of
Federal Government‐wide Controlled Equipment Lists,” which included categories of equipment
that “LEAs… may acquire if they provide additional information, certifications, and assurances.”
These included “Wheeled Armored or Tactical Vehicles, Specialized Firearms and Ammunition,
Explosives and Pyrotechnics, Riot Equipment.”115
Obama’s actions were a drop in the bucket. Under the 1033 program, between 2006 and
2014, “the Department of Defense transferred over $1.5 billion worth of equipment including over
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600 mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicles, 79,288 assault rifles, 205 grenade launchers,
11,959 bayonets, 50 airplanes, 422 helicopters, and $3.6 million worth of camouflage and other
‘deception equipment’” to state and local police forces.116 “Eighty percent of US counties received
transfers, and those transfers increased over time from 2006 to 2013 by 1414%.” 117 Jurisdictions
that received this equipment were more likely to experience police brutality than those that did
not.118 Moreover, between 2003 and 2009, Congress “appropriated over $29 billion for homeland
security assistance to states, specified urban areas and critical infrastructures (such as ports and
rail systems), the District of Columbia, and U.S. insular areas.” 61% of this funding was dedicated
to domestic counter-terrorism operations.119
Collectively, these federal programs turned American police forces into high-tech and
high-powered machines with ample capacity to curtail civil liberties. As we saw in Chapter 5,
Congress had already begun to increase the coercive capacity of local police forces through the
1968 Safe Streets Act. While this legislation enabled investments in helicopters, narcotics squads,
and riot gear, the 1033 program and the DHS counter-terrorism grants went further, providing
police forces with equipment that was designed for foreign wars. The accumulated consequences
of these programs were laid bare on the streets of Ferguson.
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Thus, even if Obama’s 1033 reforms were fully implemented, they would not have solved
the problem. Still, as with DACA and DAPA, congressional Republicans considered gutting the
reforms through legislation. Texas Representative John Ratcliffe and Pennsylvania Senator Pat
Toomey each proposed bills that would have bolstered the 1033 program. “After the riots in
Baltimore, Ferguson, and New York City where protesters torched police cars and hurled bricks,
cement blocks, and glass bottles at law enforcement, why would we make it harder to send riot
gear that would otherwise sit unused to unprotected police officers across the country?” Toomey
wrote in a letter to the president. “I would not want a police officer to respond to the recent gang
shoot-out at Waco, Texas – which killed nine and wounded 18 – without ready access to full
protective equipment, including, if needed, an armored vehicle.” He added: “armored vehicles
were essential in providing protection and transportation to law enforcement in the aftermath of
the Boston Marathon bombing.”120
Facing the inevitability of an Obama veto, and with the 2016 general election on the
horizon, neither the Ratcliffe nor the Toomey bill proceeded, and Obama’s 1033 reforms were
ultimately rescinded by President Trump in November 2017.121 Yet the reaction against the
reforms – as well as Obama’s wider efforts to regulate local policing through the Justice
Department122 – pushed the Republican Party down a similar road to the one they followed on
immigration. Trump, congressional Republicans, and the nation’s leading police unions unified
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against any attempts to regulate police conduct.123 This alliance was encapsulated on July 28, 2017,
when Trump suggested to an audience of police officers on Long Island that they should not be
“too nice” to the people whom they arrest. “When you guys put somebody in the car and you’re
protecting their head, you know, the way you put their hand over, like, don’t hit their head and
they’ve just killed somebody… you can take the hand away, okay?” – a remark met by applause
and laughter.124
The militarization of local police forces since 9/11 cannot be attributed to the transfer of
power from Congress to the executive, or to an abuse of executive discretion. Only Congress can
authorize federal government spending, and the accumulation of pre- and post-9/11 congressional
action has funneled such spending (and equipment) to local police forces – beginning in a less
militarized form during the Vietnam War and accelerating after 9/11. When the executive branch,
under President Obama, sought to temper these programs, Republican legislators defended them,
and unequivocally sided with the power of the police over the civil liberties of people targeted by
the police. This feature of Trumpism – like the attack on the civil liberties of undocumented
immigrants – originated in Republican legislative campaigns against the Obama Administration.
The War on Terror in Historical Perspective
How does the War on Terror stack up in comparative historical perspective? It did not produce
internment camps, martial law, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, a sedition act, or an
Un-American Activities Committee. This apparent improvement on past practices has led some
observers to conclude that the lessons of history have been learned – by policymakers, judges, or
even the general public. Jack Goldsmith and Cass Sunstein see evidence of an evolved legal
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culture, where what was once acceptable is now subject to review and debate.125 Eric Posner and
Adrian Vermuele see evidence of “Tyrannophobia,” where civil libertarians have irrationally
stoked fears of political repression.126 Geoffrey Stone concedes that “no cultural or legal change
is irrevocable,” but still concludes that “the cultural, political, and constitutional barriers the United
States has erected to protect antiwar speech from outright suppression are higher than they have
ever been.”127
Less cheerfully, Mark Tushnet suggests that “social learning” has made measures like mass
internment unlikely in the 21st Century United States, but Tushnet also observes the persistence of
other practices, especially restrictions on the civil liberties of non-citizens.128 Harsher critics of the
War on Terror question how much has really been learned, and whether civil liberties are any more
secure in 2021 than they were in 1921. The No Fly List, the NSA’s mass surveillance programs,
the USA PATRIOT Act, and the apparent interminability of the War on Terror are among the chief
concerns underscored by these scholars.129
The evidence from this chapter mostly supports the critics. Yet despite identifying
executive responsibility for restrictions on civil liberties throughout the War on Terror, and some
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signs of congressional impatience with the War on Terror (especially the USA FREEDOM Act
and the Torture Report), this chapter has shown how legislators have been central actors in every
War on Terror program: detention and interrogation, assassination, surveillance, expansive
“material support for terrorism” prosecutions, inhumane treatment of undocumented immigrants,
and police militarization.
Although 9/11 was not followed by an internal reorganization of Congress akin to the
entrenchment of HUAC after the Second World War or the establishment of the intelligence
committees after the Vietnam War, legislators went further after 9/11 in creating an entirely new
piece of the federal bureaucracy: the Department of Homeland Security. DHS has since
endangered civil liberties not because it transfers power from Congress to the executive, but
because it brings the War on Terror deep into American cities, neighborhoods, and towns – through
ICE and through “preparedness” grants.
In their relations with the executive branch since 9/11, legislators have also deployed the
power of the purse. Scholars who bemoan the growth of executive power have long complained
about the failure of Congress to exercise this power,130 but it was in full force to prevent President
Obama from closing Guantanamo. This creative use of the congressional purse strings reflects a
wider feature of the War on Terror: in what seems like an era of profound legislative dysfunction,
the imprint of Congress on civil liberties endures.
This imprint took on a familiar form when the Republican-controlled Congress tried to
strip the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over Guantanamo habeas petitions in September 2006.
After both the Civil War and the Second World War, legislators were also displeased by judicial
incursion into national security matters, and they responded with threats to the Supreme Court’s
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jurisdiction. The power to shape the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction lies with Congress.
During the War on Terror, legislators complemented this power with their subtler ability to
retroactively legalize possibly illegal conduct. When the FISA Amendments Act immunized
telecommunications companies from surveillance-related lawsuits, and when the Military
Commissions Act immunized torturers from lawsuits brought under the War Crimes Act, judicial
interference in the War on Terror was preemptively curbed. No court was formally targeted or
stripped of its jurisdiction, but retroactive immunity simply made sure that there would be no cases
on which to adjudicate.131
Republicans have controlled Congress for most of the post-9/11 era, and they have
generally curtailed civil liberties more aggressively than Democrats. By 2001, the gradual
realignment of conservative Southerners from the Democratic Party to the Republican Party was
almost complete. Thus, since 9/11, Republicans have been overwhelmingly conservative, and
Democrats have been overwhelmingly liberal. As a result, the post-9/11 Republicans, especially
since the election of President Obama, have come to resemble the conservative coalitions that
emerged in Congress after the World Wars, sustaining wartime restrictions on civil liberties in
pursuit of their political objectives.
Table 6.1: Congress and the War on Terror
Congressional Tools

Examples during the War on Terror

Powers over itself

Intelligence committee investigations of the 9/11 attacks

Powers over the executive

Power of the purse to keep Guantanamo open, creation of the
Department of Homeland Security, Senate torture investigation
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Powers over the judiciary

Habeas-stripping and immunity-for-torture provisions of the
2006 Military Commissions Act, retroactive immunity for
telecommunications companies in the 2008 FISA Amendments
Act

Powers over state and local Continuation of pre-9/11 Safe Streets Act grants, the 1033
government

program, DHS “preparedness” grants

Repressive legislation

“Material support” provision of the 2001 USA PATRIOT Act

Where the post-9/11 Republicans differ from earlier conservative coalitions is in their
apparent willingness to undermine not just civil liberties, but also other foundations of democracy,
especially the peaceful transfer of presidential power from one party to another. Although this antidemocratic shift seemed to be a feature of the Trump era, this chapter has traced its origins to the
War on Terror and to Congress.
What does this relatively recent history say about the future of civil liberties in the United
States? What does the longer history of war and civil liberties that has been analyzed throughout
these chapters say about crisis and post-crisis government in democracies? To what extent are the
processes revealed in these chapters distinctive to the United States? My final chapter considers
these questions.
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7. Conclusion
The history of civil liberties after major American wars is full of personal dramas, chaotic events,
political struggles, and contingencies. I have attempted to convey the richness and complexity of
this history while assessing an overarching debate about how national institutions – especially the
executive and the legislature – shape outcomes for civil liberties. This concluding chapter will
begin by distilling my core findings. Then, it will turn to their wider implications for current and
future research – on both the United States and constitutional democracies across the world.
Wartime restrictions on civil liberties often outlive their original justifications
The first question posed by this dissertation was: do wartime restrictions on civil liberties outlive
their original justifications? In each of my case studies, such restrictions have either lingered or
expanded: martial law after the Civil War, deportation legislation after the First World War, the
House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) after the Second World War, federal support
for more aggressive local policing after the Vietnam War, and mass surveillance, military
detention, and police militarization long after 9/11.
To be sure, many wartime restrictions on civil liberties have also been repealed either in
the latter stages of war or in its aftermath. Northerners were no longer subjected to martial law
after Robert E. Lee laid down his arms at Appomattox Courthouse, the Sedition Act expired at the
end of the First World War, internment camps were emptied before the end of the Second World
War, counter-intelligence programs were terminated before the end of the Vietnam War, and
indefinite military detention has gradually diminished as the War on Terror has dragged on. From
a normative standpoint, this picture is not necessarily a cause for pessimism. Permanent
curtailments of individual freedoms have not inevitably followed from major American wars.
Congress has played a crucial role in preserving wartime restrictions on civil liberties
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Still, in every case study, legislators have preserved some wartime restrictions on civil liberties.
After the Civil War, President Johnson fought against the continuation of martial law in the former
Confederacy, but congressional Republicans creatively circumvented the commander-in-chief by
allying themselves with the U.S. military. Just before the end of the First World War, Congress
passed the 1918 Immigration Act, and then, after the 1918 elections, Republican majorities in both
chambers goaded the attorney general into the infamous “Palmer Raids” and inspired the initiation
of “Little Red Scares,” especially in New York. At the end of the Second World War, Southern
Democrats and Republicans combined to entrench HUAC, and then launched a Second Red Scare
that made the first one look tame. Although the liberal Democrats who controlled Congress in the
aftermath of the Vietnam War condemned the wartime abuses of the nation’s intelligence agencies,
they did nothing to reverse the War on Crime that began with the 1968 Safe Streets Act.
Particularly after the 2010 midterm elections, Republican legislators obstructed the Obama
Administration’s modest attempts to rein in the War on Terror.
My primary goal has not been to pinpoint the motivations of these legislators. However,
the historical record illuminates some of their political objectives that have been served by
restrictions on civil liberties. Martial law, which significantly curtailed the rights to selfgovernment long enjoyed by white Southerners, aided the “Radical” (and less “Radical”)
Republicans in their attempts to rebuild the old Confederacy upon the foundation of the Fourteenth
Amendment: basic legal equality. The conservative clamor for deportations after the First World
War intended to intimidate left-wing political organizations and undermine Attorney General A.
Mitchell Palmer, who hoped to succeed Woodrow Wilson in the White House. HUAC gave
Republicans an opportunity to undermine the Truman Administration after the Second World War
and provided a platform for conservatives in both parties to reverse what they saw as the leftward
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shift of American society since the 1930s. The post-9/11 Republicans used the politics of
Guantanamo closure, immigration detention, and policing to obstruct and attack the Obama
Administration, while the Freedom Caucus faction within the Republican Party exploited its
leverage in the House of Representatives to move the party further down the path of Trumpism in
2015.
Conservatives and liberals both lent their support to the War on Crime during the Vietnam
War and, here, the question of motives is perhaps hardest to answer. Michelle Alexander’s The
New Jim Crow framed the War on Crime as a deliberate attempt by the white political elite to crush
rising black – and, perhaps, multiracial, working class – political assertiveness.1 James Forman,
Jr., and Michael Fortner have instead emphasized the real threat that violent crime posed to
communities of color, as well as white suburbanites. Hence, why black political and community
leaders endorsed tougher sentencing laws and increased resources for police forces.2 Forman and
Fortner largely agree with Alexander about the disastrous consequences of the War on Crime, but
their accounts trace this War to justifiable panic and fear, rather than racist political motives.
On the evidence presented in Chapter 5, elements of both accounts could be supported.
Southern Democrats were still a force to be reckoned with during the Vietnam War, and they
joined conservative Northern Republicans in framing violent crime as a black pathology that had
to be met with harsher policing. The 1966 D.C. crime bill was the product of this crude thinking,
which President Johnson and his liberal allies in Congress rejected. Nevertheless, Johnson
Democrats conceived what became the principal long-term threat to civil liberties emerging from
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the Vietnam War: federal subsidies for local policing. For Johnson, this solution had the virtue of
putting congressional conservatives on the back foot. For congressional liberals, this solution may
have seemed like the most humane and effective response to what they saw as a serious social
problem. It is possible to argue that these legislators helped create something that later took on a
life of its own.
Contrary to the conventional wisdom among comparative and American politics scholars,
legislators have endangered civil liberties through more than excessive delegation to the executive
branch, inadequate oversight, or persistent gridlock. These factors have been present in my case
studies: President Grant was delegated the extraordinary power to suspend the writ of habeas
corpus six years after the end of the Civil War, congressional oversight of the nation’s intelligence
agencies has been far from impressive, and the Tea Party and the Freedom Caucus honed the art
of gridlock to push their party down a slope of intolerance and anti-democratic conduct. But even
when these factors are present, they have not operated in the way that the literature suggests.
Legislators have not just failed to monitor the nation’s intelligence agencies, but they have actively
protected and defended these agencies, legalizing their conduct in the aftermath of the Vietnam
War and encouraging their mass surveillance practices during the War on Terror. Similarly,
legislative gridlock has not threatened civil liberties by empowering the presidency, but by
contributing to the far rightward shift of one of the nation’s two political parties.
Overall, legislative abdication only tells part of the story. From Reconstruction to the War
on Terror, legislators have restricted civil liberties through their distinctive powers over the
judiciary, their ability to create their own rules and committees, their numerous levers of influence
over the federal bureaucracy, their exclusive authority over federal funding for state and local
governments, and – still – their power to legislate.
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Conservative congressional coalitions do the most damage to civil liberties
The framers of the U.S. Constitution made Congress the most powerful branch of government, and
the formidable powers of Congress have given legislators the capacity to constrain civil liberties
after wartime. However, the case studies examined here suggest that conservative postwar
coalitions are especially likely to act on this capacity.
In the 1866 elections, Congress came under the control of a coalition that the sitting
president labelled “Radical.” The president and his allies regularly likened these “Radicals” to the
Jacobins of the French Revolution or the Cromwellians of the English Civil War – revolutionaries
who were willing to spill blood and persecute their enemies in a tumultuous crisis environment.
These charges were exaggerated. Even the most “Radical” of the postwar Republicans – such as
Pennsylvania Congressman Thaddeus Stevens – compromised on principles as fundamental as
black suffrage and civil rights. Far from overthrowing the existing Constitution, the “Radicals”
settled for constitutional amendments developed in negotiations with their “Moderate” colleagues.
Still, the declaration that everyone born on U.S. soil was a U.S. citizen, that the Bill of Rights
applied across the entire nation, and that non-citizens were also entitled to constitutional
protections was new and bold. The imposition of this declaration at the point of bayonet was also
a clear departure from the rights of self-rule that white Southerners had retained since the colonial
era. The “Radicals,” who only shaped the congressional agenda for a short period, were not the
bloodthirsty revolutionaries depicted by President Johnson or by apologists for the Confederacy,
but they were radical in their commitment to remaking American democracy in the aftermath of
war.
By contrast, the conservative legislative coalitions that emerged after the World Wars had
no interest in expanding civil liberties. They sustained wartime restrictions on civil liberties in
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order to strike back at what they claimed was a wartime drift toward socialism. In the process, they
curtailed free political association, violated basic due process rights, and shipped many of their
opponents out of the country altogether. As I noted in my introduction, it is not always easy to
measure the degree to which civil liberties are damaged in a given context. One summary arrest or
deportation may be more damaging than fifty if the target is a prominent journalist or political
leader; three or four invasive legislative investigations may ruin careers more effectively than a
hundred criminal prosecutions if they smear entire industries, unions, or activist groups. However,
the qualitative and quantitative evidence amassed in this dissertation strongly indicates that
conservative legislative coalitions have done the most damage to civil liberties in the aftermath of
major American wars. The post-9/11 Republicans are the latest manifestation of this recurrent
historical trend.
The post-Vietnam liberals have a mixed legacy for civil liberties. In Chapter 5, I was
harsher than most scholars in assessing this legacy: criticizing the achievements of the Church
Committee, emphasizing the legalization of electronic surveillance methods in the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act, and tracing the understudied emergence of the War on Crime to the
hands of liberal Vietnam-era legislators. On the other hand, when compared to the conservative
postwar coalitions examined in Chapters 3, 4, and 6, these liberals should be commended for what
they did not do. They never exploited the postwar moment to persecute their political enemies.
The executive branch has frequently protected civil liberties in the aftermath of war
The executive branch is obviously capable of doing serious harm to American civil liberties. The
short administration of Donald J. Trump was living proof of this danger, defined as it was by mass
deportations, state violence against demonstrators, and the forced separations of immigrant
families. While Trump was still in office, several commentators linked such abuses to some of the
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historical examples described in this dissertation, including the internment of Japanese-Americans
during the Second World War, the “Palmer Raids” after the First World War, and the unleashing
of the national security bureaucracy against the peace movement during the Vietnam War.3
However, in the aftermath of war, the executive branch has often displayed a capacity and
a willingness to fight for civil liberties. Assistant Labor Secretary Louis Post contained the
“Deportations Delirium” after the First World War, President Harry Truman obstructed the “Red
Scare” that followed the Second World War, Attorney General Elliot Richardson terminated
electronic surveillance programs in the latter years of the Vietnam War, and President Barack
Obama substantially reduced the population of the Guantanamo Bay detention facility. President
Andrew Johnson also fought hard for the civil liberties of ex-Confederates after the Civil War,
albeit with an unpleasant parallel aim of perpetuating the subjugation of African-Americans in the
former Confederacy.
I cannot say with certainty what motivated these executive officials. Obama wanted to fulfil
a campaign promise, Truman did not believe domestic Communism was a serious threat – and he
personally loathed the people who were making it seem so – and Johnson felt that Reconstruction
was unconstitutional. These three presidents seemed to act out of a combination of political,
principled, and pragmatic motives. It is surely no coincidence that each sought to defend their
political allies from a hostile Congress. Politics seemed less prominent in the thinking of Louis
Post and the executive officials who wound down the repressive programs of the Vietnam era.
Post, who was well into his twilight years and apparently happy with his far-from-glamorous title
of Assistant Labor Secretary, had no new ambitions to pursue or promises to fulfil. He simply
could not see the utility or the justice of adhering strictly to Congress’s agenda of political

I made one such comparison myself. See Harry Blain, “American Concentration Camps, Then and Now,” Foreign
Policy in Focus, July 1, 2019.
3
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deportations. In a similar vein, Elliot Richardson dutifully accepted the U.S. Supreme Court’s
invalidation of warrantless surveillance practices and ordered his colleagues in the National
Security Agency (NSA) to follow suit.
The judiciary matters at the margins
Although I have primarily compared the role of Congress and the executive in shaping postwar
restrictions on civil liberties, the Supreme Court has featured in each of my case studies. At times,
it has succumbed to legislative pressure, conceding to an attack on its jurisdiction during
Reconstruction and backing down in the face of threats to its jurisdiction in the latter years of the
Second Red Scare. At other times, the Court has been cut out of the picture more subtly, such as
through the retroactive immunity measures passed by Congress during the War on Terror or
through the use of deportation as a form of punishment during the First Red Scare. The judicial
branch was also coopted into the national security state through the creation of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court after the Vietnam War.
These examples might lead us to conclude – like many scholars of courts in times of crisis
– that the law falls silent when the state wants it to.4 Nevertheless, the preceding chapters also
point to several cases of the Supreme Court indirectly protecting civil liberties. Consider the 1972
Keith case, described in Chapter 5. “We do not attempt to detail the precise standards for domestic
security warrants,” the Court cautiously concluded. “We do hold, however, that prior judicial
approval is required for the type of domestic security surveillance involved in this case and that
such approval may be made in accordance with such reasonable standards as the Congress may
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prescribe.”5 This was a diplomatic way of saying: right now, what you are doing is probably illegal,
until you find a way of making it legal. For Attorney General Elliot Richardson, this judicial
challenge was enough to require the termination of the NSA’s Minaret surveillance program.
The ruling in the Keith case was directed at Congress as much as the executive, inviting
Congress to clarify what the law really said about domestic national security surveillance. The
eventual result was the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), which legalized such
surveillance so long as legislators (through the intelligence committees) and judges (through the
FISA court) had a role in authorizing it. The Supreme Court invited congressional intervention
more explicitly in its Guantanamo cases, especially Hamdan v. Rumsfeld in 2006. Hamdan told
the Bush Administration that it could not run the Guantanamo legal regime unilaterally. Congress
had to specifically sanction it. The Court thus put Guantanamo in jeopardy without taking the step
of explicitly invalidating indefinite military detention – a clever balancing act that recognized the
Court’s inability to enforce its own decisions. As we saw in Chapter 6, however, after Congress
was given this window of opportunity to oppose Guantanamo, it instead entrenched it through the
2006 Military Commissions Act.
In other cases, the Court made firmer statements in support of civil liberties, but only when
the programs that restricted those liberties were already fading away. We saw in Chapter 4 how
the Warren Court started criticizing HUAC in 1957. At that point, HUAC had been harassing
accused Communists for well over a decade as a standing committee of Congress, and for nearly
two decades if we include its life as a special committee from 1938-1945. All the same – and
despite a retreat from “Communist” cases in response to congressional pressure – the Court never
overruled its decisions that belatedly questioned the Red Scare. Their core principles thus endured.
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Of particular importance was the Court’s clear statement in Watkins v. United States: “there is no
congressional power to expose for the sake of exposure.”6 This statement has since been cited in
every major case involving the scope of Congress’s subpoena and contempt powers.7 Another
HUAC is not impossible, but Watkins arguably says that another HUAC is unconstitutional. This
is positive for civil liberties.
I did not analyze the Pentagon Papers case – when the nation’s newspapers overcame the
Nixon Administration’s attempts at censorship in 1971 – in Chapter 5, but it is another example of
the Court acting better late than never. Thanks in part to Seven Spielberg, Tom Hanks, and Meryl
Streep, this case is often remembered as a triumph of judicial independence and press freedom. 8
But the Supreme Court’s decision to side with the press against Nixon was also simply a practical
recognition that the Pentagon Papers were already public – not just snippets in newspapers, but the
entire collection, which had been read into the Congressional Record by Alaska Democratic
Senator Mike Gravel.9 Justice Hugo Black’s famous concurrence in the Pentagon Papers case
mattered more because of its ringing rhetorical tribute to press freedom rather than its immediate
impact on the controversy at hand.10
Finally, we saw in Chapter 2 how the 1866 Ex parte Milligan decision prohibiting the
imposition of martial law when the civilian courts are open was functionally irrelevant at the time
because Congress had determined that a legal state of war still existed in the former Confederacy.

6

Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 200 (1957).
See, most recently, Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 591 U.S. ___ (2020).
8
Steven Spielberg, The Post (20th Century Fox, 2017).
9
John Nichols, “Mike Gravel Told Americans What Was Being Done in Their Name but Without Their Consent,”
The Nation, June 28, 2021.
10
Black wrote: “In the First Amendment, the Founding Fathers gave the free press the protection it must have to
fulfill its essential role in our democracy. The press was to serve the governed, not the governors. The Government's
power to censor the press was abolished so that the press would remain forever free to censure the Government. The
press was protected so that it could bare the secrets of government and inform the people. Only a free and
unrestrained press can effectively expose deception in government.” New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S.
713, 717 (1971) (Black, J., concurring).
7

251

Yet Milligan’s overarching message – “The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers
and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of
men, at all times, and under all circumstances”11 – has been frequently cited in modern cases
concerning civil liberties during times of crisis, including, most recently, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, and Boumediene v. Bush.12
The bottom line on the judiciary is: even when the Supreme Court is slow to speak on civil
liberties controversies, its voice can still have an impact on future generations – and future courts.
At first glance, the slow, ponderous, and hesitant Court may appear useless to advocates of civil
liberties.13 Yet, when we acknowledge the constraints that the Court faces as the weakest branch
of government, its record looks more promising. If civil libertarians expect judges to step in and
save the day in real-time, they are likely to be disappointed. If civil libertarians expect judges to
create uncertainty for government policies that may violate the Constitution (as in the Keith case),
open up opportunities for the elected branches to act (as in Hamdan), or emphatically denounce
declining and extinct governmental abuses (as in Watkins and Milligan), they could yet find the
courts useful.
Further questions
The framers of the U.S. Constitution made Congress the strongest branch of government.
Intuitively, they also thought it was the most dangerous branch of government. They may not have
had specific dangers to civil liberties in mind, but they correctly anticipated that the branch of
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government blessed with such a wide variety of powers – over itself, over the executive, over the
judiciary, over lawmaking – could abuse these powers.
My analysis strongly suggests that – even if executive power enjoys a brief and partial
boost during wartime – the basic constitutional design of congressional supremacy returns in the
aftermath of war, or perhaps even earlier. Perhaps, in some wars, congressional supremacy barely
recedes at all. HUAC was a nuisance for the Roosevelt Administration during the Second World
War, Southern Democrats pressured the Johnson Administration into tougher crime policies during
the Vietnam War, and conservative legislators overruled vetoes of harsh immigration legislation
by the Wilson Administration during the First World War. Either way, the chapters of this
dissertation strongly suggest that the formidable powers granted to Congress by the Constitution
have been central to postwar restrictions on civil liberties.
Given the lack of scholarship on how legislators can endanger civil liberties, this
conclusion is a valuable one. But it still begs further questions. Does Congress endanger civil
liberties because it reflects intolerant and repressive public opinion? In some cases, the answer
seems to be yes. Early opinion polls, election returns, and the energetic activities of private
citizens’ organizations seem to reflect some popular will for the Red Scares that followed the
World Wars. In eras of more sophisticated public opinion measurement – especially the War on
Terror – there is also evidence of public support for violations of civil liberties.14
Yet, as John Mueller notes in a recent study of the War on Terror, it remains difficult to
determine whether – or in what way – public opinion is manipulated by elites or driving elite
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behavior.15 Furthermore, this dissertation has provided historical evidence of legislators advancing
intolerant policies that are relatively unpopular. In 2008, voters supported a presidential candidate
who promised to close Guantanamo (though he was elected for many other reasons), and
legislators thwarted him. More consistently, the Southern Democrats were powerful and persistent
advocates of repressive legislation in Congress – after both World Wars – and they represented
not only a tiny proportion of the nation, but also a tiny proportion of their grossly malapportioned
or otherwise democratically deficient states and districts. Arguably, the post-9/11 Republicans –
who share an unenviable record on civil liberties – have also benefited from the countermajoritarian quirks of the U.S. Congress, such as the Senate filibuster. In short, I would hesitate to
accept the notion that Congress is a threat to civil liberties because it reflects a “tyranny of the
majority” – at least of a national majority. If anything, it is a threat because it enables a tyranny of
the conservative legislator who happens to find himself (and it is usually a “he”) in a branch of
government that is richly endowed with institutional powers.
Why have some American wars produced this tyranny of the conservative legislator, while
others have produced either liberal coalitions, or, in the case of the Civil War, a coalition
committed to the expansion of democratic rights and liberties? Part of the answer could involve
another inheritance of the Constitution’s framers: U.S. election cycles. The United States has never
broken its constitutionally prescribed regime of House elections every two years, presidential
elections every four years, and Senate elections every six years. This regime allows for divided
government and for regular plebiscites on incumbent presidents. Voters thus had an early
opportunity to punish Andrew Johnson after the Civil War, and they took it by electing “Radical”
Republicans to Congress. Voters ran out of patience with lingering wartime inflation and price
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controls in 1918 and 1946, and they took out their frustration on liberal Democratic presidents by
electing conservative Republicans to Congress. The public punished Nixon by voting Democrat in
1974, and punished Obama by voting Republican in 2010 – although 2010, in particular, was much
more connected with the Wall Street bailout and healthcare reform than wartime policy. In any
case, it is tempting to conclude that liberal or “Radical” postwar legislative coalitions emerged in
1866 and 1974 because the president was conservative, and that conservative coalitions emerged
in 1918, 1946, and 2010 because the president was liberal.
It is also possible that different types of wars generated the conditions for different postwar
legislative coalitions. The Civil War began as a war to preserve the Union, but, as slaves fled
behind Union lines, and as Lincoln recognized the military value of emancipation, it became a war
to preserve the Union by abolishing slavery. This was unavoidably radical, destroying the
foundation of Southern plantation society, and carrying out the largest expropriation of private
property in U.S. and, possibly, world history. No wonder such a titanic struggle brought such a
radical political movement in its aftermath – a radicalism made more possible by the temporary
exclusion of the country’s most conservative region from the national legislature.
The World Wars, on the other hand, brought social unrest, racial conflict, and economic
disruption to the United States without setting in motion revolutionary processes on anywhere near
the scale of emancipation. Therefore, the 1918 and 1946 elections were business-as-usual: the
Republicans ran against price controls, phantom socialists, and unruly labor unions. Voters, fed up
with the inconveniences and sacrifices of wartime, were receptive to the message. Richard Nixon’s
triumph in 1968 could be framed in similar terms, although his promise of “peace with honor”
involved intensified bombing in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. The war in Vietnam ended without
much revolutionary fervor in the United States, and so the post-Vietnam liberals were only a
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friendlier version of the post-World War I and II conservatives, running on their usual promises
and producing the kinds of tepid post-crisis reforms that Democrats replicated after their post-Iraq
War, post-Wall Street crash, electoral triumph in 2008. In short, the Civil War is by far the most
destructive and destabilizing war examined in this dissertation. It is no surprise that this was the
only war to produce anything resembling a radical or revolutionary legislative coalition.
How well do my conclusions travel, especially my primary conclusion about the decisive
role of legislators in curtailing civil liberties? This could be a distinctive product of the U.S.
Constitution, which provides for a much stronger legislature and much weaker executive than most
presidential systems. The president has no formal power to propose legislation or compel the
legislature to consider it. The president cannot dissolve the legislature, although he can technically
adjourn it if the House and Senate cannot agree on the timing of their own adjournment. 16 The
president has no formal role in the constitutional amendment process, while Congress is central to
it. “If we consider an index of executive lawmaking power from a set of seven legislating powers,”
Zachary Elkins writes, “the US president appears utterly powerless.”17 Although public officials
are fond of referring to three “coequal” branches of government, the U.S. Constitution clearly
seems to say that Congress is more equal than the others.
To be sure, the U.S. executive can compensate for its relatively modest constitutional
powers through effective party leadership, expertise and control over information, unilateral
executive orders, direct access to the media and direct communication with citizens, and by
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squeezing the best leverage out of what the Constitution does provide, such as the veto, which is a
bargaining chip as much as a roadblock.18 But these extra-constitutional strategies still often flail
in the face of Congress, as the various difficulties of postwar presidents have demonstrated
throughout this dissertation.
In this context, legislators have had the capacity to curtail civil liberties in the aftermath of
war. This capacity may exist in other democracies with strong legislatures, such as the United
Kingdom. Parliament’s 1911 Official Secrets Act, 1914 Defense of the Realm Act, 1939
Emergency Powers (Defense) Act, 1974 Prevention of Terrorism Act (and its successors), and the
2000 Terrorism Act have not been friendly to “ancient” British liberties, including freedom of the
press, privacy, and due process.19 Despite the creation of a UK Supreme Court in 2009, the
devolution of power to the Scottish Parliament and the Northern Irish and Welsh Assemblies in
1998, and the incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights into British law through
the 1998 Human Rights Act, Parliament enjoys almost unchecked authority in the British
constitutional system.20 Unsurprisingly, it has often abused this authority.
In democracies with weaker legislatures, the executive branch may be the primary danger
to civil liberties. The French Constitution, for instance, grants the president far-reaching
emergency powers, as does the continually valid 1955 emergency law that predates the Fifth
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Republic. Such powers were deployed in the aftermath of violent Islamist attacks across Paris in
November 2015, particularly “administrative control measures” that allowed the Interior Secretary
to carry out searches, seizures, or closures of private residences without judicial approval. From
November 2015 to November 2017, 4,469 homes were searched under this authority and nineteen
mosques were forcibly closed.21 President Chirac also invoked emergency powers in response to
the November 2005 Paris riots, giving police the power to impose curfews, conduct warrantless
searches, close public meeting places, and place residents under house arrest.22
Comparative scholars of democratic backsliding have assessed the relationship between
the relative strength of legislatures and executives and the strength of democracy. In a recent
comparative study of sixteen cases of backsliding (including the United States), Stephan Haggard
and Robert Kaufmann conclude that “weaker legislatures” have resulted in “weaker
democracies.”23 Other comparative democratization scholars have agreed with this assessment.24
However, comparative studies of the relationship between legislative strength and civil liberties
might yield different results because civil liberties can be curtailed without democratic backsliding
occurring. Civil liberties can also be curtailed in ways that large comparative databases do not
observe, so future quantitative studies in this area may encounter serious hurdles. The qualitative
historical methodology applied in this dissertation could be more capable of capturing varying
outcomes for civil liberties in constitutional democracies. A key challenge here would be
developing a viable sample of cases: identifying, for instance, democracies with legislatures of
varying strength, varieties of presidential and parliamentary systems, and varying economic
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circumstances that experience similar outcomes for civil liberties in the aftermath of war; or
democracies that are similar in these variables but experience differing outcomes.
Future research could also consider why different wars produce different postwar political
coalitions. Isser Woloch’s recent study of “progressive forces in Britain, France, and the United
States after World War II” locates potential answers to this question in the prewar and wartime
development of national political parties. While the British Labour Party and the British labour
movement became one and the same before the Second World War, the U.S. Democratic Party
and the U.S. labor movement remained separate. This left American progressives open to attacks
from the right in the aftermath of the war. The French left, meanwhile, suffered from its
longstanding divisions in the “postwar moment,” enabling the exclusion of Communists from
government and the triumph of the “Third Force” centrist alliance in May 1947.25
Comparative studies like Woloch’s of how multiple democracies experience the same war
could be supplemented with studies of how democracies experience wars over time. In this
dissertation, I have documented varying patterns of postwar American politics, with
conservativism rising in some cases but not in others. Do some democracies experience relatively
consistent patterns of postwar politics? If so, why? Why might some democracies, like the United
States, experience variation? Future scholarship can take up these questions and begin to reveal
the combination of economic, social, and political forces that determine who governs democracies
in the aftermath of war.
Finally, future comparative studies could seek to explain differing outcomes for civil
liberties in the aftermath of non-war crises, such as pandemics and economic depressions. Some
scholars, such as Erwin Chemerinsky and Michele Goodwin, argue that “there is every reason to
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fear that the [COVID-19] pandemic could be used as a justification for a massive deprivation of
rights and abuses,” across the world. They alarmingly describe how “in Hungary, the prime
minister used COVID-19 as the basis for greatly increasing his powers,” how “in the Philippines…
President Rodrigo Duterte threatened to order the police and military to ‘shoot them dead’ when
he referred to those who protested the lack of food, which violated coronavirus-related
lockdowns,” how “Bolivia cancelled its elections, and countries like Thailand and Jordan used
their COVID-19 lockdowns to greatly restrict freedom of speech.”26
The conclusions of this dissertation would hint at a less fearful outlook. Expansions of
executive power in response to national crises do not necessarily pose long-term threats to civil
liberties, at least in democracies with relatively strong legislatures. Indeed, in democracies with
strong legislatures, danger could stem from the emergence or the entrenchment of conservative
legislative coalitions eager to roll back social reforms, rather than from emergency executive
powers. Despite Chemerinsky and Goodwin’s attempts to apply “the lessons of history” to
COVID-19, neither they nor many other scholars have sought to compare or explain cross-national
outcomes for civil liberties after earlier pandemics, such as the 1918-1920 “Spanish Flu.”27
Nevertheless, the idea of broadening the study of war and civil liberties to the study of civil liberties
and other forms of “crisis government” can be traced back to Clinton Rossiter’s classic 1948 study
of “constitutional dictatorship.” Just as Rossiter sought to explain differing constitutional
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responses to the major non-war crisis of his time – the Great Depression28 – future scholarship
could conduct similar inquiries into the comparative constitutional consequences of COVID-19.
This dissertation has focused on how American national institutions shape civil liberties in
the aftermath of American wars. Above all, it has argued that one of these institutions – the
Congress – has received inadequate scrutiny in the existing literature. National institutions have
always been pushed and pulled by deeper social forces, from the scruffy burglar-activists who
exposed COINTELPRO to the renowned lawyers who condemned the Palmer Raids. The struggle
for civil liberties in the United States has never been confined to Senate hearing rooms, federal
courts, or the Oval Office. But decisions made in these places will always affect the core rights
and liberties that underpin democracy. The need to understand them will only grow in the future.
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